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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations
During the last decade, internet activities have become an important part of many
people’s lives. As the number of these activities increases, there is a growing amount
of personal information about the users that is stored in electronic form and that is
usually transferred using public electronic means. This makes it feasible, and often
easy, to collect, transfer and process a huge amount of information about a person. As
a consequence, the need for mechanisms to protect such information is compelling.
This motivated research on information hiding, i.e., the problem of preventing
secrets from being learnt by an adversary. The term information-hiding does not have
a precise connotation in literature: we use it in a general sense, to represent a class
of problems that can be modeled in the same way by the approaches proposed in this
thesis. Two prominent research areas that we intend to address, in particular, are:
• information flow, which studies the leakage of classified information via public
outputs in programs and systems, and
• anonymity protocols, which aim at guaranteeing the anonymity of the users, so
that an adversary cannot discover the identity of a user performing a specific
action.
Even if these problems have different security concerns, we will see that they can
be appropriately modeled in a common framework as information-hiding systems,
whose security strength (and hence vulnerability) can be defined and measured in the
same way.
To this purpose, it is crucial to rely on quantitative approaches which allow one
to assess how much a given information-hiding system can be trusted and to give a
relative scale on which different security systems can be compared.
Classifying the sensitivity of data is actually at the essence of information-flow
security, which precisely aims at distinguishing the different levels of security held
by system components and to adapt the behaviour of the protocol to these degrees.
The importance of identifying and protecting sensitive information regularly hits the
headlines whenever some big data theft is achieved by hackers, such as more than 40
million credit and debit card numbers stolen in the United States in 2008 [oJ08]. The
classifications of objects and messages according to their sensitivity has proven to be
1
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able to provide key solutions to such security threats in today’s current applications. A
web-scripting language enforcing information-flow policies was for instance designed
in 2005 to secure the interfacing with databases in online information systems [LZ05].
This work was based on previous type systems such as Jif [Mye99] (which extends
Java) and FlowCaml [SR03] (which extends Caml), both already used in practice to
disallow information flow from high to low security levels in sensitive systems.
More recently, the system SABRE (Security Architecture for BRowser Exten-
sions) was developed to analyze JavaScript-based browser extensions (JSEs) by track-
ing in-browser information flow [DG09]. JSEs are widely used today to enhance the
look and feel of common web browsers, which usually have to execute them in priv-
ileged mode to allow their full functionality. Malicious JSEs represent however a
considerable threat that may, without specific protection, greatly compromise the se-
curity of the system. Systems such as SABRE allow in such cases to benefit from
functional JSEs while detecting their potential information flow violations.
In 2007, a dynamic analysis system based on information-flow analysis was also
specifically developed to detect spyware, i.e., malicious code installed surreptitiously
on a computer, which tracks and reports back specific actions of the machine’s user
[EKK+07]. By analyzing the flow of sensitive information processed by the web
browser, this tool was able to classify unknown components as benign programs or
spyware and provide comprehensive reports on their behavior. The same year, the sys-
tem Panorama [YSE+07] was proposed, to detect and analyze malware in a broader
context (e.g., keyloggers, password thieves, network sniffers, stealth backdoors, spy-
ware and rootkits) by capturing their typical information access and processing be-
havior. As a case study, Panorama could detect that even Google Desktop, a popular
local file system search tool, may send back sensitive information to remote servers in
certain settings.
On the other hand, an increasing number of applications are today more concerned
about obfuscating the actual identity of the sender (and/or receiver) of a message than
hiding the transmitted information itself. This situation corresponds to anonymity
protocols which constitute the second main instance of information-hiding systems
we will consider in this thesis. Recently, the demand for anonymity has particularly
grown, followed by the development of various anonymization strategies and tools.
In the following, we give a few concrete examples which reflect this evolution and
justify our motivation for giving in this thesis a particular importance to anonymity
systems. Not surprisingly, good as well as bad purposes motivate the need for ano-
nymity. On the one hand, malicious users such as criminals or terrorists may com-
municate anonymously to prevent law-enforcement bodies from identifying them. On
the other hand, anonymity may also be used to counter government censorship which,
over the internet, can easily be achieved on a large scale by restricting or blocking
transmissions from and/or to specific IP addresses. In countries controlled by repres-
sive governments, enforcement of anonymity allows users to communicate freely with
the rest of the world. Recently, the 2006 OpenNet Initiative [ONI], a research project
conducted by the universities of Harvard, Cambridge, Oxford and Toronto, studied
government censorship in 46 countries and concluded that 25 of them filtered to some
extent communications concerning e.g., political or religious positions. People may
also anonymously denounce abuse from their employers or report crimes without fear
of retaliation. Anonymous tips are widely used nowadays as a source of information
by newspapers, and many countries even have laws protecting the anonymity of a
person giving tips to a newspapers. Furthermore, legal protections also exist in most
countries for the anonymity in communication with priests, doctors, etc. Anonymity
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may also increase the objectivity of a message, since the receiver cannot based her
interpretation on properties of the sender such as her age, sex or nationality. Relieved
from the fear of being identified, an individual may also dare to speak more freely
about private problems and find medical or psychological support to solve them. A
research showed indeed that, as expected, anonymous participants disclose signifi-
cantly more information about themselves that non-anonymous users [Joi01].
Pseudonymity is a variant of anonymity, in which the true identity to be hidden
is replaced by another one. This strategy may be preferred to perfect anonymity, for
instance when two pseudonyms wish to communicate with each others repeatedly
and/or for a long time without revealing their true identity, or when a pseudonym
sends several messages whose common origin is not part of the secret information.
On the other hand, the security provided by pseudonymity is usually weaker than ano-
nymity, since aggregation of information about the same pseudonym from different
sources may reveal part of its identity. Pseudonymity is particularly relevant in social
networks such as Facebook [Fac] or Twitter [Twi], which are becoming world-wide
social phenomena today. Each user, or avatar, is characterized by her pseudonym and
profile, the set of information she is willing to share with the other members of the
online community she belongs to. The privacy and anonymity of social networks were
recently analyzed [NS09], which revealed that the information one may learn (even
with very little or no effort) on the true identity of a user can significantly exceed the
profiled data: one third of the users who could be verified to have accounts on both
Twitter and Flickr [Fli] could be re-identified in the anonymous Twitter graph with
only a 12% error rate.
In general, the main issue which limits network anonymity is the need to include
in every transmitted message the accurate destination address (so that it can be routed
to the expected receivers) as well as truthful source information to achieve reliability.
In practice, for internet communication, this data is encoded in the IP address of a
node, which represents the address of its computer and thus specifies the locations of
the source in the topology of the network. This IP number is usually logged along
with the host name (logical name of the source). Even when the users connect to the
internet with a temporary IP number assigned to them for a single session only, these
temporary numbers are also in general logged by the ISP (Internet Service Provider),
which makes it possible, with the ISP’s complicity, to know who used a certain IP
number at a certain time. The anonymity tools currently available aim therefore at
preventing the observers of an online communication from seeing the IP address of
the participants. Most applications rely on proxies, i.e., intermediary computers to
which messages are forwarded and which appear then as senders of the communica-
tion, thus hiding the original initiator. While a proxy server is today easy to implement
and maintain, single-hop architectures, in which all users enter and leave through the
same proxy, create a single point of failure which can soon significantly threaten the
security of the network. Multi-hop architectures have therefore been developed to
increase the security of the system. In daisy-chaining anonymization for instance, a
user’s traffic hops deliberately via a series of participating nodes (changed for every
new communication) before reaching the intended receiver, which prevents any sin-
gle entity from identifying the user. Anonymouse [Ans], FilterSneak [Fil] and Prox-
ify [Pro] are famous free web based proxies, while Anonymizer [Ane] is currently one
of the leading commercial solution.
Unfortunately, adding an anonymity layer to network communication is usually
achieved at the cost of a decrease in performance. Today, the trade-off between ano-
nymity and performance requirements in real-life large networks is an active field of
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research, which has to be scaled on a case-by-case basis. Anonymous email services
for instance have usually strong requirements on anonymity, but few or no constraints
on performance. On the other hand, an online streaming video application may select
in priority a path of participants through the network that maximizes bandwidth and
minimizes jitter, even if a lower degree of anonymity results and has consequently to
be tolerated.
Anonymity plays also a key role in electronic voting. The Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project (VTP) [VTP] was established in 2000 to “prevent a recurrence
of the problems that threatened the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election” and is still ac-
tively developing better voting technologies, improving election administration and
deepening scientific research in this area. The last decade has namely seen a signifi-
cant move to e-voting systems in some countries such as the United States. Besides
standard rules that have to be satisfied by any paper-based voting system, e-voting
has to meet specific requirements before the trio key goals of anonymity, auditabil-
ity and integrity are achieved. Existing solutions were recently reviewed and their
flaws analyzed in [Ren09], which led the authors to the development of HandiVote, a
new simple, anonymous, and auditable electronic voting which outperforms the limi-
tations of previous systems. One of its main advantages is the possibility for the users
to vote by mobile phones or even old-fashioned landline telephones, thus considerably
extending the portion of the population which may take part to democratic votes.
Another application which has gained an increasing interest in the last decades is
biometric access control. The European Biometrics Forum (EBF) [EBF] is an inde-
pendent European organisation supported by the European Commission, which was
created in 2003 to promote biometrics towards the Policy, Public, Industry and Re-
search audiences. The consortium focuses on the two main functionalities of biomet-
rics today: on the one hand, identifying biometrics aims at establishing or verifying
the user’s true identity and is used, e.g., in border or airport controls. On the other
hand, anonymous biometrics is used when reliable authentication is required but the
user’s identity may have to be kept secret. Recently, a new Anonymous Biometric
Access Control (ABAC) was for instance proposed, which verifies membership of
a user without knowing her true identity [YLZC09]. This system was validated on
iris biometrics experiments, illustrating a practical implementation of an anonymous
biometric system.
We believe that our framework is general enough to be applicable to a wide spec-
trum of security systems in use today, which actually tend to increasingly require both
information protection and anonymity enhancing technologies.
These concerns are not new, and we will see in the next section the various ex-
isting research that has been performed in the field of information-flow security and
anonymity, in Section 1.2.1 and Section 1.2.2 respectively.
1.2 Related Work
1.2.1 Information Flow
1.2.1.1 Qualitative Information Flow
Multilevel Security Systems In 1976, Bell and La Padula introduced a security
formalism called multilevel security systems, in which all components of a security
system were classified into subjects and objects [BLP76]. Objects consisted of pas-
sive entities such as files, while subjects were active components such as users or
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processes. Processes were further divided into trusted and untrusted entities. In this
context, the security policy of the system consisted on a set of rules applied to un-
trusted subjects, where these latter had to follow the “read down and write up” condi-
tion, i.e., untrusted processes were only allowed to read from objects of lower or equal
security level and to write to objects of greater or equal security level.
This model was further developed to represent discrete event systems in which
information was typically classified into different security levels. In these models, all
the sensitive information contained in a process entered in the form of discrete inputs
labeled with a security level indicating their sensitivity, and left the process in the
form of labeled outputs. An event consisted of an input or an output, and the view of
a security level l corresponded to the events labeled with a level less or equal than l.
All other events were said to be hidden from l. In this formalism, a trace represented
a temporally ordered series of events that corresponded to one possible execution of
the system.
Usually, only two different security levels were distinguished: low information
corresponded to public, observable data, while high information represented sensi-
tive data that had to be kept secret from observers. The goal of secure information
flow analysis was then to prevent programs from leaking their high inputs to their low
outputs. Under the settings of information flow, confidentiality (i.e., ensuring that in-
formation is accessible only to the users authorized to have access to it) corresponded
to the absence of flows of information from secret inputs to publically observable out-
puts. Similarly, integrity (i.e., ensuring that the data remains valid) meant that there
was no flow from a possibility tainted source, low, to an untainted one, high. In this
thesis, we will primarily focus on the security goal of confidentiality.
Information flow is still tremendously relevant today as it addresses for instance
issues of the everyday use of the internet: the goal of a spyware (trojan horse) is
precisely to get access to high data and to leak this information to an attacker legally
restricted to access only low data.
Noninterference Even if the Bell-LaPadula model represented a fundamental ad-
vance in the protection of systems security, it suffered from several drawbacks. First, it
only considered confidentiality as security goal, and thus did neither enforce integrity
nor availability. Furthermore, it lacked flexibility because access rules for subjects
could not be changed once they had been defined. Last but not least, the model did
not prevent the existence of covert channels, i.e., transmissions of information using
non legitimate data transfer mechanisms that were neither designed nor intended for
this purpose. Typical examples of covert channels include storage channels and tim-
ing channels. With a storage channel, one process (the sender) allocates some specific
storage location and the other (the receiver) checks for the evidences of this allocation.
With a timing channel, the sender influences the timing (e.g. CPU-time) of an event
visible to the receiver. In terms of access control, a low subject could for instance
send an object to a higher compromised subject who could then reclassify the object
to his own (higher) security level or leave it in the lower security level, thus defining
two different states that could be observed by the lower user and used to encode one
bit. If, for instance, the object was reclassified, then the lower subject would not be
allowed to access the object anymore, contrary to the situation in which the object was
not reclassified and its access still permitted to the lower user.
These issues motivated the development of stronger multilevel security systems
mainly based on the enforcement of noninterference, a property stating that security
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Figure 1.1: Noninterference is not satisfied, although the adversary cannot learn the
secret.
can only be reached if high information does not interfere with low data output from
the system. In other words, the low outputs are completely independent from the
high inputs and any kind of information leakage is forbidden. Goguen and Meseguer
gave an extensive study of noninterference [GM82] which they informally defined as
follows:
One group of users, using a certain set of commands, is noninterfering
with another group of users if what the first group does with those com-
mands has no effect on what the second group of users can see.
They proposed a new model which strictly distinguished between the system and the
security policies applying on it. On the one hand, the system was modelled as a
generalized automaton called a capability system. It consisted of both an ordinary
state machine component and a capability machine component which kept track of
what actions were permitted to which users. On the other hand, security policies were
given as a set of noninterference assertions that declared which information flows
were forbidden. They were further divided into static policies that always held and
dynamic policies that depended on the state of the capability component of a system
and were thus handled using conditional noninterference assertions.
Nondeducibility Goguen and Meseguer’s model was however restricted to deter-
ministic systems, in which outputs were entirely determined by the inputs and non-
interference held if there was no noticeable difference in the outputs inferred by a
removal of the high inputs. In a nondeterministic system however, removing high
inputs and re-executing the protocol could lead to an (unrelated) change in the low
outputs due to nondeterminism only, but this change would violate noninterference,
albeit not revealing a security flaw. In many situations, the requirement of nonin-
terference actually proved to be too strong for the security level needed in a system.
Consider for instance the system illustrated in Figure 1.1, in which a high-level user
H1 sends a messagemwhich is xor-ed by a string k issued by a second high-level user
H2 before being transmitted to a low-level receiver L. In this case, noninterference
does not hold because high-level information is leaked from the system (in form of
the cypher text c), even if the low-level user, because of the encryption, cannot learn
anything from the message.
Most of the following research was therefore aimed at weakening noninterfer-
ence and extending it to nondeterministic systems. In 1986, Sutherland proposed
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a slightly weaker definition of security than noninterference, called nondeducibility
[Sut86]. According to this definition, information flow was interpreted as deducibil-
ity and a system was secure if it was impossible for a user to deduce the actions of
other users having a higher security status, thus being closer in spirit of the consid-
eration of security as ”nondisclosure of information”. In the previous example of an
encrypted high-level message transmitted to a low-level user, nondeducibility was en-
forced since the output message c did not increase the receiver’s knowledge. In a
deterministic system, nondeducibility held therefore whenever a low-level user could
not select, from the outputs, a preferred input whose occurence was more likely than
the others. This definition could be generalized to nondeterministic system, by in-
terpreting nondeducibility as the impossibility for a low-level subject to rule out any
consistent high input from the low outputs of the system.
Restrictiveness In 1990, McCullough, an expert in network systems, argued that
Sutherland’s model was not appropriate for the protection of security in real-life sys-
tems which often showed nondeterministic and asynchronous behaviours. In partic-
ular, McCullough described examples of nondeterministic systems which satisfied
nondeducibility while violating basic security requirements [McC90]. Consider for
instance a nondeterministic system which fills in the spaces between messages with
strings of random bits to prevent attackers from analyze the flow of traffic on the
system. Nondeducibility would be preserved even if a low-level user could read un-
encrypted high messages. If the attacker reads e.g., “We attack tomorrow”, then she
might guess that the string belonged to the high message, which might be true with
high probability. However, the attacker would not be able to deduce with certainty
that the sentence was not generated by chance in the string of random bits, hence en-
forcing nondeducibility. This criticism could be seen as an early attempt to advocate
for the use of a quantitative definition, since the security of the system relied on “how
much” an attacker could deduce about the high information given the observables, and
nondeducibility held as soon as some information concerning high variables could not
be deduced with certainty.
In order to address this issue, McCullough’s first contribution was to define gener-
alized noninterference, a notion of noninterference that could be extended to nonde-
terministic systems [McC87]. McCullough also pointed out the crucial importance of
hook-up security, i.e., composability in multi-users systems, a property which has to-
day become all the more relevant with the increasing complexity of computer systems
and will therefore be specifically addressed in this thesis. Composability is a desir-
able property for several reasons. First, complex systems cannot today be built and
maintained effectively in the long run if they cannot be decomposed into smaller com-
ponents that can be handled separately and added or removed when necessary without
perturbating the whole system. This is particularly relevant in open systems, which
usually do not have a permanent notion of “entire system” and may evolve quickly.
On the other hand, composability makes it much easier to check that a given property
holds for the global system if it is sufficient to check it at the scale of the components
of the system. With the degree of complexity reached by today’s computer systems,
composability has become a necessary requirement for building a modular and flexi-
ble system.
McCullough’s contribution was to show that the three main approaches to system
security that had been used so far, i.e., the Bell-LaPadula (access control), nonin-
terference and nondeducibility all failed to be composable. Moreover, McCullough
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Figure 1.2: Generalized noninterference is not composable
recognized that his generalized noninterference was not hooked-up secure either, and
was thus not yet a satisfactory security property for multi-users systems. The example
provided by McCullough in [McC90] to show that generalized noninterference was
not composable is illustrated on Figure 1.2.
The system consists of a component A represented on a vertical time axis in Fig-
ure 1.2 (case a and case b), which can exchange low-level and high-level inputs and
outputs. Low-level inputs and outputs are represented as solid arrows, while high-level
inputs and outputs are represented as dashed arrows.
The component is subject to a random number of high-level inputs (from its left)
and high-level outputs (to its right) possibly occuring after some delays. At one point
in time, the low message stop is output to the right and is immediately followed
by another low message odd or even (called parity message) which is output to the
left, leaking the parity of the number of high-level events (inputs and outputs) that
have occured so far (i.e., before the output of stop). Since the high-level outputs
may be delayed and the two low outputs can occur at any time one after the other, all
high-level inputs may not have been output when the two low outputs occur.
This system is noninterference secure: if there had been an even number of high-
level inputs, the output would be either {stop, odd} if an odd number of high-
level outputs occured so far (case a in Figure 1.2), or {stop, even} if an even
number of high-level outputs occured so far (case b in Figure 1.2). An odd number
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of high-level inputs would lead to the symmetrical situation and therefore a change in
the high inputs would not affect the low-level outputs, as required by noninterference
(i.e., whatever the high inputs may be, an adversary observing the low outputs of the
protocol can never rule out any of the two possibilities {stop, odd} or {stop,
even}).
We now consider the component B which is similar to A except that the high-
level outputs occur to the left, the parity messages are output to the right and the
stop message is now a low-level input that comes from the left. The component B
works similarly to A and it is easy to see that it satisfies noninterference as well (as
illustrated on cases c and d in Figure 1.2).
Cases e and f in Figure 1.2, show that it is now possible to connect A to the left-
hand side of B so that the outputs to the right of A become inputs to the left of B
and the outputs to the left of B become inputs to the right of A. We assume here that
B cannot receive any high-level input from the outside world. Under these settings,
the combined system does not satisfy noninterference anymore: since the high-level
outputs from A are input to B and vice-versa, one can easily see that A and B both
output the same parity messages as long as no input to A from the outside occured
(case e in Figure 1.2). However, an adversary can deduce with certainty that some
high-level input occured from the outside if A and B do not output the same parity
messages (case f in Figure 1.2). Therefore a change in the high inputs could affect the
low-level outputs of the combined system, which violates generalized noninterference.
In order to enforce composability of security in nondeterministic systems, McCul-
lough defined a new security property called restrictiveness, equivalent to noninterfer-
ence for deterministic systems but extended to nondeterministic systems. The main
problem with the previous approach was the need for a machine which behaves the
same whether a low-level input was preceded by a low-level, a high-level or no input.
The component B in the previous example for instance does not satisfy this property,
since it outputs even if no high-level input occured, and odd otherwise. McCullough
modelled the system as a state machine and specified a set of rules that had to be
fulfilled by the state machine to satisfy restrictiveness, i.e., to prevent any high-level
information from affecting the behavior of the system, as viewed by a low-level user.
The important notion of view in this model was defined as an equivalence relation on
states and input sequences. Then McCullough could prove that restrictiveness was
composable. In the previous example, the fact that a high-level input followed by
stop did not have the same effect as stop alone violated restrictiveness for compo-
nent B.
Forward correctability In 1988, Johnson and Thayer argued that hook-up security
as defined by McCullough was often stronger than needed in typical real-life appli-
cations such as basic text editors [JT88]. In order to justify their statement, they first
defined a weaker notion of security called n-forward-correctability, based on the no-
tions of perturbation and correction. A perturbation is a sequence of events (which
may not necessarily be a valid trace) obtained from a valid trace by inserting or delet-
ing high-level inputs. A correction consists then of a valid trace which is obtained
from a sequence of events by inserting or deleting high-level outputs only. An event
system is n-forward-correctable iff for any trace α and any perturbation α′ obtained
by inserting or deleting a single high-level input before at most n low-level inputs
preceding a high-input-free segment γ , there is a correction of α′ supported in γ.
Johnson and Thayer proved that McCullough’s hook-up security is equivalent to ω-
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Figure 1.3: Valid trace for the forward correctability example
Figure 1.4: Forward correctability does not imply hook-up security
forward-correctability, i.e., n-forward-correctability for any integer n. In other words,
it is possible to correct a perturbation after an arbitrarily long sequence of low-level
inputs. As shown in [JT88], this is strictly stronger than simple forward-correctability
(n = 1), because of the following relation:
∀m,n, s.t. m > n m-forward correctability
6⇐
⇒ n-forward correctability
(1.1)
This proposition can be highlighted by a simple example in the case n = 0, m =
ω, which shows that 0-forward correctability (i.e., simple forward-correctability) does
not imply ω-forward correctability. We consider a low-level monitoring task checking
whether messages between two high-level processes have been transferred (without
being itself able to read the content of the messages).
In order to comply with the specification saying that any high input (a message
released by the sender process) has indeed been output (received by the receiver pro-
cess), it is required that every low output (an aknowledgment of the monitoring task)
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Figure 1.5: Forward correctability does not imply hook-up security (cont.)
is preceded by an equal number (possibly zero) of high inputs and high outputs. Any
high output oh occurs therefore in a segment of the form i
+
h [il]o
+
h , i.e., a finite number
of high inputs followed by a finite number of high outputs, with possibly one low input
between the two sequences (see the segments a and b in the trace given as example
on Figure 1.3). In this figure, high inputs ih (resp. low inputs il) appear as grey (resp.
white) squares labeled i (resp. i), while high outputs oh (resp. low outputs ol) appear
as grey (resp. white) squares labeled o (resp. o). A perturbation of this system can
be performed by inserting or deleting a high input ih closely before a high-level-free
final segment γ (i.e., immediately before γ or before a low-level input immediately
preceding γ). Then a correction must be applied in case a low output is contained
in the final segment in order to restablish the balance between high inputs and high
outputs before the low output occurs.
This can be achieved by inserting a high output oh immediately after an ih (case b
in Figure 1.4) or after a low input if it occured right after an ih (case a in Figure 1.4).
On the other hand, a perturbation may also come from the deletion of a ih preced-
ing a high-level-free final segment γ with or without a low level input preceding γ
(cases c in Figure 1.4 and case d in Figure 1.5 respectively). Again, if the final seg-
ment contains a high output, a correction must be applied, as illustrated in the figure.
Since all these corrections are performed inside the sequence γ, the system satisfies
0-forward correctability (case b in Figure 1.4 and case d in Figure 1.5) and 1-forward
12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.6:
correctability (cases a and case c in Figure 1.4).
On the other hand, it is not McCullough hook-up secure (i.e., ω-forward cor-
rectable): consider the perturbation ihililol, where ih has been inserted in the trace
ililol (cases e and f in Figure 1.5). The only possible corrections are ihohililol (case
f ) and ihilohilol (case e). However, these corrections are performed outside the se-
quence γ, therefore the system is not 2-forward correctable and thus not ω-forward
correctable.
Johnson and Thayer argued that requiring forward correctability is strong enough
for a large set of security systems, and they proved that this property is also compos-
able, i.e., two hooked-up systems which are individually forward correctable lead to a
combined system which is forward-correctable as well.
Nondeducibility on strategies Two years later, Wittbold and Johnson pursued the
refinement of security properties and proposed nondeducibility on strategies (NoS)
[WJ90], an extension of Sutherland’s deducibility theory (called nondeducibility of
inputs NoI in the following), weaker than forward correctability but strong enough
to avoid the drawbacks of NoI and to be applicable to nondeterministic systems that
may be networked. In particular, the following example shows how a system which
satisfies NoI can be used to transmit information through a covert channel that is
prevented when the system satisfies NoS. Consider the nondeterministic state-machine
pictured on Figure 1.6. At each step of the computation, the system is in a state
(K1,K2) hidden from the high transmitter H and to the low receiver L. H and L
both give an input (resp. x and r), where x ∈ {0, 1, q}. As illustrated on Figure 1.6,
if x ∈ {0, 1}, then transition A occurs. Otherwise transition B occurs. The outputs
OH and OL given respectively to H and L in each case are written above the output
arrows on the figure. Note that K ′1 and K
′
2 correspond to random updates of K1 and
K2.
SinceH determines the outputs by his input x, he can learn at any step the value of
K1 by giving x = q as input. Then, if he sends as next input the value x ∈ {0, 1}, this
value is encoded into x ⊕K1 (random pad) and the result of this operation received
as output by L, as illustrated in case A on the Figure 1.6. If H repeats this protocol
and L ignores one bit out of two (namely the bit output to L when K1 is output
to H , corresponding to the transition B on the Figure 1.6), any encrypted message
can be successfully transmitted fromH to L without L ever learning the value ofH’s
initial inputs (since L never learnsK1 and is therefore unable to decrypt the message).
This system is thus nondeducible on inputs because L cannot learn H’s input string.
However, L deduces information onH’s input strategy, which means that this system
1.2. RELATED WORK 13
Figure 1.7: Nondeducibility on strategies does not imply forward correctability
violates NoS.
After providing a formal definition of this notion, Wittbold and Johnson related it
to forward correctability by proving the following relation:
forward correctability
6⇐
⇒ NoS (1.2)
i.e., forward correctability is strictly stronger than NoS, which can again be un-
derstood from an example given in [WJ90]. Consider the state machine with two
consecutive states sm−1 = (um−1, vm−1) and sm = (um, vm). Again, one low-
level user L and and one high-level userH give inputs IL and IH and receive outputs
OL and OH respectively. In a trace, a state transition is represented by the tuple
(IL,m, IH,m, OL,m, OH,m).
For eachm we have:
um−1 = vm = OH,m
If vm−1 = x ∈ {0, 1}, then OL,m = x
If vm−1 = t, then OL,m = IH,m
(1.3)
This defines two kinds of transitions A and B depending on the value of vm−1, as
illustrated on Figure 1.7. Consider now the following trace, illustrated on Figure 1.8:
(t, 0)(r, 0, 0, t)(0, t)(r, 1, 1, 0)(1, 0) (1.4)
And its perturbation, illustrated by the crossed input on Figure 1.8:
(t, 0)(r, 0, 0, t)(0, t)(r, 0, 1, 0)(1, 0) (1.5)
This perturbation affects the input ofH in case it is given as output to L. The only
way to correct this perturbation and thus avoid a change in the output to L is to modify
um−1 = vm from t to 0 or 1, hence avoiding the propagation of the perturbation in
the low output. However, this correction violates forward correctability, because it
is performed before the perturbated input. On the other hand, there is no deduction
about H’s behaviour that could be made by L from its view of the system, so NoS is
not violated and this security property is more appropriate than forward correctability
in this case to reflect the desirable security requirement satisfied by the system.
As explained in [WJ90], the difference between the two notions comes from the
fact that a system violates forward correctability whenever a deduction can be made by
a low-level user L from the entire input/output history of the computation, possibly
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Figure 1.8: Nondeducibility on strategies does not imply forward correctability (cont.)
including the high user’s history which, in reality, remains hidden from L. In our
example, L can deduce that the output he gets should match the high input as long as
he knows that the high output previously received by H was t. However, L is usually
not allowed to see the output history of H , and therefore in this case the requirement
for forward correctability is too strong. On the other hand, NoS only requires a low
user to be prevented from making deductions based on his own input/output history,
i.e., on what is indeed visible to him in reality.
In [WJ90], Wittbold and Johnson also insisted on the necessity to adopt a proba-
bilistic approach, rather than a possibilistic one, in order to guarantee the protection of
security in a nondeterministic context. They motivated their argument by the example
of the two matrices on Figures 1.9 and 1.10, where each row represents a possible
strategy πi of the high user (i.e., a secret) and each column stands for a possible view
oj of the low-level user:
o1 o2 . . . om
π1 p i . . . p
π2 p p . . . i
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
πn p p . . . p
Figure 1.9: Possibilistic approach: for each strategy πi each low view is either possible
(p) or impossible (i) [WJ90]
The first matrix, which corresponds to the possibilistic approach, is binary and
each element mij ∈ {p, i} specifies whether the view oj is possible (p) or not (i),
given that the strategy of the high-level user was πi. The second matrix, on the other
hand, corresponds to the probabilistic approach, and each coefficients gives the likeli-
hood pij = p(oj |πi) of the view oj given the strategy πi.
In the first case, NoS is satisfied iff there are no i entries in the matrix, i.e., all views
are possible. In a probabilistic context, this is equivalent to saying that all likelihoods
are positive. In the second case however, NoS is satisfied iff all likelihoods are the
same for a given strategy, i.e., all the rows are equal, which is a significantly stronger
requirement (and corresponds to our notion of strong anonymity as explained further
on in this thesis).
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o1 o2 . . . om
π1 p11 p12 . . . p1m
π2 p21 p22 . . . p2m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
πn pn1 pn2 . . . pnm
Figure 1.10: Probabilistic approach: pij is the likelihood of the view oj given the
strategy πi [WJ90]
Nondeducibility on composition An interesting extension to nondeducibility on
strategies called nondeducibility on compositionwas developed in [FGM95] and proved
to be specifically suitable for process calculi. In that paper, a variant of Milner’s CCS
is used to compare different definitions of noninterference. The notion of strategy
expressed in the previous approach is here formalized as a high-level process which
interacts with the system. Security of the system is achieved if such interactions are
not observable by low-level users. Several other papers have explored this property
[FG96, FG97, BFPR02, FR02], and real-time and probabilistic information flow anal-
yses were performed in [FGM03] and [ABG04] on suitable extensions of CCS. Along
the same line of research, noninterference was also expressed in the setting of CSP cal-
culus [BHR84, Ros95a, RWW94, Rya91]. A comparison between this formalization
of noninterference and nondeducibility on composition and an overview on several
noninterference notions from a process algebraic perspective were given respectively
in [Foc96] and [RS99].
On the other hand, several extensions to the π-calculus were developed to address
more specifically security concerns. In particular, the spi-calculus, defined by Abadi
and Gordon [AG97, AG99], used cryptographic primitives to describe and analyze
authentication protocols. Hennessy and Rieley proposed an extension of the asyn-
chronous π-calculus in which a variety of security properties were captured using
types [HR02]. In their work, the multi-level security and access control properties
were defined through the typing system which prevented implicit information flow
from high-level to low-level processes.
Restricted composition All the aforementioned approaches to composability aimed
at modifying security properties so that they could be preserved under arbitrary com-
positions. Another strategy consists in restricting composition so that a given security
property can be preserved. Zakinthnos and Lee developed restricted forms of com-
position [ZL95, ZL96, ZL98] and proved that McCullough’s generalized noninterfer-
ence is preserved by composition if the combined system is feedback-free, i.e., for
all connected pair (ci, cj) of components (meaning that at least one output from ci
is an input to cj), then (cj , ci) is not connected. This can be restated as the require-
ment that no feedback loop occurs in the combined system, where a feedback loop
to a component i occurs if there exists a trace which starts and ends in i. Zakinth-
nos and Lee also also showed that generalized noninterference could be preserved by
composition even in the presence of feedback loops as long as a delay component was
inserted into all feedback loops that involved high-level events. More precisely, these
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
components needed to delay any feedback to after the next low-level event. Another
interesting result related to compositionality in [ZL98] is the derivation of conditions
for emergent properties, i.e., properties that are not necessarily satisfied by all individ-
ual components but hold when these components are composed if certain conditions
are fulfilled. Mantel used a generalization of the zipping lemma [JT88] to explore this
phenomenon [Man02].
1.2.1.2 Quantitative Information Flow
In many security systems, a small information leakage may be acceptable, but can-
not be handled by the aforementioned (qualitative) models. Guessing a password in
an access control protocol releases for instance inevitably part of the high informa-
tion, because the search space has become smaller whatever the result of the guess
is. Similarly, in an anonymous voting protocol, an observer should be able to see
the number of votes for each candidate but not the identity of the voters. Several ap-
proaches, reviewed in Sabelfeld and Sands [SS05], have been developed to address
these violations of noninterference.
In the following, we review the strategies that have been developed to address
this issue by quantifying the notion of noninterference, i.e., measuring the amount of
interference between high and low information occuring in a system. This allows,
depending on the specificities of the system under concern, to set a threshold cor-
responding to the maximal acceptable level of interference, thus giving much more
flexibility than did the qualitative notion of interference developed so far.
Early approaches for quantifying information flow were focused on the detection
of covert channels between processes in multi-user systems, and Shannon’s informa-
tion theory was the preferred approach to tackle this problem, as it could be used to
prevent information flow between processes which were not explicitly covered by the
access rules of the security policy.
History-free approach In 1982, Denning explored the use of information theory as
the basis for a quantitative analysis of information flow in programs [Den82]. She
identified the quantity of leakage from a state s to a state s′ of the system as the de-
crease in uncertainty about the high information in state s, resulting from the knowl-
edge of the low information in s′. Denning used the conditional entropy H(hs|ls)
to quantify the uncertainty about the high data in state s (denoted hs) given the low
data in state s (ls). Then, the existence of an information flow from high to low is
equivalent to the condition:
M1 = H(hs|ls)−H(hs|ls′) > 0 (1.6)
i.e., the uncertainty about hs given ls after the execution of the protocol is smaller than
before the execution. If this condition holds (i.e., ifM1 is positive) thenM1 quantifies
the amount of information leaked from high to low.
However, this definition suffered from a flaw identified by Clark et al. in [CHM07]:
the lack of consideration of the history of low inputs. Clark et al. considered the ex-
ample of the two following programs, where x is a high-level integer variable which
takes a value in -16,. . . ,15 with uniform distribution, and y is a low variable initialized
to abs(x) (the absolute value of x) in the initial state s. Variables (e.g., x) in state s′
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are primed (x′) while variables in state s′′ are double-primed (x′′).
(A) {s} if x = 0 then y = 1 else y = 2 {s′}
(B) {s} if x < 0 then y = 1 else y = 2 {s′′}
(1.7)
We have:
• H(hs|ls) = H(x|y =abs(x)) = (1/32)H(x|y = 0)+(31/32)H(x|y > 0) =
(31/32) log 2 = 31/32
• H(hs|ls′) = (1/32)H(x|y
′ = 1) + (31/32)H(x|y′ = 2) = (31/32) log 31 =
4.8 > (31/32)
• H(hs|ls′′) = (1/2)H(x|y
′′ = 1) + (1/2)H(x|y′′ = 2) = log 16 = 4 >
(31/32)
Since H(hs|ls) < H(hs|ls′) and H(hs|ls) < H(hs|ls′′), M1 is strictly negative
for (A) and for (B), therefore Denning’s calculation gives that there is no leakage
from high to low in these programs. However, intuitively one would expect that there
is leakage in (B) because the value of y′′ (i.e., y in state s′′) specifies the sign of x, a
new piece of information that was not available in the previous state s. On the other
hand, the value of y′ in (A) only specifies whether x is different from zero or not, an
information which could already be deduced in the previous state from the value of
y =abs(x). Thus there is no new knowledge in state s′ compared to state s, and we
would therefore expect a measure of leakage to give zero in this case.
It is easy to see that the problem comes from the low-level information y =abs(x)
in state s, which gives a lot of information about x (i.e., at most two possible values
remain for xwhen y is known) while y′ or y′′ gives less information about x, assuming
that the value of y in state s has been ”forgotten”. However, in most real systems, the
attacker is able to keep track of the previous low-level values (i.e., he has a memory),
which lead to Clark et al.’s refinement of Denning’s condition for the existence of
information flow from high to low [CHM07]:
M2 = H(hs|ls)−H(hs|ls′ , ls) > 0 (1.8)
SinceH(X|Y,Z) ≤ H(X|Y ) for any random variableX,Y, Z (conditioning reduces
entropy), we have M1 ≤ M2. The quantity M2 corresponds to conditional mutual
information, to which we will come back later in this chapter.
Applied to the programs (A) and (B), this yields:
• H(hs|ls) = H(x|y =abs(x)) = 31/32
• H(hs|ls′ , ls) = (1/32)H(x|y
′ = 1, y =abs(x))+(31/32)H(x|y′ = 2, y =abs(x)) =
(31/32) log 2 = 31/32
• H(hs|ls′′ , ls) = (1/2)H(x|y
′′ = 1, y =abs(x))+(1/2)H(x|y′′ = 2, y =abs(x)) =
0
The quantityM2 is therefore equal to 0 in (A) and to 31/32 in (B), so there is leakage
in (B) but not in (A), which complies with our intuition. We will come back to Clark
et al.’s approach [CHM07] later on in this section.
18 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Millen’s Model Millen made an important step in the connection between informa-
tion flow models and Shannon information theory, by establishing a formal analogy
between noninterference and mutual information. He modelled the multi-user com-
puter system as a channel with a sequence of inputsW (possibly coming from several
users) and an output Y at the end of the computation [Mil87]. In his approach, the
random variable X was a subsequence of W which represented the high input from
a user U and X¯ was the complement of X , i.e., the subsequence of W consisting of
inputs from users other than U . Millen showed that for deterministic systems, if X
was non-interfering with Y , then I(X;Y ) = 0, provided that X and X¯ were indepen-
dent. The quantity I(X;Y ) was the classical Shannon’s mutual information between
X and Y [Sha48] and represented the information flow between the high input X and
the output Y . In other words, under the assumption thatX did not depend on the other
inputs, noninterference was a sufficient condition for the absence of information flow.
Millen also provided a counter-example to show that this condition was not necessary,
i.e., the information flow could be zero even when X was not non-interfering with
Y . His argument actually relied on the same observation that had lead Sutherland to
define one year before nondeducibility as security property: the impossibility for non-
interference to make a difference between the true eavesdropping of high-level data
by a low-level user (where the information was leaked, e.g., through a covert channel),
and the obtention of the encrypted version of a high-level message from which noth-
ing could be deduced by the low-level user. In both cases, there was a strictly positive
interference between high and low users but in the second case the mutual informa-
tion between them was zero since the low-level user could not extract any information
from the leaked data (assuming he did not know the decryption key).
Flow Model In 1990, McLean argued that a better distinction between allowed and
forbidden information flows in a program was possible when the notion of time was
introduced in the model, so that causal relations were specified explicitly [CM90]. He
developed the security model called Flow Model (FM), which took time into account
and viewed information as flowing from a high-level user H to a low-level user L
only ifH assigned values to objects in a state that preceded the state in which Lmade
its assignment. Therefore, only certain classes of dependency betweenH and L were
considered security violations, which gave more expressiveness in the specification of
the system security properties than previous models did and was suitable to prevent
information flows in systems with memory.
However, McLean’s model was highly general and abstract, and lacked therefore
the potential to be applied to the analysis of real and complex systems which were
thriving in the early ninethies. Moreover, its equation defining security was dependent
on the input probabilities which are usually unknown and we will in this thesis, as
explained later in more details, try to abstract from them whenever possible.
Trade-off between general abstract models and simple restricted ones Gray pro-
posed in 1991 a general purpose probabilistic state machine extendingMillen’s model,
with the purpose to bridge the gap between the two main categories of models that had
been developed so far in the field of information flow security [III91]: on the one hand,
general models such as McLean’s Flow Model (FM) [CM90] which were appropri-
ate to evaluate security models but remained very abstract and thus hardly applicable
to real systems, and models such as Millen’s [Mil87, Mos91, WJ90] on the other
hand, which were focused on concrete examples but tended to be so simple that they
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could neither be used to describe real-life complex systems, such as computers with
a general purpose memory. Gray proposed therefore to make a “trade-off” between
these two tendencies and presented a general framework for the study of information
leakage based on a probabilistic state machine and resembling Millen’s model (in par-
ticular for the use of channels, inputs and outputs), but with a probabilistic rather than
a nondeterministic transition function. More precisely, the transition from state s to
state s′ after an input I and yielding output O was specified in Gray’s model by a
probability T (s, I, s′, O), while a transition in Millen’s model was given in terms of
the two random variablesW (representing, as described in the previous paragraph, an
unknown interleaving between inputX and all other inputs X¯) and Y = out(t, y) the
output to user y in t, the state at the conclusion of the trial.
Furthermore, Gray partitioned the channels into two setsH and L representing re-
spectively the channels connected to high and low processes. The generality of Gray’s
model came from the assumption that the only information about the system and its
environment that was directly accessible to the high (resp. low) environment were
the inputs and outputs that had previously occured on the high (resp. low) channels.
So if the high environment obtained information about the low environment, it had to
obtain it indirectly through its interaction with the system, and vice-versa (i.e., there
was no direct communication exterior to the system). This allowed the environment
external to H (resp. L) to use feedback from the system and to have memory of what
the system had already done on channels in H (resp. L), thus capturing many real
systems. This approach could be related to Wittbold and Johnson’s nondeducibility
on strategies due to feedback (see Paragraph 1.2.1.1).
After specifying individual security properties for the system and the environ-
ment, Gray defined a general probability measure P to reason about the probabilistic
behaviour of both the system and the environment and used it to specify a condition
for information flow security:
P (LI ∩ LO ∩HI ∩HO) > 0 ⇒
P (l|LI ∩ LO ∩HI ∩HO) = P (l|LI ∩ LO)
(1.9)
where LI (resp. LO) is the occurence of a particular input (output) history on the
channels in L. The same holds for the channels in H and l is a final output event
occuring on the channels in L.
This condition meant that the probability of a low output l could depend on previ-
ous low events LI ∩LO but not on previous high eventsHI ∩HO. As noted by Gray,
the output history on high channels HO was necessary even if one could first believe
that the following weaker condition was sufficient:
P (LI ∩ LO ∩HI) > 0 ⇒
P (l|LI ∩ LO ∩HI) = P (l|LI ∩ LO)
(1.10)
However, this condition did not rule out the existence of a covert channel. Con-
sider for instance an encryption scenario in which the high inputs HI are encrypted
and thus hidden from the low outputs LO. Now if the high environment can gain
knowledge (e.g., through the high outputs HO) on the encryption method (e.g., by
observing some probabilistic pattern), then it could modify its input value accordingly
and successfully transmit information to the low environment. In this case Condi-
tion 1.10 would hold but would not be sufficient to guarantee information flow secu-
rity.
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Another interesting contribution of Gray was his explicit definition of the capacity
of the channel fromH to L, which generalized the definition initially given by Shannon
for memoriless discrete noisy channels [Sha48]. In order to account for the fact that
the covert channels he considered could have memory and feedback, Gray calculated
the mutual information between the low output at time t and the entire history of high
inputs and outputs from time 0 through time t−1. Additionally, Gray used conditional
mutual information in order to take into account the knowledge of the low inputs and
low outputs in the history. He obtained following channel capacity from H to L:
C ≡ limn→∞ Cn
where
Cn ≡
maxH,L
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(In Seq EventH,i,Out Seq EventH,i;
Final Out EventL,i|In Seq EventL,i,Out Seq EventL,i)
(1.11)
In this definition, In Seq EventA,t represents the occurence of a particular input
history on the channels in A up to and including time t − 1. The other terms in the
mutual information are defined similarly. Gray showed that under this definition, the
absence of information flow from H to L implies C = 0.
Information escape McIver and Morgan used an expression of channel capacity
very similar to Equation 1.11, but based on a new notion of flow quantity in the con-
text of program refinement and for a sequential programming language enriched with
probabilities [MM03]. Their security goal differed from most traditional approaches
of information flow, which usually focused on the protection of the initial values (only)
of the high information. This is what McIver and Morgan called weakly secure. On
the other hand, their security goal was to ensure that the privacy of the high variables
was maintained (continuously) along the execution of the program:
A system comprising operations Op is secure provided that if the value
ofHigh’s variables are not known (to Low) initially, then they cannot be
inferred at any later time during use.
This requirement was stronger than weakly secure, and the authors showed that
security of final values implied security of initial values for standard deterministic
programs. McIver and Morgan defined the flow quantity from H to L (called infor-
mation escape in [MM03]) as the difference given by:
H(h|l)−H(h′|l′) (1.12)
where h and l were respectively the high security and low security partitions of the
store at the start of the program, and h′ and l′ the high security and low security
partitions of the store at the end of the program.
The authors defined the channel capacity as the least upper bound over all possible
input distributions of the information escape, and showed that security of the program
was equivalent to the channel capacity being equal to zero.
Moreover, one of their theorems provided interesting alternative equivalent for-
mulations to their notions of security for a program P :
1. P is secure
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2. P is a secure permutation of the high variables
3. P is uniform preserving
The second statement means that a program can only permute high values. The
third statement means that from the point of view of a low observer, the execution
of the program gives no information about the probability distribution of the high
variables. Since complete ignorance of h is equivalent to the uniform distribution,
the high variables should appear as uniformly distributed to the low observer during
the whole execution of the program. In other words, the program preserves maximal
entropy on high values.
This approach avoided the need to keep track of the whole history like in Gray’s
model (see Equation 1.11), but suffered unfortunately from similar problems as other
history-free approaches such as Denning’s (see Section 1.2.1.2) and could be at best
applied to adversaries without memory.
Another limitation of this model was illustrated by Clark et al. [CHM07] who gave
the example of a program which swaps h and l (both independent of each other and
belonging to the same data set with uniformly distributed elements), using a (high)
temporary variable temp:
temp:=l;
l:=h;
h:=temp;
Intuitively, we would expect to find some positive information flow from h to l
because at the end of the computation, the sensitive value h is entirely revealed in l.
However, the calculation of the information escape according to McIver and Morgan
[MM03] gives:
H(h|l)−H(h′|l′) = H(h|l)−H(l|h) = H(h)−H(l) = 0 (1.13)
Another interesting contribution of McIver and Morgan, still in [MM03], was their
definition of demonic nondeterminism, an interesting approach to distinguish between
probabilistic choices that could not be influenced (so-called probabilistic nondeter-
minism), and nondeterminism that could be resolved by a scheduler (the demon) and
that could be seen as underspecification in distributed systems.
The authors integrated these notions into their security model expressed in the
probabilistic guarded command language: probabilistic information was specified as
usual by probability distributions, while demonic behaviour was described by subsets
of possibilities. Programs were then described by functions from initial states to sets
of distributions over final states, with the degree of nondeterminism as well as the
probabilistic information recorded in the multiplicity of the result set. The authors
investigated then the influence of restricting the power of the demon making the non-
deterministic choices, such that it could see all data, only low data, or no data. Very
recently, McIver, Meinicke and Morgan also considered probabilistic noninterference
(without demonic choice) and considered the compositional closure of order relations
based on the Bayes risk ??.
Information Flow Cardinality Lowe proposed in the following year a definition of
quantity of information flow using the process algebra timed CSP and based on the
notion of information flow cardinality [Low04]. This quantity represents the number
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n of behaviours of a high-level user that a low-level user can distinguish, and corre-
sponds therefore to the number log n of bits of information that can be passed from
the high-level to the low-level user.
Static analysis for quantifying information flow Recently, Clark, Hunt andMalacaria
presented a static analysis for quantifying information flow [CHM07] that followed
several previous publications [CHM02, CHM05a] and clarified different metrics of
security used by other authors such as Millen [Mil87] and Gray [III91]. They pro-
vided lower and upper bounds on the amount of information flow, expressed as
I(Lout;Hin|Lin)
i.e., the mutual information flow from high inputs to low outputs, given that the ad-
versary had control over the low inputs. As described in Paragraph 1.2.1.2, they also
identified a flaw in Denning’s approach and corrected it by introducing the notion of
memory of previous values. They then showed that their approach coincided with this
modified definition. This work was recently reconsidered by Malacaria [Mal07] who
added a definition of security of looping constructs.
Additionally, the authors of [CHM07] mentioned the independent work of Di
Pierro, Hankin and Wiklicky who measured interference and derived a quantitative
measure of the similarity between agents written in a probabilistic concurrent con-
straint language [DPHW02]. However, as opposed to [CHM07], no measure of in-
formation was provided in their work. Very important in my thesis will also be the
recent work of Smith [Smi09] who introduced a new foundation based on a concept
of vulnerability, measuring uncertainty by applying Renyis min-entropy rather than
Shannon entropy. We defer a detailed discussion on this approach to Chapter 5 in this
thesis.
An important point in Clark et al.’s model was that neither the lower nor the up-
per bound on the amount of information flow depended on the input distribution and
therefore the latter was an upper bound on the channel capacity of the program, i.e.,
it was secure against the worst-case attack. In the next section, we will however see
that it may be of interest to weaken the security required in a system in order to better
fit the expected attacker model and thus to ensure an acceptable security level while
using less resources and reducing the complexity of the system.
1.2.1.3 Consideration of the attacker model
The dependence on the input distribution is a fundamental issue in the definition of se-
curity protocols. Ideally, the degree of protection guaranteed by a protocol should be
high enough to protect against the expected attacker model without raising the com-
plexity of the system higher than what can be handled effectively. This is all the more
relevant in today’s cryptosystems such as RSA which rely on computational-theoretic
(also known as cryptographic) security rather than information-theoretic security, i.e.,
the security only holds because decryption is intractable with current technologies.
In real systems, a trade-off between security and complexity must therefore be met,
which depends on the specific application of the protocol under concern. In this sec-
tion, we will review some of the approaches which have been developed to take into
account the attacker model in the security protocol.
Entropy measures Ko¨pf and Basin expressed an attacker’s remaining uncertainty
about a secret as a function of the number of side-channel measurements made [KB07].
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Several information-theoretic entropy measures were proposed to quantify the remain-
ing uncertainty of the attacker. One of the motivations of the authors was to address
a wide range of systems with different models of attackers, thus requiring different
types of entropy. As discussed in [Mas94, Pli00, Cac97], the different notions are
partially incomparable. Still, Ko¨pf and Basin gave interesting intuitive meanings of
the different definitions in terms of guesses of the attacker. The first measure H(X),
Shannon Entropy [Sha48], corresponded to a lower bound for the average number of
binary questions that needed to be asked to determine the value of the random vari-
able X . In case the attacker had already some knowledge, the conditional entropy
H(X|Y ) was used, which expressed the remaining uncertainty of the attacker with
prior knowledge Y . The second measure, the Guessing Entropy G(X) [Mas94] cor-
responded to the average number of questions of the kind ”does X = x hold?” that
had to be asked to guess the value ofX . A generalization of this notion gave the third
measureMarginal GuessworkWα(X) [Pli00] which, for a fixed α ∈ [0, 1], quantified
the number of questions of the kind ”does X = x hold?” that had to be asked until
the value ofX was correctly determined with a chance of success given by α. Condi-
tional entropies could also be defined for guessing entropy and marginal guesswork.
While lower bounds forG(X) could be given in terms ofH(X), there was no general
upper bound forG(X) in terms ofH(X) and it was proven that no general inequality
related Shannon entropy with marginal guesswork [Pli00].
Belief-based approach Recently, Clarkson et al. defined as information leakage the
difference between the a priori accuracy of the guess of the attacker, and the a poste-
riori one, after the attacker had made his observation [CMS08]. The accuracy of the
guess was defined as the Kullback-Leibler distance between the belief (which was a
weight attributed by the attacker to each input hypothesis) and the true distribution on
the hypotheses. The reliability of this probabilistic belief-based approach (compared
to e.g., a worst-case strategy) is however hard to evaluate, as different attackers may
have different beliefs.
Absolute leakage and rate of leakage A recent effort in the specification of the
attacker model was subsequently given by Boreale who studied the quantitative mod-
els of information leakage in process calculi using pi-calculus, and who defined two
different quantitative notions of information leakage differing essentially in the as-
sumptions made on the power of the attacker [Bor09].
First, an attacker with full control over the process was assumed, who knew the
program code and could conduct any number of tries over it. Moreover, the attacker
could know the probability distribution of the inputs (given as random variable X)
as well as other ”side information” publicly available and modelled as random vari-
able Z. This corresponded therefore to a worst-case of attacker, i.e., an attacker with
unlimited computational resources which allowed to define security guarantees inde-
pendent from the computational power of the actual attacker. The leakage of interest
was in this case the absolute leakage, i.e., the average amount of information that
was leaked to the attacker by the program under these assumptions. As expected,
and following the earlier results of Millen [Mil87] and Gray [III91], absolute leak-
age coincided with the conditional mutual information I = H(X|Y ) −H(X|Y,Z),
where Z = P (X,Y ) represented the outputs, i.e., the ”observational behaviour” of
the protocol. As described previously, Clark et al. also considered conditional mutual
information as measure of leakage [CHM07] but the main difference here was the con-
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sideration of concurrent programs by Boreale rather than sequential (and necessarily
terminating) computations.
A more realistic situation was then considered, in which the resources of the at-
tacker were limited and a notion of cost was introduced. More precisely, an attacker
could only perform a predefined number n of tries over the protocol, each yielding
a binary answer representing success of failure. The leakage of interest in this case
was the leakage rate, i.e., the maximal number of bits of information that could be
obtained per experiment over the protocol.
Boreale also studied the relation between these notions of leakage and proved that
they were consistent, i.e the absolute leakage coincided with the maximum amount
of information about the inputs that could be extracted by repeated experiments on
the protocol, and that the cost the adversary had to pay to achieve it was at least the
absolute leakage divided by the rate of leakage.
Interestingly, Boreale related his notions of leakage with the probability of er-
ror and the guesswork of the adversary. The relations between absolute leakage and
these notions could be easily derived from well-known inequalities involving Shan-
non’s conditional entropy (from which mutual information could be deduced): Fano’s
inequality [CT06] for a lower bound on the probability of error of the attacker and
Massey’s [Mas94] and Jensen’s [CT06] inequalities for a lower bound on conditional
guesswork.
The author also considered compositionality of leakage, and proved that for both
notions a global system could not have a greater leakage (rate) than its individual
subsystems, with the exception of parallel composition in the case of leakage rate.
Other previous work on the rate of leakage The notion of rate of leakage had
already been introduced in previous works, albeit not that explicitly. Volpano and
Smith considered the problem of trying to guess the k-bit value of a secret s using
well-typed programs written in a deterministic programming language with match
queries [VS00]. Under this formalism, the authors proved that no well-typed program
running in time bounded by a polynomial in k could deduce s. Furthermore, if a
probability distribution could be specified for s, then choosing the uniform distribution
made the probability that a well-typed polynomial-time program could deduce s goes
to zero as k increased.
The notion of process similarity developed by Di Pierro, Wiklicky and Hankin
[DPHW02] and already mentioned previously replaced the traditional notion of (ab-
solute) indistinguishability of processes [RS99] by a quantitative measure of their
behavioural difference. Therefore, two behaviours though distinguishable, could still
be considered as effectively non-interfering as long as their difference was below a
specified threshold. This gave a notion of distance between behaviours which was
connected to the number of tries necessary to distinguish them and thus came close to
Boreale’s notion of rate of leakage.
1.2.2 Anonymity
1.2.2.1 Definition and Protocols
In my thesis, I will particularly focus on information flow in the context of anonymity
protocols. Anonymity means that the identity of the user performing a certain action is
maintained secret. It is an information-hiding property different from confidentiality
(also known as secrecy) which consists in keeping secret the content of a message,
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and from privacy, which is more general and deals with the protection of personal
data. One can roughly say that “confidentiality deals with data, while privacy deals
with people”, and anonymity can be seen as a specific part of privacy.
Halpern and O’Neill describe in more details the distinction between anonymity
and other information-hiding properties [HO03, HO05]. Several different formal def-
initions and protocols for anonymity have been defined in the past. They are mainly
based on process-calculus [SS96, RS01], epistemic logic [SS99, HO05] or “function
views” [HS04].
In this thesis we will focus on the process calculus approach, which has already
widely been used in the field of security [AG99, AL00, Low97, Ros95b, Sch96]. In the
following, we will briefly review existing work on possibilistic (i.e., nondeterministic)
and probabilistic approaches to anonymity, before motivating our choice to use both
formalisms together and giving an overview of research related to this ”combined”
approach.
1.2.2.2 Possibilistic versus probabilistic approaches
Possibilistic approach The possibilistic (i.e., purely nondeterministic) approach
[SS96, RS01] is based on the so-called principle of confusion: a system is anonymous
if the set of the possible outcomes is saturated with respect to the intended anonymous
users. This means that for any observable trace produced by an anonymous user dur-
ing the computation, there must exist for each other anonymous user an alternative
computation which produces the same trace (modulo the identity of the anonymous
users). In this approach, a distinction is made between total lack of anonymity and
“some” anonymity, but all protocols that provide anonymity to some extent, from the
least to the maximal degree, are considered equivalent. However, this is insufficient
in most security systems in which it is desirable to be able to measure more precisely
“how much” anonymity is preserved. In other words, we are not only interested in
knowing whether events are possible or impossible (possibilistic approach), but rather
in determining what is their likelihood to occur.
Probabilistic approach Probabilistic definitions of anonymity have already been
investigated by several authors ([Cha88, HO03, BP05, RR98, CP05]), who distin-
guished different strengths of anonymity, which will be described later in this section.
Several probabilistic anonymity protocols have also been developed in the past,
such as the Dining Cryptographers [Cha88], Crowds [RR98], Onion Routing [SGR97]
and Freenet [CSWH01]. We will focus here on Crowds and the Dining Cryptographer,
which will be used as running example through this thesis.
Crowds Crowds was presented by Reiter and Rubin as an anonymity protocol
for web transactions [RR98]. It involves a public network represented as a set of
nodes (the crowd) which may send messages to each other. The security goal consists
in ensuring that any sender remains anonymous, even to the receiver of the message.
In order to achieve this goal, a message sent over the network is forwarded randomly
until it reaches the receiver.
More precisely, a node which wants to send a message chooses randomly (with
uniform probability) a node (possibly himself) in the crowd and sends the message
to him. Upon reception of the message, the following node tosses a biased coin and
forwards the message if heads is obtained. Otherwise, the message is sent directly to
the final receiver.
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Figure 1.11: The Crowds protocol (S stands for the sender and R for the receiver of a
message)
In this scenario, the receiver of a message can never determine who is the initial
sender of the message, who remains therefore anonymous. Even if a node may know
who was the previous node in the path, he cannot determine whether this node initiated
or just forwarded the message.
This protocol is illustrated on Figure 1.11. As we will see later, the security goal
defined by Reiter and Rubin for Crowds is probable innocence, which states that a
node appears equally likely to have initiated the message as not to have. The protocol
was extended to the case in which some of the nodes are corrupted, i.e., they can
collaborate in order to reveal the identity of the initiator of the message.
Dining Cryptographers In the Dining Cryptographers (DC) protocol, proposed
by Chaum, and illustrated in Figure 1.12, three cryptographers and a master are dining
together and they agree that only one of the four, secretly chosen by the master, will
have to pay the bill [Cha88]. At the end of the dinner, the master secretly tells to each
cryptographer whether he has to be the payer or not. The cryptographers would like
then to find out whether the payer is the master or if it is one of them, but without
discovering which cryptographer is the payer in this latter case (i.e., they want the
payer to remain anonymous if it is one of the cryptographers).
Chaum gave a solution to this problem: each cryptographer tosses a coin and the
result is visible only to him and his right neighbour. Each cryptographer announces
then ”agree” if the two coins he can see (his own coin and his left neighbour’s) are
both head or both tail, and ”disagree” otherwise. However, if one cryptographer is the
payer, he lies and says the opposite.
It can be proven that if the number of ”disagree” is even, then the master is paying.
Otherwise, one of the cryptographer is the payer, but his identity is unknown. This
result is easy to understand, since if the master is paying (i.e., all cryprographers tell
the truth), there will be either zero ”disagree” if the three coins give the same result,
or two ”disagree” if one of the coin differ from the two others. If one cryptographer
is paying (and thus lies), this will add one to the previous sum, which gives indeed an
odd number of ”disagree” in this case.
Combining nondeterminism and probabilities In this thesis we will follow the
framework described by Bhargava and Palamidessi in [BP05, Pal06, BP09]. While
previous formal definitions of anonymity were either nondeterministic or purely prob-
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Figure 1.12: The Dining Cryptographers protocol
abilistic, the authors of those papers consider the most general situation in which the
users have a nondeterministic behaviour while the protocol follows a probability dis-
tribution.
The choice of nondeterminism to characterize the users’ behaviour is motivated
by the fact that usually nothing is known about the relative frequency by which each
user performs the anonymous actions. Moreover, in several systems, this behaviour
may change and be irregular over time. This is particularly relevant in distributed and
concurrent systems where there may not be a global notion of time. In this case, the
sequence of actions performed by an agent (e.g. a, b, c) may be seen as a different
sequence (e.g. a, c, b, b, a, c) by other agents, depending on their relative space-time
locations in the system. Nondeterminism may provide a convenient formalization in
such contexts.
It has long been discussed whether nondeterminism could be assimilated to a
probabilistic behaviour where the probability distribution is unknown, but the general
agreement today is that nondeterminism does not follow a probability law whatsoever.
On the other hand, we are interested in anonymity protocols (such as Crowds
or the Dining Cryptographers) which rely on random mechanisms to add noise and
obfuscate the identity of the users. These strategies can usually be described by a
probability law, hence the choice of a probabilistic model for the anonymity protocol.
This approach clearly separates the considerations of the protocol from the as-
sumptions on the users, which models effectively the situation occuring in most real
systems, where we want to have guarantees on the security of the anonymity protocol
whoever the users may be.
Probabilistic Automata An appropriate formal description of this model re-
quires therefore the capability to express both nondeterminism and probability. Many
models proposed in the literature combine these two approaches, and one of the most
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general is the formalism of the probabilistic automata proposed by Segala and Lynch
[SL95]. In [BP05] the notion of anonymity is formulated in terms of observables for
processes in the probabilistic π-calculus, whose semantics is based on probabilistic
automata. A function called scheduler is used to resolve nondeterminism, and the
problem of the choice of the scheduler will be addressed later in this thesis.
1.2.2.3 Degrees of anonymity
Anonymity Metrics Several anonymity metrics have already been proposed in the
past, which can mainly be classified as metrics based on the anonymity set, informa-
tion theoretic entropy metrics and probability-based metrics.
Anonymity set metrics The simplest metrics rely on the anonymity set as de-
fined by Chaum for the Dining Cryptographer [Cha88], i.e., the size of the set of
users that may have sent a message through the system. The larger the set of potential
initiators of the message, the stronger the anonymity of the sender. Therefore, the
degree of anonymity was defined directly as the size n of the anonymity set, or as
log(n). Unfortunately, these metrics only work when the adversary considers the a
priori probability distribution of the possible senders to be uniform, an assumption we
will try to relieve in this thesis.
Information theoretic entropy metrics An information theoretic entropy met-
ric was then proposed by Danezis and Serjantov in 2002 [SD02a] in order to overcome
the limitations of the previous approach and quantify anonymity in case of an arbitrary
distribution of potential senders. Here, the uncertainty of an adversary is quantified in
terms of Shannon entropy H(S) where S is the probability distribution on the com-
munication participants regarding which one is the sender in a communication. Here,
we have 0 ≤ H(S) ≤ log n, where H(S) = 0 corresponds to knowledge of the
sender (i.e., pi = 1 if the sender is the user i) and H(S) = logn represents strong
anonymity (i.e., S is the uniform distribution).
Diaz et al. [DSCP02a] proposed a normalization of this metric by defining the
degree of anonymity as H(S)/ log n so that it varies between 0 and 1.
The main drawback of these metrics is their explicit reliance on the knowledge of
an adversary, which may complicate the comparison of different real-life anonymity
systems. Diaz and Sassaman [DSD04] addressed this issue by statistical analysis, i.e.,
by calculating for a large volume of traffic data gathered in two anonymity systems
the maximum and minimum observed entropies over a long time period.
Probability-basedmetrics: the anonymity hierarchy The large flexibility given
by probabilities compared to possibilistic approaches, already mentioned previously,
was also used by several authors to define different degrees of anonymity, thus scal-
ing the gap between the least and maximal anonymity that occurs with a possibilistic
approach. In the next paragraph, we will see how this approach was used to define the
so-called anonymity hierarchy.
The Anonymity Hierarchy Reiter and Rubin were the first in [RR98] to give a hi-
erarchy of anonymity degrees, which, as they explain, adds a third aspect to the two
other classical properties of an anonymity system, namely the anonymous communi-
cation model and the attacker model, both defined in the eighties by Pfitzmann and
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Waidner [PW87]. An anonymous communication model may be characterized either
by sender anonymity, where the identity of the sender is hidden while the receiver and
the message may not be, or by receiver anonymity where the identity of the receiver
is hidden, or by unlinkability of sender and receiver, where only the communication
between sender and receiver is hidden but possibly not their identities. On the other
hand, the attacker can be either modelled as an eavesdropper that may observe mes-
sages exchanged in the system, or as collaborations of some senders, receivers, and
other parties, or variations of these.
In order to complement these two properties, Reiter and Rubin defined a contin-
uum of degrees of beliefs, ranging from absolute secrecy (no observable effect for
the attacker) to provably exposed (the attacker can identify the sender and prove his
identity to other parties). In between these two extrema and in decreasing degree of
anonymity, the following three intermediary notions are defined:
• Beyond suspicion: From the attackers point of view, the sender appears no more
likely to be the originator of the message than any other potential sender in the
system.
• Probable innocence: From the attackers point of view, the sender appears no
more likely to be the originator of the message than to not be the originator.
• Possible innocence: From the attackers point of view, there is a nontrivial prob-
ability that the real sender is someone else.
Initially, these levels were tailored to Crowds (i.e., they depended in [RR98] on sym-
metries inherent to Crowds that do not necessarily occur in a more general system)
and it was shown that the degree of anonymity provided by the protocol for the sender
is probable innocence.
Strong anonymity Reiter and Rubin’s hierarchy was a first step towards a real
quantification of anonymity [RR98]. However, as mentioned previously, it was re-
stricted to systems satisfying the assumptions in Crowds. Following work in this field
aimed therefore at generalizing the anonymity hierarchy, starting from the definition
of strong anonymity.
This notion had already been defined by Chaum who proved that his Dining Cryp-
tographer protocol satisfies strong anonymity, under the assumption that the coins are
fair [Cha88]. Intuitively, strong anonymity occurs when the observables (here the an-
swers of the cryptographers) do not give additional knowledge to the observer on the
secret information (here the identity of the payer). This notion of anonymity describes
the ideal situation in which the protocol does not leak any information concerning the
identity of the user. In [Cha88], it was formulated as the condition p(a|o) = p(a),
where a is a secret action and o is an observable.
In the subsequent research, there have been basically two points of view to ex-
press strong anonymity. The first one corresponds to Chaum’s definition [Cha88] and
expresses “probabilistic noninterference”, i.e., the fact that the attacker does not learn
anything about an anonymous action from the execution of the protocol, or in other
words that the a priori probability p(a) of an anonymous action a is equal to its a
posteriori probability p(a|o) after the observation of o. In [CP05] it was observed that
this condition is equivalent to the equality of the likelihoods of all anonymous events:
∀a, a′, o, p(o|a) = p(o|a′) (1.14)
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The second point of view, adopted by Halpern and O’Neill [HO03, HO05] con-
siders the lack of confidence of the attacker and requires that after an observation o,
all the a posteriori probabilities of the anonymous events p(a|o) (where a is an anony-
mous action) be equal, so that the attacker cannot have confidence in one hypothesis
more than in another. Formally, this means:
∀a, a′, o, p(a|o) = p(a′|o) (1.15)
The notion of strong anonymity was called conditional anonymity by Halpern and
O’Neill in [HO03]. It is also equivalent to the anonymity level called beyond suspicion
in Reiter and Rubin’s hierarchy [RR98].
It corresponds to the situation in which all anonymous events produce the same
observables events with the same probability, which prevents the attacker from de-
ducing anything concerning the anonymous events. This definition was adopted by
Chatzikokolakis and Palamidessi, because it meets the security goal without relying
on the distribution of the anonymous events [CP05].
Chatzikokolakis also studied compositionality of strong anonymity and proved
that if S1 and S2 are two anonymity systems, then the composition S1;S2 is an ano-
nymity system which satisfies strong anonymity if and only if S1 and S2 satisfy both
strong anonymity [Cha07].
Probable Innocence Besides the notion of strong anonymity, a weaker notion is
needed to characterize systems in which some leakage is allowed and which could
correspond to the (informal) notion of ”probable innocence” in Reiter and Rubin’s
hierarchy, defined as the situation in which the probability that the initiator sends the
message to an attacker is at most 1/2. Halpern and O’Neill reinterpreted more formally
this notion which reflects the quantification of an observer’s uncertainty [HO05], and
thus comes close to the recent work of Clarkson et al. previously mentioned with
their notion of attacker’s belief [CMS08]. A definition of anonymity in the process
algebra CSP is also given in [HO05], as well as definitions of information hiding using
function views.
In [CP05], a generalized notion of probable innocence is proposed, which com-
bines both approaches, i.e., expresses a limit both on the attackers confidence and
on the probability of detection. Moreover, it relaxes the two assumptions that were
the main drawbacks of the former definitions: it does not depend on the probability
distribution of the anonymous events as Halpern and O’Neill’s approach [HO05] and
holds for systems without the symmetries present in Crowds [RR98]. On the other
hand, it still reduces to the definition in [HO05] when the anonymous events have a
uniform distribution and to the definition in [RR98] when the system is given the same
symmetries as in Crowds, as expected from a correct modelization.
Notice that [CP05] contains a proof showing that as expected, the generalized
probable innocence remains indeed weaker than strong anonymity (i.e., the latter im-
plies the former).
1.2.2.4 Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channel
Information-Theoretic Approach to Anonymity The work on information flow
decribed in Paragraph 1.2.1 made wide use of the representation of security proto-
cols as noisy channels where noninterference is formalized as the converse of channel
capacity. Similarly, there have been various attempts to define the anonymity de-
gree in terms of entropy and mutual information [SD02b, DSCP02b, ZB05, DPW07].
1.2. RELATED WORK 31
Moscowitz et al. related channel capacity to anonymity, by proposing a method where
non-perfect anonymity could be used to create covert communication [MNCM03,
MNS03].
Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi and Panangaden defined the notion of conditional
capacity, a generalization of Shannon capacity very useful for protocols in which
some loss of anonymity is permitted [CPP08a]. This occurs for instance in an elec-
tion protocol in which the number or votes for each candidate should be known, but
without revealing the individual choice of each voter.
The authors of [CPP08a] also considered the problem of the effective computation
of the channel capacity. This is not a trivial issue since there is no analytical formula
available for this calculation and numerical algorithms such as the Arimoto-Blahut
algorithm [CT06] can only converge asymptotically to the capacity. It was shown in
[CPP08a] that symmetries of the channel, which are very common in real systems
may be exploited to compute the capacity more easily. A simple operation which
involves only one row of the matrix and which can be computed in time linear with
the number of observables is provided to calculate the capacity of a channel matrix
with symmetries.
Hypothesis Testing and Bayes Risk In [CPP08b], the properties of the channel
matrix (e.g., its symmetries) were also related to the inferences that could be made by
an attacker about the anonymous events from the channel matrix (i.e., the likelihood
probabilities) and the observables. The amount of anonymous information that can
be obtained by the attacker with this so-called hypothesis testing strategy is captured
by the probability of error, i.e., the probability that the attacker makes a wrong guess.
Typically, the attacker will follow the Bayesian method and apply the MAP (Max-
imum Aposteriori Probability) criterion which, as the name says, dictates that one
should choose the hypothesis with the maximum aposteriori probability for the given
observation, and which is provably the best strategy for the attacker. “Best” means
that this strategy induces the smallest probability of error in the guess of the hypoth-
esis. The probability of error, in this case, is also called Bayes risk. In [CPP08a],
the authors proposed to define the degree of protection provided by a protocol as the
Bayes risk associated to the matrix and we will pursue in this direction later on in this
thesis.
Recently, Smith used a notion closely related to the Bayes risk and called vulner-
ability to argue that Renyi’s min-entropy was a better measure of uncertainty than the
traditionally used Shannon entropy when the attacker attempts to guess correctly the
secret in one try [Smi07, Smi09]. He shows an example of two programs in which the
mutual information is about the same, but the probability of making the right guess,
after having observed the output, is much higher in one program than in the other.
In this case, Renyi’s min-entropy allows to clearly distinguish between the two situa-
tions, which justifies Smith’s approach.
1.2.3 Belief Logics
We conclude this section with a brief review of the literature on belief logics, which
will be helpful to understand our motivation for developing in this thesis a new modal
logic with error control to express dynamic belief of agents in security systems, and to
formalize security properties such as probabilistic anonymity and oblivious transfer.
The literature on belief logics is large due to their wide applicability in philosoph-
ical logic, artificial intelligence, and information security. However, all belief logics
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we are aware of and which will be presented below are either only about belief without
error control, or static belief with error control. In situations involving uncertainties
or subjective and potentially changing quantities, error control, i.e., the specifications
of lower and/or upper bounds for a variable quantity, is particularly important, as it
allows to restrict the potential error within a precise margin and thus to turn an impre-
cise quantity into a precise variability domain of this same quantity. In the context of
security, error control is particularly useful to assess with more accuracy the power of
an attacker and thus to determine the degree of security enforced in the system.
Static belief with error control is introduced in [HO05] in the form of a functional
symbol (term constructor) Pri(φ) to be used in atomic formulas Pri(φ) ≤ α that
are true in a certain state by definition if and only if the probability according to
agent i that φ is true is at most α in that state. The probability value results from a
probability measure applied to the set of all those states that are indistinguishable from
the current state to agent i and where φ is true. The authors then obtain a formalization
of probabilistic anonymity for the dining cryptographers that mixes static knowledge
(as a modality) and static belief. The logic is static, i.e., it does not have a temporal
fragment. A fortiori, the belief in the logic is static (not possibly evolving). Also, the
authors do not explicitly account for the possible presence of a scheduler.
In [HP05], the authors introduce what they call randomized, explicit (or algorith-
mic) belief. The intuition is that a randomized knowledge algorithm returning “Yes”
to a query about a fact φ provides evidence for φ being true. The algorithm always
returns either “Yes”, “No”, or “Don’t know”, and the return value “Yes” may depend
on the outcome of coin tosses. The authors’ motivation for the algorithmic modeling
of belief is the resource-boundedness of real agents, which are thus identified with
algorithms. The authors define measurable upper and lower weights of evidence as-
signed to hypotheses given observations. Such a weight is not a probability measure,
but rather “a prescription for how to update a prior probability on the hypotheses into
a posterior probability on those hypotheses, after having considered the observations
made”.
A formalization of non-probabilistic anonymity for the dining cryptographers is
presented in [LP07], expressed in a modal logic combining knowledge and time.
Hence, their notion of knowledge is dynamic, yet not enhanced with probability: it
really is knowledge, which is necessarily true, and not belief, which possibly is false.
In [DMO07], the authors present a formalization of non-probabilistic anonymity
for the dining cryptographers expressed in the µ-calculus with knowledge. Hence, the
same comments apply as for [LP07]. Additionally, their logic is, as ours, closely tied
to a process calculus.
Internalized probability in our logic is based on the construct [φ]p introduced in
[PS07] to represent probabilistic statements. The operator [φ]p is true whenever the
probability of the states that satisfy the formula φ is at least p. A different probabilistic
extension of Hennessy-Milner logic is the one of [LS91, DEP98], where they consider
a probabilistic variant a p of the modal operator a . Intuitively, a pφ means that a
process can perform an a-transition and go with probability at least p to a state that
satisfies φ. As showed in [PS07], the operator [φ]p is more expressive, because a pφ
can be represented as a [φ]p. Furthermore, Parma and Segala have shown that the
operator [φ]p is necessary for characterizing (probabilistic) bisimulation in systems
that allow both probabilistic and non-deterministic branching from the same state,
which turns out to be the case for CCSp.
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1.3 Contribution
In Chapter 3, we focus on protocols for information-hiding which typically use ran-
domized primitives to obfuscate the link between the observables and the information
to be protected. The degree of protection provided by such a protocol can be expressed
in terms of the probability of error associated to the inference of the secret information.
The best approximation of this value is achieved by applying the so-called Maximum
Aposteriori Probability (MAP) rule which requires the input distribution to be known.
This assumption is however often too strong for the applications we consider. There-
fore, we distinguish in this chapter two different cases: the scenario in which the input
distribution is known, in which case we consider the Bayes risk as probability of error,
and the one in which we have no information on the input distribution, or it changes
over time. In this second scenario, we consider as degree of protection the probability
of error associated to the Maximum Likelihood rule, averaged on all possible input
distributions. It turns out that such average is equal to the value of the probability of
error on the point of uniform distribution, which is much easier to compute.
In Section 3.2, we consider a probabilistic process algebra called CCSpfor the
specication of information-hiding protocols, and we investigate which constructs in
the language can be used safely in the sense that by applying them to a term, the degree
of protection provided by the term does not decrease. This provides a criterion to build
specications in a compositional way, while preserving the degree of protection. We
do this study for both the Bayesian and the Maximum Likelihood (ML) approaches.
We then apply in Section 3.6 these compositional methods to the example of the
Dining Cryptographers, and we are able to strengthen the strong anonymity result by
Chaum. Namely we show that we can have strong anonymity even if some coins are
unfair, provided that there is a spanning tree of fair ones. This result is obtained by
adding processes representing coins to the specication and using the fact that this can
be done with a safe construct.
In Chapter 4, we introduce in Section 4.2 a novel modal logic, namely the doxastic
µ-calculus with error control (DµCEC), and propose a formalization of probabilistic
anonymity and oblivious transfer in the logic, and the validation of these formaliza-
tions on implementations formalized in probabilistic CCS. The distinguishing feature
of our logic is to provide a combination of dynamic operators for belief (whence the
attribute “doxastic”) and for internalized probability, with a control on the possible
error of apprehension of the perceived reality. As described in Section 1.2.3, existing
works in this field are, to the best of our knowledge, restricted to (dynamic) belief
without error control, or to static belief with error control. We show some application
examples of our logic to the dining cryptographers [Cha88] (Section 4.3), and to obliv-
ious transfer [Rab81] for single bits and entire strings (Section 4.4). In both cases, we
specify the protocol in CCSp. Dynamicity is useful for the logical formalization of
the original intuition of probabilistic anonymity and oblivious transfer, which is an
invariant with respect to a priori and a posteriori stances of apprehension of the per-
ceived reality (cf. Sections 4.3 and 4.4). The new operators we define allow to clearly
distinguish between the subjective notion of confidence, i.e., the qualification of an
agent’s belief (that something is the case) and the objective notion of certainty, i.e., a
qualification of something being the case. In our framework, both qualifications are
also quantitative thanks to the mentioned error control in terms of a lower and upper
probability bound.
Finally, we consider the notion of information leakage, or vulnerability of the
system, which has been related in some approaches to the concept of mutual informa-
34 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
tion of the channel. A recent work of Smith has shown, however, that if the attack
consists in one single try, then the mutual information and other concepts based on
Shannon entropy are not suitable, and he has proposed to use Re´nyi’s min-entropy
instead [Smi09]. In Chapter 5, we consider and compare two different possibilities of
defining the leakage, both based on the Bayes risk, which was already defined previ-
ously and happens to be closely related to Re´nyi min-entropy.
We propose to formalize the notion of leakage as the “difference” between the
probability of error a priori (before observing the output) and a posteriori (using the
output to infer the input via the aforementioned MAP rule). We argue that there are
at least two natural ways of defining this difference: one, that we call multiplicative
in Paragraph 5.3.3, corresponds to Smith’s proposal. The other, which we present in
Paragraph 5.3.4 and call additive, is new. In both cases, we show that it is relatively
easy to find the suprema, which is nice in that it allows us to consider the worst case
of leakage. The worst case is also interesting because it abstracts from the input
distribution, which, as previously mentioned, is usually unknown, or (in the case of
anonymity) may depend on the set of users. In Section 5.6 we compare both measures
of leakage before discussing and illustrating our results.
1.4 Publications
The main results of this thesis have previously been the subject of several scientific
publications. Chapter 3 is based on the articleCompositional methods for information-
hiding published in the proceedings of FOSSACS 2008 [BCP08]. The logical ap-
proach developed in Chapter 4 was described in the article A quantitative doxastic
logic for probabilistic processes and applications to information-hiding that has been
published in the Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics in 2009 [KPS+10]. Finally,
the results in Chapter 5 appeared in the article Quantitative notions of leakage for
one-try attacks published in the proceedings of the MFPS 25 Conference [BCP09].
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we first give a brief introduction to probability spaces and probabilistic
automata. Then, we present the probabilistic process algebra CCSp, an extension of
standard CCS ([Mil89]) obtained by adding probabilistic choice. In the remaining,
we give some insights on notions from information theory such as Re´nyi entropies,
Shannon entropy, and mutual information. Finally, convexity and corner points are
reviewed to complete this overview over the preliminary notions necessary to under-
stand the content of this thesis.
2.1 Probability spaces
Let Ω designate a set. A σ-field (also σ-algebra) over Ω is a collection F of subsets
of Ω closed under complement and countable union and such that Ω ∈ F . If B is a
collection of subsets of Ω then the σ-field generated by B is defined as the smallest
σ-field containing B (its existence is ensured by the fact that the intersection of an
arbitrary set of σ-fields containing B is still a σ-field containing B). A probability
measure on F is a function µ : F → [0,∞] such that
1. µ(∅) = 0,
2. µ(
⋃
i Ci) =
∑
i µ(Ci) if {Ci}i is a countable collection of pairwise disjoint
elements of F , and
3. µ(Ω) = 1.
We denote by supp(µ)
def
= {x ∈ Ω | µ({x}) > 0} the support set of µ. A
probability space is a tuple (Ω,F , µ) where Ω is a set, called the sample space, F is
a σ-field on Ω and µ is a probability measure on F . The elements of a σ-field F are
also called events. For x ∈ Ω, we denote by δ(x) (called the Dirac measure on x)
the probability measure on F such that δ(x)({y}) = 1 if y = x, and δ(x)({y}) = 0
otherwise. If c1, . . . , cn are convex coefficients (namely ci ≥ 0 for all i and
∑
i ci =
1), and µ1, . . . , µn are probability measures, we denote by
∑
i ciµi the probability
measure defined as (
∑
i ciµi)(A)
def
=
∑
i ciµi(A). If A,B are events then A ∩ B is
also an event. If µ(A) > 0 then we can define the conditional probability p(B | A),
meaning “the probability of B given A”, as
p(B | A)
def
=
µ(A ∩B)
µ(A)
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Note that p( · | A) is a new probability measure on F . In continuous probability
spaces, where many events have zero probability, it is possible to generalize the con-
cept of conditional probability to allow conditioning on such events. However, this is
not necessary for the purpose of this thesis. Thus we will use the above “traditional”
definition of conditional probability and make sure that we never condition on events
of zero probability. A probability space and the corresponding probability measure are
called discrete if Ω is countable and F = 2Ω. In this case, we can construct µ from
a function p : Ω → [0, 1] satisfying
∑
x∈Ω p(x) = 1 by assigning µ({x}) = p(x).
The set of all discrete probability measures with sample space Ω will be denoted by
Disc(Ω).
2.2 Probabilistic Automata
In this section we introduce the probabilistic automata of [SL95, Seg95] following a
notation that is similar to the one used in [Seg06].
A probabilistic automaton M is a tuple (St , sinit ,Act , T ) where St is a set of
states, sinit ∈ St is the initial state, Act is a set of actions and T ⊆ St × Act ×
Disc(St) is a transition relation. Intuitively, if (s, a, µ) ∈ T then there is a transition
from the state s performing the action a and leading to a distribution µ over the states
of the automaton. The idea is that the choice of transition among the available ones
in T is performed non-deterministically, and the choice of the target state among the
ones allowed by µ (i.e. those states s′ such that µ(s′) > 0) is performed probabilis-
tically. Note that in general from a state there can be two transitions with the same
action leading to two different distributions. A probabilistic automaton M is fully
probabilistic if from each state of M there is at most one transition available.
An execution fragment h of a probabilistic automaton is a (possibly infinite) alter-
nating sequence s0a1s1a2s2 . . . of states and actions, such that for each i there is a
transition (si, ai+1, µi) ∈ T and µi(si+1) > 0. The concatenation of a finite execu-
tion fragment h1 = s0 . . . ansn and an execution fragment h2 = snan+1sn+1 . . . is
the execution fragment h1 · h2 = s0 . . . ansnan+1sn+1 . . .. A finite execution frag-
ment h1 is a prefix of h, written h1 ≤ h, if there is an execution fragment h2 such that
h = h1 ·h2. We use fst(h), lst(h) to denote the first and last state of a finite execution
fragment h respectively.
An execution (or history) h is an execution fragment such that fst(h) = sinit . An
execution h is maximal if it is infinite or there is no transition from lst(h) in T . We
denote by exec∗(M ), exec⊥(M ), and exec(M ) the set of all the finite, all the non
maximal, and all the executions of the probabilistic automaton M , respectively.
A scheduler for a probabilistic automaton M = (St , sinit ,Act , T ) is a total func-
tion
ζ : exec⊥(M )→ T
such that ζ(h) = (s, a, µ) ∈ T implies that s = lst(h). The role of the scheduler is
to resolve nondeterminism: when we are in state s the scheduler selects a transition
among the ones available in T for s, and it can base its decision on the history of the
execution that has led to s.
The above definition actually corresponds to a restricted class of schedulers called
the Dirac non-halting schedulers. These schedulers choose a transition each time one
is available (while in general a scheduler may choose to stop even if a transition is
available). This restriction will allow us to simplify the definition of the probability
measures induced by the scheduler, since it reduces the sample space. Besides this
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constraint, we also impose that a scheduler does not use randomization in resolving
nondeterminism, while in general a scheduler may be randomized.
.
The execution tree of M under the scheduler ζ, denoted by etree(M , ζ), is a fully
probabilistic automaton M ′ = (St ′, sinit ,Act , T
′) such that St ′ ⊆ exec∗(M ), and
(h, a, µ′) ∈ T ′ if and only if ζ(h) = (lst(h), a, µ) for some µ, and µ′(has) = µ(s).
Intuitively, etree(M, ζ) is produced by unfolding the executions of M and resolving
all non-deterministic choices using ζ.
Given a probabilistic automatonM = (St , sinit ,Act , T ) and a scheduler ζ we can
define the probability space (ΩM ,FM , pM ) on the maximal executions of M induced
by ζ as follows:
• ΩM
def
= exec(M ) \ exec⊥(M ) (the set of all the maximal executions of M ).
• Given a finite execution h, the cone with prefix h is defined as Ch
def
= {h′ ∈
ΩM |h ≤ h
′}. Define F as the σ-field generated by the set of all cones of M .
• Define the probability of a cone Ch, where h = s0a1s1 . . . ansn, as
p(Ch)
def
=
n∏
i=1
µi(si)
where, for each i, ζ(s0a1s1 . . . ai−1si−1) = (si−1, ai, µi). We define pM ,ζ as
the measure extending p to F (see [Seg95] for more details).
Remark 2.2.1. The σ-field used in [SL95] considers the sample space Ω = exec(M)
to account for the termination at non-maximal executions. Since here we require that
the schedulers are total, the support of the measure pM ,ζ needs not to include elements
of exec⊥(M ). Note that the σ-field defined in this chapter coincides with the sub-
σ-field not containing exec⊥(M ) of the standard σ-field on probabilistic-automata
induced by total schedulers.
Convention Given a probabilistic automaton M and a scheduler ζ, we will denote
pM ,ζ by pζ whenever M is clear from the context.
2.3 CCS with probabilistic choice
In this section, we consider an extension of standard CCS ([Mil89]) obtained by
adding probabilistic choice. The resulting calculus CCSp can be seen as a simpli-
fied version of the probabilistic π-calculus presented in [HP00, PH05] and is similar
to the one considered in [DPP05, CP07b]. As in those calculi, computations have both
a probabilistic and a nondeterministic nature.
We consider a finite set A of actions and a set A¯ of complementary actions such
that, for each a ∈ A there is a complementary action a¯ ∈ A¯ with a¯ = a. The whole
set of actions Act = A ∪ A¯ ∪ {τ} corresponds to the union of A, A¯ and the action
τ /∈ A ∪ A¯ which represents the invisible action and does not have a complementary
action. Usually the number of elements in A is assumed to be at most countable, so
it can be in general either finite or infinite. We will restrict this condition to the finite
case when necessary in the remainder of the thesis.
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PROB
◦
∑
i pi Ti
τ
−→
∑
i pi δ(Ti)
ACT
j ∈ Iunionsqmultitext
Iai.Ti
aj
−→ δ(Tj)
PAR1
T1
a
−→ µ
T1 | T2
a
−→ µ | T2
PAR2
T2
a
−→ µ
T1 | T2
a
−→ T1 | µ
REP1
P
a
−→ µ
!P
a
−→ µ | !P
REP2
P
a
−→ δ(P1) P
a
−→ δ(P2)
!P
τ
−→ δ(P1 | P2 | !P )
COM
T1
a
−→ δ(T ′1) T2
a
−→ δ(T ′2)
T1 | T2
τ
−→ δ(T ′1 | T
′
2)
RES
T
b
−→ µ b 6= a, a
(νa)T
b
−→ (νa)µ
Table 2.1: The semantics of CCSp.
2.3.1 Syntax
T F process term
◦
∑
i∈I pi Ti probabilistic choice (
∑
i∈I pi = 1)
|
unionsqmultitext
i∈I ai.Ti nondeterministic choice (∀i, ai ∈ Act)
| T | T parallel composition
| (νa)T restriction (a ∈ Act)
| !T replication
All the summations in the syntax are finite and the set I is a finite set of indices.
The nil process is implicitely specified by a nondeterministic choice where the set of
indices is empty. We will use the notation T1⊕p T2 to represent a binary probabilistic
choice ◦
∑
i pi Ti with p1 = p and p2 = 1− p. Similarly we will use a1.T1
unionsqmultitext
a2.T2 to
represent a binary nondeterministic choice.
2.3.2 Semantics
The semantics of a given CCSp term is a probabilistic automaton whose states are
process terms, whose initial state is the given term, and whose transitions are those
derivable from the rules in Table 2.1. We will use the notations (T, a, µ) and T
a
−→ µ
interchangeably. We denote by µ | T the measure µ′ such that µ′(T ′ | T ) = µ(T ′)
for all processes T ′ and µ′(T ′′) = 0 if T ′′ is not of the form T ′ | T , and similarly for
T | µ. Furthermore we denote by (νa)µ the measure µ′ such that µ′((νa)T ) = µ(T ),
and µ′(T ′) = 0 if T ′ is not of the form (νa)T .
We explain now briefly the meaning of the rules:
• ACT represents the execution of the action aj in
unionsqmultitext
Iai.Ti.
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• PAR1 (resp. PAR2) represent the fact that in T1 | T2, the process T1 (resp. T2)
can execute a step while T2 (resp. T1) stays idle (interleaving).
• COM represents a communication step between T1 and T2 in T1 | T2, which
can take place when T1 and T2 are ready to perform complementary actions.
• RES filters out the transitions with label a or a¯ from a process restricted on a.
• REP1 (resp. REP2) express the fact that !T can spawn one (resp. two) copies
of T and let these copies perform a step.
• PROB models internal probabilistic choice: a silent τ transition is available
from the sum ◦
∑
i pi Ti to a measure composed of the sum of the Dirac functions
of its operands (the δ(Ti)’s) weighted by the corresponding probabilities pi.
Note that a term Ti in the probabilistic sum ◦
∑
i pi Ti generates exactly one
(probabilistic) transition Ti
τ
−→ δ(Ti).
Thus, all the rules of CCSp specialize to the ones of CCS except for PROB.These
rules allow the occurence of nondeterminism in the execution path of an automaton, by
involving nondeterministic choices or parallel processes. As explained in Section 2.2,
schedulers will be used to resolve such nondeterminism.
Note that in the produced probabilistic automaton, all transitions to non-Dirac
measures are silent. In other words, any non-silent transition performed by the au-
tomaton leads to a Dirac measure, i.e. is of the form T
a
−→ δ(T ′), which corresponds
to a transition of a non-probabilistic automaton (i.e. a standard labeled transition
system where, given the current process and the next action, only one transition is
possible).
It is interesting to observe that the resulting automaton is consistent with the def-
inition of alternating automaton of [PS07]: a probabilistic automaton is alternating
if the states that enable a non-Dirac transition enable only one transition. We call
probabilistic those states that enable non-Dirac transitions, and nondeterministic all
the other states. In other words, a probabilistic state enables at most one transition
while a nondeterministic state may enable several transitions with the constraint that
the target measure of each of these transitions is a Dirac measure.
2.4 Re´nyi Entropies, Shannon Entropy, and Mutual Information
In this thesis, we will be interested in evaluating the amount of information that can be
deduced about a random variable, given the knowledge of another random variable.
We recall now the most important notions which were defined for this purpose.
Re´nyi entropies [Re´n60] are a family of functions representing the uncertainty
associated to a random variable. The Re´nyi entropy of order α, with α ≥ 0 and
α 6= 1, is defined as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α
log
(
n∑
i=1
p(xi)
α
)
where X is a random variable ranging over the set {x1, . . . , xn} and p(xi) is the
probability of xi. In the case of a uniform distribution all the Re´nyi entropies of are
equal to log n. Otherwise the entropies are weakly decreasing as a function of α. The
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following are some particular cases:
α = 0 H0(X) = log |X| = logn Hartley entropy
α→ 1 H1(X) = −
∑
i p(xi) log p(xi) Shannon entropy
α→∞ H∞(X) = − logmaxi p(xi) min-entropy
We will be particularly interested in Shannon entropy, initially introduced by
Claude Shannon in 1948 [Sha48] (we will often write H for H1 in the remaining).
In particular, Shannon conditional entropy ofX given Y represents the average resid-
ual entropy of X once the value of Y is known, and it is defined as
H1(X|Y ) =
∑
y p(y)H1(X|Y = y)
= −
∑
ij p(xi, yj) log p(xi|yj)
= H1(X,Y )−H1(Y )
where H1(X,Y ) represents the entropy of the conjunction of X and Y .
The mutual information of X and Y represents the correlation of information
between X and Y . It is defined as
I(X;Y ) = H1(X)−H1(X|Y ) = H1(X) +H1(Y )−H1(X,Y )
It is possible to show that I(X;Y ) ≥ 0, with I(X;Y ) = 0 iff X and Y are indepen-
dent. For more details, we refer the reader to [CT06].
For min-entropy, the definition of H∞(X|Y ) has been subject to controversy in
the literature: some authors, e.g., [Cac97], generalize the aforementioned definition
of H1(X|Y ) to min-entropy, which leads to:
H∞(X|Y ) =
∑
y p(y)H∞(X|Y = y)
= −
∑
j p(yj) logmaxi p(xi|yj)
(2.1)
Other authors, e.g., [DORS08, Smi09], use the following definition:
H∞(X|Y ) = − log
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)p(xi)) (2.2)
The motivation for this second definition will become clear in Chapter 5.
2.5 Convexity and Corner Points
Finally, we recall here some basic notions of convexity. Let R be the set of real
numbers. The elements λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R constitute a set of convex coefficients
if, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, λi ≥ 0 and
∑
k λk = 1. Given a vector space V , a
convex combination of ~v1, ~v2, . . . , ~vk ∈ V is any vector of the form
∑
i λi ~vi where
λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R are a set of convex coefficients. A subset S of a vector space is
convex if every convex combination of vectors in S is in S.
In the following we will denote byD(n) the domain of probability distributions of
dimension n. It is easy to see that, for every n, D(n) is convex.
Given a convex subset S of a vector space V , and a function f : S → R, we
say that the function f is convex if for any ~v1, ~v2, . . . , ~vk ∈ S and any set of convex
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coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R, we have f(
∑
i λi ~vi) ≤
∑
i λif(~vi). A function f is
concave if its opposite −f is convex.
We now introduce (with a slight abuse of terminology) the concept of convex base.
Given a subset S of V , the convex hull of S, which we will denote by ch(S),
is the smallest convex set containing S. ch(S) is the set of convex combinations of
nonempty finite subsets of S. Since the intersection of convex sets is convex, it is
clear that ch(S) always exists.
Given two vector sets S and U , we say that U is a convex base for S if U ⊆ S
and S ⊆ ch(U).
In the following, for a given vector ~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), we will use the notation
(~v, f(~v)) to denote the vector (with one additional dimension) (v1, v2, . . . , vn, f(~v)).
Similarly, given a vector set S in a n-dimensional space, we will use the notation
(S, f(S)) to represent the set of vectors {(~v, f(~v)) | ~v ∈ S} in an (n+1)-dimensional
space. The notation f(S) represents the image of S under f , i.e. f(S) = {f(~v) | ~v ∈
S}.
Given a vector set S, a convex base U of S, and a function f : S → R, we say
that U is a set of corner points of f if (U, f(U)) is a convex base for (S, f(S)). We
also say that f is convexly generated by f(U).
In other words, if U is a set of corner points of f , then for every ~v ∈ S, there
are elements ~u1, ~u2, . . . , ~uk in U and λ1, λ2, . . . , λk in R such that ~v =
∑
i λi~ui and
f(~v) =
∑
i λif(~ui).

Chapter 3
The process calculus approach
3.1 Introduction
Recently it has been observed that at an abstract level information-hiding protocols
can be viewed as channels in the information-theoretic sense. A channel consists of
a set of input values S, a set of output values O (the observables) and a transition
matrix which gives the conditional probability p(o|s) of producing o as the output
when s is the input. In the case of privacy preserving protocols, S contains the secret
information that we want to protect andO the facts that the attacker can observe. This
framework allows us to apply concepts from information theory to reason about the
knowledge that the attacker can gain about the input by observing the output of the
protocol.
In the information-hiding systems we consider in this thesis, the attacker finds
himself in the following scenario: he cannot directly detect the information of interest,
namely the actual value of the random variable S ∈ S, but he can discover the value
of another random variable O ∈ O which depends on S according to a known con-
ditional distribution. This kind of situation is quite common also in other disciplines,
like medicine, biology, and experimental physics, to mention a few. The attempt to
infer S from O is called hypothesis testing (the “hypothesis” to be validated is the
actual value of S), and it has been widely investigated in statistics. One of the most
used approaches to this problem is the Bayesian method, which consists in assuming
that the a priori probability distribution of the hypotheses is known, and deriving from
that (and from the matrix of the conditional probabilities) the a posteriori distribution
after a certain fact has been observed. It is well known that the best strategy for the
adversary is to apply the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability) criterion, which,
as the name says, dictates that one should choose the hypothesis with the maximum
a posteriori probability for the given observation. “Best” means that this strategy in-
duces the smallest probability of error in the guess of the hypothesis. The probability
of error, in this case, is also called Bayes risk. In [CPP07], the degree of protection
provided by a protocol was defined as the Bayes risk associated to the matrix.
A major problem with the Bayesian method is the requirement that the a priori
distribution is known, which is by far not the common case in security applications.
It may be sometimes possible to approximate the a priori distribution by statistical
inference, but in most situations the input distribution is not known beforehand, and
may actually change over time. Thus other methods need to be considered, which do
not depend on the a priori distribution. Such a well-known alternative is the method
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based on the so-called Maximum Likelihood (ML) criterion. Given an hypothesis
s, the likelihood of an outcome o corresponds to the probability p(o|s) and the ML
criterion dictates to choose the highest such probability for this hypothesis.
For the large majority of the security protocols considered in this thesis, the ML
rule will provide a convenient approximation to the MAP rule. We will see in this
chapter that this approximation particularly holds when the protocol is repeated a
very large number of times, since a sufficient number of repetitions allows one to
effectively ”factor out” the a priori probabilities in the calculation of the preferred
hypothesis.
In the next section we present the variant of CCSp used in this chapter. Section 3.3
shows how to model protocols and process terms as channels. Section 3.4 discusses
hypothesis testing and presents some properties of the probability of error. Section 3.5
characterizes the constructs of CCSp which are safe, in the sense that applying them do
not decrease the security of the protocol. Finally Section 3.6 applies previous results
to find a new property of the Dining Cryptographers.
3.2 CCSp with secret and observable actions
In this section, we use a variant of the calculus CCSp introduced in Section 2.3. We
make here a distinction between observable and secret actions, introduced for the
purpose of specifying information-hiding protocols. More precisely, we assume that
the set of actions Act is partitioned into a set Sec of secret actions s, a set Obs of
observable actions o, and the silent action τ , i.e., Act = Sec ∪Obs ∪{τ} = A∪ A¯∪
{τ}.
Furthermore, for any secret s ∈ Sec (resp. o ∈ Obs) we assume that the comple-
mentary action satisfies s ∈ Sec (resp. o ∈ Obs).
The syntax corresponds to the one given in Paragraph 2.3.1, with two differences:
all actions in the nondeterministic choice are observables, and an additional choice
called secret choice is introduced, which only differs from nondeterministic choice by
the fact that all actions are secrets. More precisely, the nondeterministic choice in the
syntax given in Paragraph 2.3.1 is replaced by the two following choices:
unionsqmultitext
i si.Ti secret choice (si ∈ Sec)
unionsqmultitext
i ri.Ti nondeterministic choice (ri ∈ Obs ∪ {τ})
The semantics of CCSp described in Paragraph 2.3.2 is similar in this chapter.
The distinction between the two kind of labels (secrets and observables) influences
the notion of scheduler for CCSp: the secret actions are assumed to be inputs of the
system, namely they can only be performed if the input matches them. Hence some
choices are determined, or influenced, by the input. In particular, a secret choice with
different guards is entirely decided by the input. The scheduler has only to resolve the
residual nondeterminism which occurs in nondeterministic choices (where the labels
are observables) and in parallel composition of processes.
In the following, we use the notation X ⇀ Y to represent the partial functions
fromX to Y , and h|Sec to represent the projection of a sequence of actions h on Sec. If
for instance h = s1s2o1s3o2o3 with ∀i, si ∈ Sec and oi ∈ Obs , then h|Sec = s1s2s3.
We now adapt the notion of scheduler defined in Section 2.2 to secret choices.
Definition 3.2.1. Let T be a process in CCSp and M be the probabilistic automaton
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generated by T . A scheduler is a function
ζ : Sec∗ → exec∗(M ) ⇀ T
such that:
(i) if s = s1s2 . . . sn and h|Sec = s1s2 . . . sm withm ≤ n, and
(ii) there exists a transition (lst(h), a, µ) such that, if a ∈ Sec then a = sm+1
then ζ(s)(h) is defined, and it is one of such transitions. We say that the scheduler ζ
is compatible with the input s on h. We will write ζs(h) for ζ(s)(h).
In other words, a scheduler can only determine the outcome of a secret choice if
there exists a transition from the current state involving a secret action which matches
the next secret in the input sequence. Moreover, we require that the scheduler always
executes a transition if one is possible, which differs from the definition of scheduler
used in probabilistic automaton, where the scheduler can decide to stop, even if a
transition is allowed. This means that the schedulers we consider here always perform
maximal executions, i.e., they only stop when no next transition is possible.
We now adapt the definition of execution tree from the notion found in probabilis-
tic automata. In our case, the execution tree depends not only on the scheduler, but
also on the input. Given an input s and a scheduler ζ, it corresponds to the fully prob-
abilistic automaton which is obtained by removing from the execution tree exec∗(M )
of the initial automaton all transitions that are not chosen by ζs.
Definition 3.2.2. Let M = (St , T,Act , T ) be the probabilistic automaton generated
by a CCSp process T , where St is the set of processes reachable from T . Given an in-
put s and a scheduler ζ, the execution tree of T for s and ζ, denoted by etree(T, s, ζ),
is a fully probabilistic automaton M ′ = (St ′, T,Act , T ′) such that St ′ ⊆ exec(M ),
and (h, a, µ′) ∈ T ′ if and only if ζs(h) = (lst(h), a, µ) for some µ, and µ
′(has) =
µ(s).
3.3 Modeling protocols for information-hiding
In this section we propose an abstract model for information-hiding protocols, and we
show how to represent this model in CCSp.
3.3.1 Protocols as channels
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we view protocols as channels in
the information-theoretic sense [CT06]. The secret information that the protocol is
trying to conceal constitutes the input of the channel, and the observables constitute
the outputs. The set of the possible inputs and that of the possible outputs will be
denoted by S and O respectively. We assume that S and O are of finite cardinalitym
and n respectively. We also assume a discrete probability distribution over the inputs,
which we will denote by ~π = (πs1 , πs2 , . . . , πsm), where πs is the probability of the
input s.
To fit the model of the channel, we assume that at each run, the protocol is given
exactly one secret si to conceal. This is not a restriction, because the si’s can be
complex information like sequences of keys or tuples of individual data. During the
run, the protocol may use randomized operations to increase the level of uncertainty
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about the secrets and obfuscate the link with the observables. It may also have in-
ternal interactions between internal components, or other forms of nondeterministic
behavior, but let us rule out this possibility for the moment, and consider a purely
probabilistic protocol. We also assume there is exactly one output from each run of
the protocol, and again, this is not a restrictive assumption because the elements of O
can be structured data.
Given an input s, a run of the protocol will produce each o ∈ O with a certain
probability p(o|s) which depends on s and on the randomized operations performed
by the protocol. Note that p(o|s) depends only on the probability distributions on
the mechanisms of the protocol, and not on the input distribution. The probabilities
p(o|s), for s ∈ S and o ∈ O, constitute a m × n array M which is called the matrix
of the channel, where the rows are indexed by the elements of S and the columns are
indexed by the elements of O. We will use the notation (S,O,M) to represent the
channel.
Note that the input distribution ~π and the probabilities p(o|s) determine a distri-
bution on the output. We will represent by p(o) the probability of o ∈ O. Thus both
the input and the output can be considered random variables. We will denote these
random variables by S and O.
If the protocol contains some forms of nondeterminism, like internal components
giving rise to different interleaving and interactions, then the behavior of the protocol,
and in particular the output, will depend on the scheduling policy. We can reduce
this case to previous (purely probabilistic) scenario by assuming a scheduler ζ which
resolves the nondeterminism entirely. Of course, the conditional probabilities, and
therefore the matrix, will depend on ζ, too. We will express this dependency by using
the notationMζ .
3.3.2 Process terms as channels
A given CCSp term T can be regarded as a protocol in which the input is constituted
by sequences of secret actions, and the output by sequences of observable actions. We
assume that only a finite set of such sequences is relevant. This is certainly true if the
term is terminating, which is usually the case in security protocols, as each session is
supposed to terminate in finite time.
Thus the set S could be, for example, the set of all sequences of secret actions up
to a certain length (for example, the maximal length of executions) and analogously
O could be the set of all sequences of observable actions up to a certain length. To be
more general, we will just assume S ⊆fin Sec
∗ and O ⊆fin Obs
∗.
Definition 3.3.1. Given a term T and a scheduler ζ : S → exec∗(M ) → T , the
matrix Mζ(T ) associated to T under ζ is defined as the matrix such that, for each
s ∈ S and o ∈ O, p(o|s) is the probability of the set of the maximal executions in
etree(T, s, ζ) whose projection in Obs is o.
The following remark may be useful to understand the nature of the above defini-
tion:
Remark 3.3.2. Given a sequence s = s1s2 . . . sh, consider the term
T ′ = (νSec)(s¯1.s¯2. . . . .s¯h.0 | T )
Given a scheduler ζ for T , let ζ ′ be the scheduler on T ′ that chooses the transition
((νSec)(s¯j .s¯j+1. . . . .s¯h.0 | U), r, (νSec)(s¯j .s¯j+1. . . . .s¯h.0 | µ))
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if ζs chooses (U, r, µ), with (r 6∈ Sec), and it chooses
((νSec)(s¯j .s¯j+1. . . . .s¯h.0 | U), τ, (νSec)(δ(s¯j+1.s¯j+2. . . . .s¯h.0 | U
′)))
if ζs chooses (U, sj , δ(U
′)).
Note that ζ ′ is a “standard” scheduler, i.e., it does not depend on an input se-
quence.
We have that each element p(o|s) in Mζ(T ) is equal to the probability of the set
of all the maximal executions of T ′, under ζ ′, whose projection in Obs gives o.
3.4 Inferring the secrets from the observables
In this section we discuss possible methods by which an adversary can try to infer
the secrets from the observables, and consider the corresponding probability of error,
that is, the probability that the adversary draws the wrong conclusion. We regard the
probability of error as a representative of the degree of protection provided by the
protocol, and we study its properties with respect to the associated matrix.
We start by defining the notion of decision function, which represents the guess the
adversary makes about the secrets, for each observable. This is a well-known concept,
particularly in the field of hypothesis testing, where the purpose is to try to discover the
valid hypothesis from the observed facts, knowing the probabilistic relation between
the possible hypotheses and their consequences. In our scenario, the hypotheses are
the secrets.
Definition 3.4.1. A decision function for a channel (S,O,M) is any function
f : O → S
Given a channel (S,O,M), an input distribution ~π, and a decision function f ,
the probability of error P(f,M,~π) is the average probability of guessing the wrong
hypothesis by using f , weighted on the probability of the observable (see for instance
[CT06]). The probability that, given o, s is the wrong hypothesis is 1 − p(s|o) (with
a slight abuse of notation, we use p(·|·) to represent also the probability of the input
given the output). Hence we have:
Definition 3.4.2 ([CT06]). The probability of error is defined by
P(f,M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
p(o)p(f(o)|o)
Given a channel (S,O,M), the best decision function that the adversary can use,
namely the one that minimizes the probability of error, is the one associated to the
so-called MAP rule, which prescribes choosing the hypothesis s which hasMaximum
Aposteriori Probability (for a given o ∈ O), namely the s for which p(s|o) is max-
imum. The fact that the MAP rule represent the ‘best bet’ of the adversary is rather
intuitive, and well known in the literature. We refer to [CT06] for a formal proof.
The MAP rule is used in the so-called Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing,
and the corresponding probability of error is also known as Bayes risk. We will denote
it by PMAP(M,~π). The following characterization is an immediate consequence of
Definition 3.4.2 and of the Bayes theorem p(s|o) = p(o|s)πs/p(o).
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PMAP(M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
max
s
(πsp(o|s))
It is natural then to define the degree of protection associated to a process term
as the infimum probability of error that we can obtain from this term under every
scheduler (in a given class) which is compatible with the input on this term.
In the following, we assume the class of schedulers A to be the set of all the
schedulers compatible with the given input S on the given term.
It turns out that the infimum probability of error on A is actually a minimum. In
order to prove this fact, let us first define a suitable metric on A.
Definition 3.4.3. Consider a CCSp process T , and let M be the probabilistic automa-
ton generated by T . We define a distance d between schedulers in A as follows:
d(ζ, ζ ′) =

 2
−m ifm = min{|h| | h ∈ exec∗(M ) and ζ(h) 6= ζ ′(h)}
0 if ζ(h) = ζ ′(h) for all h ∈ exec∗(M )
where |h| represents the length of h.
Note that M is finitely branching, both in the nondeterministic and in the proba-
bilistic choices, in the sense that from every node T ′ there is only a finite number of
transitions (T ′, a, µ) and µ is a finite summation of the form µ =
∑
i pi δ(Ti). Hence
we have the following (standard) result:
Proposition 3.4.4. (A, d) is a sequentially compact metric space, i.e., every sequence
has a convergent subsequence (namely a subsequence with a limit in A).
We are now ready to show that there exists a scheduler that gives the minimum
probability of error:
Proposition 3.4.5. For every CCSp process T we have
inf
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) = min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π)
Proof. By Proposition 3.4.4, (A, d) is sequentially compact. Since the channel matrix
is a continuous function of the distance on the schedulers (each pair of a secret and an
observable, and the corresponding conditional probability is determined after a finite
number of steps), and since PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) is a continuous function of the matrix,
then PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) is a continuous function from (A, d) to ([0, 1], d
′), where d′
is the standard distance on real numbers. Consequently, ({PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) | ζ ∈
A}, d′) is also sequentially compact. Let {ζn}n be a sequence such that for all n
PMAP(Mζn(T ), ~π)− inf
A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) ≤ 2
−n
We have that {PMAP(Mζn(T ), ~π)}n is convergent and
lim
n
PMAP(Mζn(T ), ~π) = inf
A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π)
Consider now a convergent subsequence {ζnj}j of {ζn}n. By continuity of PMAP , we
have
lim
n
PMAP(Mζn(T ), ~π) = lim
j
PMAP(Mζnj (T ), ~π) = PMAP(limj
Mζnj (T ), ~π)
which concludes the proof. ✷
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Thanks to the previous proposition, we can define the degree of protection pro-
vided by a protocols in terms of the minimum probability of error.
Definition 3.4.6. Given a CCSp process T , the protection PtMAP(T ) provided by T ,
in the Bayesian approach, is given by
PtMAP(T, ~π) = min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π)
The problem with the MAP rule is that it assumes that the input distribution is
known to the adversary. This is often not the case, so it is natural to try to approximate
it with some other rule. One such rule is the so-called ML rule, which prescribes
the choice of the s which has Maximum Likelihood (for a given o ∈ O), namely
the s for which p(o|s) is maximum. The name comes from the fact that p(o|s) is
called the likelihood of s given o. We will denote the corresponding probability of
error by PML(M,~π). The following characterization is an immediate consequence of
Definition 3.4.2 and of the Bayes theorem.
PML(M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
πsmax
s
(p(o|s))
Note that if the input distribution is the uniform distribution ~πu = (
1
m ,
1
m , . . . ,
1
m ),
then PMAP and PML coincide:
PMAP(M,~πu) = 1−
∑
Omaxs∈S(p(o|s)πs)
= 1−
∑
Omaxs∈S(p(o|s)
1
m )
= 1− 1m
∑
Omaxs∈S(p(o|s))
= PML(M,~πu)
(3.1)
It has been shown (see for instance [CPP08a]) that under certain conditions on the
matrix, the ML rule approximates indeed the MAP rule, in the sense that by repeating
the protocol the adversary can make the probability of error arbitrarily close to 0, with
either rule.
We could now define the degree of protection provided by a term T under the
ML rule as the minimum PML(Mζ(T ), ~π), but it does not seem reasonable to give a
definition that depends on the input distribution, since the main reason to apply a non-
Bayesian approach is that indeed we do not know the input distribution. Instead, we
define the degree of protection associated to a process term as the average probability
of error with respect to all possible distributions ~π:
Definition 3.4.7. Given a CCSp process T , the protection PtML(T ) provided by T , in
the Maximum Likelihood approach, is given by
PtML(T ) = min
ζ∈A
(m− 1)!
∫
~π
PML(Mζ(T ), ~π) d~π
In the above definition, (m − 1)! represents a normalization factor: 1(m−1)! is
namely the hyper-volume of the domain of all possible distributions ~π on S, namely
the (m− 1)-dimensional space of points ~π (wherem is the cardinality of S) such that
∀s, 0 ≤ πs ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
∑
s∈S πs = 1 .
50 CHAPTER 3. THE PROCESS CALCULUS APPROACH
Fortunately, it turns out that this definition is equivalent to a much simpler one: the
average value of the probability of error, under the Maximum Likelihood rule, can be
obtained simply by computing PML on the uniform distribution ~πu = (
1
m ,
1
m , . . . ,
1
m ).
Theorem 3.4.8. PtML(T ) = minζ∈A PML(Mζ(T ), ~πu)
Proof. Simplifications First we note that the proof is trivial form = 1, which corre-
sponds to the situation in which there is only one secret. In this case an adver-
sary always guesses correctly the secret and therefore the probability of error
under the MAP rule and under the ML rule is zero. In the following we assume
m ≥ 2. Given a channel (S,O,M) and an input distribution ~π = (π1, . . . , πm)
of cardinalitym, the probability of error under the ML rule is characterized by
the expression:
PML(M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
πsmax
s
(p(o|s)) = fm(~π)
where fm(~π) is a function of the input distribution ~π. Since the elements
maxs(p(o|s)) are coefficients of the channel matrix, fm(~π) is of the form:
fm(~π) = a1π1 + . . .+ amπm
where the coefficients ai are linear combinations of elements of the channel
matrix. Therefore, fm(~π) is linear.
With the additional constraint
∑
i=1...m πi = 1, the dependency on one of the
m variables π1, . . . , πm, for instance πm, can be removed. Replacing πm by
the equivalent expression 1−
∑m−1
i=1 πi yields:
fm(~π) = c1π1 + . . .+ cm−1πm−1 + cm
with
c1 = a1 − am
c2 = a2 − am
. . .
cm−1 = am−1 − am
cm = am
Expression of the normalization factor The hyper-volume Vm(X) of the domain
Dm(X) of all possible distributions ~π on S (where m is the cardinality of S),
i.e., the (m − 1)-dimensional space of points ~π such that ∀s,0 ≤ πs ≤ X and
0 ≤
∑
s∈S πs = X is given by:
Vm(X) =
Xm−1
(m− 1)!
Induction hypothesis We will show by induction on m that following equality Hm
holds for allm ≥ 2:
∫
Dm(X)
fm(~π)d~π = Vm(X)fm(~πu(X)) (Hm) (3.2)
where ~πu(X) = (
X
m ,
X
m , . . . ,
X
m ). Theorem 3.4.8 then follows by takingX = 1.
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According to the aforementioned notations,Hm can be written as:
Lm(X) = Rm(X)
where
Lm(X) =
X∫
xm−1=0
X−xm−1∫
xm−2=0
. . .
X−xm−1−...−x2∫
x1=0
fm(x1, . . . , xm−1)dx1 . . . dxm−1
and
Rm(X) =
Xm−1
(m− 1)!
(
m−1∑
i=1
ci
X
m
+ cm)
Base case: m = 2
We have:
L2(X) =
∫ x1=X
x1=0
(c1x1 + c2)dx1
= c1X
2
2 + c2X
= X( c1X2 + c2)
= R2(X)
ThusH2 holds.
Induction step: Hm ⇒ Hm+1
Consider
fm+1(x) = c1x1 + . . .+ cmxm + cm+1
=
∑m
i=1 cixi + cm+1
= fm(x)− cm + cmxm + cm+1
The left-hand side ofHm+1 is given by:
Lm+1(Y ) =
∫ xm=Y
xm=0
. . .
∫ x1=Y−xm−...−x2
x1=0
fm+1(x1, . . . , xm)dx1 . . . dxm
The m − 1 inner-most integrations can be resolved according to Hm (re-
placing X by Y − xm) which leads to:
Lm+1(Y ) =
∫ xm=Y
xm=0
Vm(Y − xm)fm+1(
Y−xm
m , . . . ,
Y−xm
m )dxm
=
∫ xm=Y
xm=0
(Y−xm)
m−1
(m−1)! (
∑m−1
i=1 ci
Y−xm
m + cmxm + cm+1)dxm
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Replacing Y − xm by Z leads to:
Lm+1(Y ) =
∫ Z=Y
Z=0
Zm−1
(m−1)! ((
∑m−1
i=1 ci)
Z
m + cm(Y − Z)
+cm+1)dZ
=
∫ Z=Y
Z=0
(( 1m! (
∑m−1
i=1 ci)−
cm
(m−1)! )Z
m
+( cmY+cm+1(m−1)! )Z
m−1)dZ
= ( 1m! (
∑m−1
i=1 ci)−
cm
(m−1)! )
Ym+1
m+1 + (
cmY+cm+1
(m−1)! )
Ym
m
=
(
Pm−1
i=1
ci)+cm
(m+1)! Y
m+1 + cm+1m! Y
m
= Y
m
m! (
∑m
i=1 ci
Y
m+1 + cm+1) = Rm+1(Y )
ThusHm+1 holds.
This completes the proof for Theorem 3.4.8. ✷
The next corollary follows immediately from Theorem 3.4.8 and from the defi-
nitions of PMAP and PML which imply that PML(M,~πu) = PMAP(M,~πu) (see Equa-
tion 3.1):
Corollary 3.4.9. PtML(T ) = minζ∈A PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~πu)
We conclude this section with some properties of PMAP , which will hold also for
PML on the uniform distribution, because of Equation 3.1.
The next proposition shows that the probabilities of error are concave functions
with respect to the space of matrices.
Proposition 3.4.10. Consider a family of channels {(S,O,Mi)}i∈I , and a family
{ci}i∈I of convex coefficients, namely 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I , and
∑
i∈I ci = 1.
Then:
PMAP(
∑
i∈I
ciMi, ~π) ≥
∑
i∈I
ci PMAP(Mi, ~π)
Proof. Consider ∀i ∈ I,Mi = (pi(o|s))s∈S,o∈O. Then:
PMAP(
∑
i ciMi, ~π) = 1−
∑
omaxs(
∑
i ci pi(o|s)πs)
≥ 1−
∑
o
∑
i ci maxs(pi(o|s)πs) (convexity of max)
= 1−
∑
i
∑
o ci maxs(pi(o|s)πs) (positive summands)
= 1−
∑
i ci
∑
omaxs(pi(o|s)πs)
=
∑
i ci −
∑
i ci
∑
omaxs(pi(o|s)πs) (since
∑
i∈I ci = 1)
=
∑
i ci(1−
∑
omaxs(pi(o|s)πs
=
∑
i ciPMAP(Mi, ~π)
✷
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Corollary 3.4.11. Consider a family of channels {(S,O,Mi)}i∈I , and a family {ci}i∈I
of convex coefficients. Then:
PMAP(
∑
i∈I ciMi, ~π) ≥ mini∈I PMAP(Mi, ~π)
Proof.
PMAP(
∑
i∈I ciMi, ~π) ≥
∑
i∈I ci PMAP(Mi, ~π)
≥
∑
i∈I ci mink∈I PMAP(Mk, ~π)
= mini∈I PMAP(Mi, ~π)
✷
The next proposition shows that if we transform the observables, and collapse the
columns corresponding to observables which have become the same after the trans-
formation, the probability of error does not decrease.
Proposition 3.4.12 (Collapsing observables lowers leakage). Consider a channel (S,O,M),
where M has conditional probabilities p(o|s), and a transformation of the observ-
ables f : O → O′. Let M ′ be the matrix whose conditional probabilities are
p′(o′|s) =
∑
f(o)=o′ p(o|s) and consider the new channel (S,O
′,M ′). Then:
PMAP(M
′, ~π) ≥ PMAP(M,~π)
Proof. The result derives from:
∑
o′∈O′ maxs(p
′(o′|s)πs) =
∑
o′∈O′ maxs(
∑
f(o)=o′ p(o|s)πs)
≤
∑
o′∈O′
∑
f(o)=o′ maxs(p(o|s)πs)
=
∑
o∈Omaxs(p(o|s)πs)
✷
The following propositions are from the literature.
Proposition 3.4.13 (Probabilistic noninterference minimizes leakage [CPP08a]). Given
S,O, letM be a matrix indexed on S,O such that all the rows ofM are equal, namely
p(o|s) = p(o|s′) for all o ∈ O, s, s′ ∈ S. Then,
PMAP(M,~π) = 1−max
s
πs
Furthermore PMAP(M,~π) is the maximum probability of error, i.e., for every other
matrixM ′ indexed on S, O we have:
PMAP(M,~π) ≥ PMAP(M
′, ~π)
Proposition 3.4.14 ([BP05]). Given a channel (S,O,M), the rows of M are equal
(and hence the probability of error is maximum) if and only if p(s|o) = πs for all
s ∈ S, o ∈ O.
The condition p(s|o) = πs means that the observation does not give any additional
information concerning the hypothesis. In other words, the a posteriori probability of
s coincides with its a priori probability. The property p(s|o) = πs for all s ∈ S and
o ∈ O was used as a definition of (strong) anonymity by Chaum [Cha88] and was
called conditional anonymity by Halpern and O’Neill [HO05].
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3.5 Safe constructs
In this section we investigate constructs of the language CCSp which are safe with
respect to the protection of the secrets.
We start by giving some conditions that will allow us to ensure the safety of the
parallel and the restriction operators.
Definition 3.5.1. Consider a process term T , and the observables o1, o2, . . . , ok such
that
(i) T does not contain any secret action, and
(ii) the observable actions of T are included in o1, o2, . . . , ok.
Then we say that T is safe for Obs \ {o1, o2, . . . , ok}.
The following theorem states our main results for PtMAP . Note that they are also
valid for PtML, because PtML(T ) = PtMAP(T, ~πu).
Theorem 3.5.2. The probabilistic choice, the nondeterministic choice, and a re-
stricted form of parallel composition are safe constructs, namely, for every input prob-
ability π, and any terms T1, T2, . . . , Th, we have
(1) PtMAP(⊙
∑
i
pi Ti, ~π) ≥
∑
i
pi PtMAP(Ti, ~π) ≥ min
i
PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
(2) PtMAP(
unionsqmultidisplay
i
oi.Ti, ~π) = min
i
PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
(3) PtMAP((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2), ~π) ≥ PtMAP(T2, ~π)
if T1 is safe for Obs \ {o1, o2, . . . , ok}.
Proof. 1. By definition PtMAP(◦
∑
i pi Ti, ~π) = minζ∈A PMAP(Mζ(◦
∑
i pi Ti), ~π).
Let ζm = minargAPMAP(Mζ(◦
∑
i pi Ti), ~π). The scheduler ζm corresponds to
the worst case with respect to the protection of security, i.e., it always chooses
the execution path which minimizes the probability of error. By definition of
ζm, we have:
PtMAP(⊙
∑
i
pi Ti, ~π) = PMAP(Mζm(⊙
∑
i
pi Ti), ~π)
Consider, for each i, the scheduler ζmi defined as ζm on the i-th branch, except
for the removal of the first state and the first τ -step (i.e., the probabilistic choice)
from the execution fragments in the domain. Since ζm has no influence on the
first transition corresponding to the probabilistic choice, it is easy to see that
Mζm(⊙
∑
i
pi Ti) =
∑
i
piMζmi (Ti)
Thus we have:
PMAP(Mζm(◦
∑
i pi Ti), ~π) = PMAP(
∑
i piMζmi (Ti), ~π)
≥
∑
i piPMAP(Mζmi (Ti), ~π) (Prop. 3.4.10)
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Finally, observe that if ζm is compatible with the input S on T , then ζmi is com-
patible with S on Ti, i.e., all transitions labeled by a secret action that were al-
lowed with ζm are still allowed with ζmi . This comes from the fact that the only
action ”consumed” in the execution of the probabilistic choice is a τ -action and
therefore this step does not change the input sequence, i.e., the input sequence
given to every ζmi is the same as the one given to ζm. This also means that
every ζmi is the worst-case scheduler in the subbranch starting with the process
Ti and hence we have
PMAP(Mζm(◦
∑
i pi Ti), ~π) ≥
∑
i piPMAP(Mζmi (Ti), ~π)
≥
∑
i piPtMAP(Ti, ~π)
which concludes the proof of the first inequality.
The second inequality follows from Corollary 3.4.11.
2. Let ζm = minargAPMAP(Mζ(
unionsqmultitext
k ok.Tk), ~π). Let Ai be the class of schedulers
that choose the i-th branch at the beginning of the execution, and define
ζni = minargAiPMAP(Mζ(
unionsqmultidisplay
k
ok.Tk), ~π)
Since ζm is the worst-case scheduler for the whole execution tree and ζni is the
worst-case scheduler for the subtree starting with Ti, ζm coincides with ζnj ,
if ζm chooses the transition
unionsqmultitext
k ok.Tk
oj
−→ δ(Tj) as first step. The remaining
question is now how to determine which first path is chosen by ζm. This will
obviously be the path j in which the scheduler ζnj leads to the minimal proba-
bility of error compared to the any other scheduler ζnk in a path k. Therefore
we have
PtMAP(
unionsqmultitext
i oi.Ti, ~π) = PMAP(Mζm(
unionsqmultitext
k ok.Tk), ~π)
= mini PMAP(Mζni (
unionsqmultitext
k ok.Tk), ~π)
Consider now, for each i, the scheduler ζmi defined as as ζni , except for the
removal of the first state and the first step from the execution fragments in
the domain. Obviously ζmi is still compatible with S on
unionsqmultitext
k ok.Tk (because
the first step does not involve a secret action), and the observables of Ti are
in one-to one correspondence with those of
unionsqmultitext
k ok.Tk via the bijective func-
tion fi(oioj1 . . . ojk) = oj1 . . . ojk which maps the observables of the process
oiTi to the observables of Ti. Furthermore, all the probabilities of the channel
Mζni (
unionsqmultitext
i oi.Ti) are the same as those of Mζmi (Ti) modulo the renaming of o
into f(o). In other words, the scheduler does not increase the probability of
error by another way that the choice of a transition.
PtMAP(
unionsqmultitext
i oi.Ti, ~π) = mini PMAP(Mζni (
unionsqmultitext
k ok.Tk), ~π)
= mini PMAP(Mζmi (Ti), ~π)
= mini PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
which concludes the proof.
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3. Let ζm = minargAPMAP(Mζ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π). Hence
PtMAP((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2), ~π) =
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
The proof proceeds by constructing a set of series of schedulers whose limit
with respect to the metric d in Definition 3.4.3 correspond to schedulers on
the execution tree of T2. Consider a generic node in the execution tree of
(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2) under ζm, and let (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 | T
′
2) be
the corresponding term in that node, where T ′1 represents the evolution of T1
and T ′2 represents the evolution of T2. Assume h to be the execution history up
to that node. Let us consider separately the three possible kinds of transitions
derivable from the operational semantics, i.e., a transition from T ′1, a transition
from T ′2 or a synchronization between T
′
1 and T
′
2:
a) Transition from T ′1
We consider the step
(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 | T
′
2)
a
−→ (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (µ | T
′
2) (3.3)
due to a transition T ′1
a
−→ µ. In this case, a cannot be a secret action
because of the assumption that T1 does not contain secret actions. On
the other hand, the assumption that all the observable actions of T ′1 are
included in {o1, o2, . . . , ok}, and the fact that the transition does not ”con-
sume” any of them (as seen from the top-level restrictions) means that a
cannot be an observable action either. Therefore, a must be τ . Assume
that µ =
∑
i pi δ(T
′
1i). Then we have
(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (µ | T
′
2) =
∑
i pi δ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i | T
′
2)). Let
us consider the tree obtained by replacing this distribution with
δ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i | T
′
2)) (i.e., the tree obtained by pruning all alter-
natives except (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i | T
′
2), and assigning to it probability
1). Let ζmi be the projection of ζm on the new tree (i.e., ζmi is defined as
the projection of ζm on the histories h
′ such that if h is a proper prefix of
h′ then hτ(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i | T
′
2) is a prefix of h
′). We have
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
=
PMAP(
∑
i pi Mζmi((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
≥ (by Proposition 3.4.10)∑
i pi PMAP(Mζmi((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
The transition given in Equation 3.3 does not have a correspondent in the
execution tree of T2 (since the execution in the parallel processes occurs
on the side of T1). However, the outcome of the transition in the side of
T1 may have an influence on the future computation in the execution tree
of T2: nothing prevents the execution of (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i | T
′
2) from
differing from the execution of (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1j | T
′
2) when i 6= j.
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In other words, ζmi and ζmj may follow different paths in the execution
tree of T2. This obliges us to consider all different schedulers for T2 which
are associated to the various ζmi’s for different i’s.
b) Transition from T ′2
We consider a step
(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 | T
′
2)
a
−→ (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 | µ)
due to a transition T ′2
a
−→ µ, with a not included in {o1, o2, . . . , ok}. In
this case, the corresponding scheduler for T2 will choose the same transi-
tion, i.e., T ′2
a
−→ µ. This comes from the fact that the observables actions
of T1 are included in {o1, o2, . . . , ok}, which are not “consumed” in this
transition. Therefore, the scheduler for T2 cannot win anything by choos-
ing another transition than T ′2
a
−→ µ.
c) Synchronization between T ′1 and T
′
2
We consider a step
(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 | T
′
2)
τ
−→ (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) δ(T
′′
1 | T
′′
2 )
due to the transitions T ′1
a
−→ δ(T ′′1 ) and T
′
2
a¯
−→ δ(T ′′2 ). In this case
a must be an observable o because of the assumption that T1 does not
contain secret actions. The corresponding scheduler for T2 must choose
the transition T ′2
a¯
−→ δ(T ′′2 ).
By considering the inequalities given by the transitions of type (a), we obtain
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
≥∑
i pi PMAP(Mζmi((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
≥∑
i pi
∑
j qj PMAP(Mζmij ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
≥∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh PMAP(Mζmijh((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
≥
. . .
Observe now that {ζm, ζmi, ζmij , ζmijh, . . .} is a converging series of sched-
ulers whose limit ζmijh... is isomorphic to a scheduler for T2, except that some
of the observable transitions in T2 may be removed due to the restriction on
o1, o2, . . . , ok. This removal determines a (usually non injective) mapping f on
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Figure 3.1: Secret choice does not preserve safety
the observables. Hence:
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
≥∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh . . .PMAP(Mζmijh...((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π)
≥ (by Proposition 3.4.12)∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh . . .PMAP(Mζmijh...(T2), ~π)
≥∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh . . .minζ∈A PMAP(Mζ(T2), ~π)
Finally, observe that
∑
i pi =
∑
j qj =
∑
h rh = . . . = 1, hence
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 | T2)), ~π) ≥ min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T2), ~π)
which concludes the proof.
✷
Unfortunately the safety property does not hold for the secret choice. The follow-
ing is a counterexample, illustrated on Figure 3.1.
Example 3.5.3. Let the set of secrets be Sec = {s1, s2} and assume that the set S of
possible input sequences does not contain the empty sequence. Let T = o1.0
unionsqmultitext
o2.0.
Then PtMAP(T, ~π) is maximum (i.e., PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1 − max~π) because for every
sequence s ∈ S we have p(o1|s) = p(o2|s). Let T
′ = s1.T
unionsqmultitext
s2.T . We can now
define a scheduler ζ0 such that, if the secret starts with s1, it selects o1, and if the secret
starts with s2, it selects o2. Hence, under this scheduler, p(o1|s1s) = p(o2|s2s) = 1
while p(o1|s2s) = p(o2|s1s) = 0. Therefore
PMAP(Mζ0(T
′), ~π) = 1−
∑
Omaxs∈S(p(o|s)πs)
= 1−maxs∈S(p(o1|s1s)p1)−maxs∈S(p(o2|s2s)p2)
= 1− p1 − p2
where p1 and p2 are the maximum probabilities of the secrets of the form s1s and
s2s, respectively. Note now that either max~π = p1 or max~π = p2 because of the
3.5. SAFE CONSTRUCTS 59
Figure 3.2: Without condition (i), parallel composition may not preserve safety
assumption that S does not contain the empty sequence. Let ~π be such that both p1
and p2 are positive. Then we have
PtMAP(T
′, ~π) = minζ PMAP(Mζ(T
′), ~π) by definition
≤ PMAP(Mζ0(T
′), ~π)
= 1− p1 − p2
< 1−max~π p1 and p2 positive
= PtMAP(T, ~π)
which shows that the safety property is not satisfied.
The reason why we need the condition (i) in Definition 3.5.1 for the parallel op-
erator is analogous to the case of secret choice. The following is a counterexample
illustrated on Figure 3.2.
Example 3.5.4. Let Sec and S be as in Example 3.5.3. Define T1 = s1.0
unionsqmultitext
s2.0
and T2 = o1.0
unionsqmultitext
o2.0. Clearly, PtMAP(T2, ~π) = 1 −max~π. Consider now the term
T1 | T2 and define a scheduler that first executes an action s in T1 and then, if s is s1,
it selects o1, while if s is s2, it selects o2. The rest proceeds like in Example 3.5.3,
where T ′ = T1 | T2 and T = T2.
The reason why we need the condition (ii) in Definition 3.5.1 is that without it the
parallel operator may create different interleavings, thus increasing the possibility of
an adversary discovering the secrets. The following is a counterexample illustrated on
Figure 3.3.
Example 3.5.5. Let Sec and S be as in Example 3.5.3. Define T1 = o.0 and T2 =
s1.(o1.0 ⊕.5 o2.0)
unionsqmultitext
s2.(o1.0 ⊕.5 o2.0). It is easy to see that PtMAP(T2, ~π) = 1−
max~π (here T2 only involves probabilistic and secret choices, which do not leave any
nondeterminism to be resolved by the scheduler). Consider the term T ′ = T1 | T2 and
define a scheduler that first executes an action s in T2 and then, if s is s1, it selects first
T1 and then the continuation of T2, while if s is s2, it selects first the continuation of
T2 and then T1. Hence, under this scheduler, p(oo1|s1s) = p(oo2|s1s) = .5 and also
p(o1o|s2s) = p(o2o|s2s) = .5 while p(oo1|s2s) = p(oo2|s2s) = 0 and p(o1o|s1s) =
p(o2o|s1s) = 0. Therefore PtMAP(T
′, ~π) ≤ 1 − p1 − p2 where p1 and p2 are the
maximum probabilities of the secrets of the form s1s and s2s, respectively. Following
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Figure 3.3: Without condition (ii), parallel composition may not preserve safety
the same reasoning as in Example 3.5.3, we have that for certain ~π, PtMAP(T
′, ~π) ≤
1− p1 − p2 < 1−max~π = PtMAP(T2, ~π).
3.6 A case study: the Dining Cryptographers
In this section, we consider the Dining Cryptographers (DC) protocol already pre-
sented in Paragraph 1.2.2.2, and we show how to describe it in CCSp. Then, we
apply the results of the previous section to obtain a generalization of Chaum’s strong
anonymity result.
The cryptographers correspond to nodes of a so-called DC multigraph, in which
the edges represent the coins and there may be several edges between two nodes
(hence the name “multigraph”). Here the master is not explicitely represented. The
theorem proven by Chaum in [Cha88] states that the DC is strongly anonymous if all
the coins are fair, i.e., they give 0 and 1 with equal probability, and the DC multigraph
is connected, namely there is a path between each pair of nodes. To state formally the
property, let us denote by s the secret identity of the payer, and by o the collection of
the declarations of the cryptographers.
Theorem 3.6.1 ([Cha88]). If the DC multigraph is connected, and the coins are fair,
then DC is strongly anonymous, namely for every s and o, p(s|o) = p(s) holds.
We can now represent a DC protocol involving n cryptographers as a noisy chan-
nel matrix M where each coefficient mij = p(oj |si) corresponds to the probability
that the cryptographer i is the payer, given the observable oj . There are n secrets and
2n observables in the protocol: each observable oj = (oj1, oj2, . . . , ojn) is a (binary)
n-tuple of the possible answers of the cryptographers.
We are now going to show how to express the DC in CCSp. We start by introducing
a notation for value-passing in CCSp, following standard lines.
Input c(x).T =
unionsqmultidisplay
v
cv.T [v/x]
Output c¯〈v〉 = c¯v
We define a processC rypti and a processCoinh for each cryptographer and each
coin respectively. An additional processCollect is created whose purpose is to collect
all the declarations of the cryptographers, and output them in the form of a tuple. To
each cryptographer Crypt i is associated a secret action pay i, which is zero unless the
corresponding cryptographer is the payer. All the other actions are observables.
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C rypti = ci,i1(x1) . . . . . ci,ik(xk) . pay i(zi) . ¯outi〈x1 + . . .+ xk + zi〉
Coinh = c¯ℓ,h〈0〉 . c¯r,h〈0〉.0 ⊕ph c¯ℓ,h〈1〉 . c¯r,h〈1〉.0
Collect = out1(y1) . out2(y2) . . . . . outn(yn) . outall〈y1, y2, . . . , yn〉
DC = (ν~c)(ν ~out)(
∏
i C rypti |
∏
h Coinh | Collect)
Table 3.1: The dining cryptographers protocol expressed in CCSp. The action
¯outi〈x1 + . . .+ xk + zi〉 represents the output of the sum modulo 2 of x1, . . . , xk, zi
and the notation
∏
i Ti stands for the parallel computation of all Ti processes.
The channel ci,h represents the communication channel between the cryptogra-
pher C rypti and the coin Coinh if the index h is indeed the index of a coin in the
system. Otherwise, ci,h is a communication channel “with the environment”. We call
this latter external channel. In the original definition of the DC there are no exter-
nal channels, we have added them to prove a generalization of Chaum’s result. They
could be interpreted as a way for the environment to influence the computation of the
cryptographers and hence to test the system, for the purpose of discovering the secret.
The protocol can then be described as the parallel composition of the cryptogra-
phers processes C rypti, of the coin processes Coinh, and of the process Collect.
See Table 3.1 for the DC protocol expressed in CCSp.
We are now ready to state our generalization of Chaum’s result, which states that
all edges (i.e., coins) of the DC network are not required to achieve strong anonymity,
as long as a spanning tree of fair coins connects all cryptographers of the network.
We recall that a spanning tree of a connected graphG is a tree composed of all the
vertices and some (or perhaps all) of the edges of G. It is also a minimal set of edges
that connect all vertices of the graph.
Theorem 3.6.2. A DC is strongly anonymous if the DC multigraph has a spanning
tree consisting of fair coins only.
Proof. Consider the term DC in Table 3.1. Remove all the coins that do not belong
to the spanning tree, and the corresponding restriction operators. Let T be the process
term obtained this way. Let A be the class of schedulers which select the value 0 for
all the external channels. This situation corresponds to the original formulation of
Chaum and so we can apply Chaum’s result (Theorem 3.6.1) and Proposition 3.4.14
to conclude that all the rows of the matrixM are the same and hence, by Proposition
3.4.13, PMAP(M,~π) = 1−maxi πi.
Consider now one of the removed coins, h, and assume, without loss of generality,
that cℓ,h(x), cr,h(x) are the first actions in the definitions of Cryptℓ and Cryptr.
Consider the class of schedulers B that selects value 1 for x in these actions. The
matrixM ′ that we obtain is isomorphic toM : the only difference is that each column
o is now mapped to a column o + w, where w is a tuple that has 1 in the ℓ and r
positions, and 0 in all other positions, and + represents the componentwise binary
sum. Since this map is a bijection, we can apply Proposition 3.4.12 in both directions
and derive that PMAP(M
′, ~π) = 1−maxi πi.
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By repeating the same reasoning on each of the removed coins, we can conclude
that PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−maxi πi for any scheduler ζ of T .
Consider now the term T ′ obtained from T by adding back the coin h:
T ′ = (νcℓ,hcr,h)(Coinh | T )
By applying Theorem 3.5.2 we can deduce that
PtMAP(T
′, ~π) ≥ PtMAP(T, ~π)
By repeating this reasoning, we can add back all the coins, one by one, and obtain the
original DC . Hence we can conclude that
PtMAP(DC , ~π) ≥ PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−max
i
πi
and, since 1−maxi πi is the maximum probability of error we have
PtMAP(DC , ~π) = 1−max
i
πi
which concludes the proof. ✷
Interestingly, also the other direction of Theorem 3.6.2 holds. We report this result
for completeness, however we have proved it by using traditional methods, not by
applying the compositional methods of Section 3.5.
Theorem 3.6.3. A DC is strongly anonymous only if the DC multigraph graph has a
spanning tree consisting of fair coins only.
Proof. By contradiction. Let G be the multigraph associated to the DC and let n be
the number of vertices in G. Assume that G does not have a spanning tree consisting
only of fair coins. Then it is possible to split G in two non-empty subgraphs, G1 and
G2, such that all the edges between G1 and G2 are unfair. Let (c1, c2, . . . , cm) be
the vector of coins corresponding to these edges. Since G is connected, we have that
m ≥ 1.
Let a1 be a vertex in G1 and a2 be a vertex in G2. By strong anonymity, for every
observable o we have
p(o | a1) = p(o | a2) (3.4)
Observe now that p(o | a1) = p(o+ w | a2) where w is a binary vector of dimension
n containing 1 exactly twice, in correspondence of a1 and a2, and + is the binary
sum. Hence (3.4) becomes
p(o+ w | a2) = p(o | a2) (3.5)
Since, by construction, G1 and G2 are two non-empty subgraphs, part of the el-
ements in the n-tuple o correspond to edges in G1 and others to edges in G2. Let d
be the binary sum of all the elements of o in G1, and d
′ be the binary sum of all the
elements of o+w in G1. Since in G1 w contains 1 exactly once, we have d
′ = d+1.
Hence Equation 3.5, being valid for all o’s, implies
p(d+ 1 | a2) = p(d | a2) (3.6)
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Because of the way o, and hence d, are calculated, and since the contribution of the
edges internal to G1 is 0, and a2 (the payer) is not in G1, we have that
d =
m∑
i=1
ci
from which, together with Equation 3.6, and the fact that the coins are independent
from the choice of the payer, we derive
p(
m∑
i=1
ci = 0) = p(
m∑
i=1
ci = 1) = 1/2 (3.7)
The last step is to prove that p(
∑m
i=1 ci = 0) = 1/2 implies that one of the ci’s
is fair, which will give us a contradiction. We prove this by induction on m. The
property obviously holds form = 1. Let us now assume that we have proved it for the
vector (c1, c2, . . . , cm−1). Observe that p(
∑m
i=1 ci = 0) = p(
∑m−1
i=1 ci = 0)p(cm =
0) + p(
∑m−1
i=1 ci = 1)p(cm = 1). From Equation 3.7 we derive
p(
m−1∑
i=1
ci = 0)p(cm = 0) + p(
m−1∑
i=1
ci = 1)p(cm = 1) = 1/2 (3.8)
Now, it is easy to see that Equation 3.8 has only two solutions: one in which p(cm =
0) = 1/2, and one in which p(
∑m−1
i=1 ci = 1) = 1/2. In the first case we are done, in
the second case we apply the induction hypothesis. ✷
3.7 Conclusion and future work
In this chapter we have investigated the properties of the probability of error associated
to a given information-hiding protocol, and the CCSpconstructs that are safe, i.e., that
are guaranteed not to decrease the protection of the protocol. Then we have applied
these results to strengthen a result of Chaum: the dining cryptographers are strongly
anonymous if and only if they have a spanning tree of fair coins.
In the future, we would like to extend our results to other constructs of the lan-
guage. This is not possible in the present setting, as the examples after Theorem 3.5.2
show. The problem is related to the scheduler: the standard notion of scheduler is
too powerful and can leak secrets, by depending on the secret choices that have been
made in the past (problem of the omniscient scheduler). All the examples after The-
orem 3.5.2 are based on this kind of problem. This problem has already been consid-
ered in [CPP07], where a language-based solution was used to restrict the power of the
scheduler. We are planning to investigate whether such approach could be exploited
here to guarantee the safety of more constructs.

Chapter 4
The logical approach
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a modal logic, called doxastic µ-calculus with error con-
trol (DµCEC), for expressing properties based on belief, such as “the execution of the
protocol does not increase the belief about the identity of the culprit” (anonymity),
and “Alice believes with degree of confidence 1/2 that Bob has received the bit 0”
(a feature of the oblivious transfer), thus expressing notions that were not captured
by the approach based on process calculus developed in Chapter 3. In this chapter,
we express security protocols in terms of DµCEC logical formulae interpreted as pro-
cesses of the specification formalism CCSp(CCS with probabilistic internal choice).
This language was already presented in Chapter 2 and used in Chapter 3 to formalize
information-hiding protocols and to study their compositionality.
Contrary to Chapter 3, we will not need in this chapter to distinguish between
secret and nondeterministic choices and we will therefore use the initial version of the
language.
The distinguishing feature of our logic is to provide a combination of dynamic
operators for belief (whence the attribute “doxastic”) with a control on the possible
error of apprehension of the perceived reality, and for internalized probability. Both
operators are dynamic (non-monotonic) thanks to the possibility of combining them
with temporal operators, and are parameterized with a lower and upper probability
bound (the error control).
Dynamicity is useful for the logical formalization of the original intuition of prob-
abilistic anonymity and oblivious transfer, namely the invariance between the a priori
and the a posteriori stances of apprehension of the perceived reality (cf. Section 4.3
and Paragraph 4.4.2). The belief operator is used to express that an agent a believes
with confidence of at least l and at most u that a state of affairs φ is the case. The
operator for internalized probability is used to express that a state of affairs φ is the
case with certainty of at least l and at most u. Note that confidence is a qualification of
an agent’s belief (that something is the case), whereas certainty is just a qualification
of something being the case: confidence has a subjective (belief) connotation whereas
certainty has an objective (truth) connotation. In our framework, both qualifications
are also quantitative thanks to the mentioned error control in terms of a lower and
upper probability bound.
Our motivation for developing such a logic relies on its multiple advantages com-
pared to the approaches based on the expression of the properties directly on the un-
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derlying formalism used to model the protocol. First, the logic resides on a higher
level and therefore allows to reason more deeply about the properties of the protocol,
by highlighting their subtelties. Moreover, using a logic to express properties leads
to a specification that is independent from the (lower-level) formalism used for rep-
resenting the protocol. Last but not least, the logic is more expressive, in particular
thanks to the possible distinction between subjective and objective uncertainty, i.e.
between belief and probabilistic truth.
As an example, consider the property of strong anonymity that, in Paragraph 1.2.2.3
and following [CP05], we expressed as the equality of the likelihoods of all anony-
mous events. Intuitively we intend such likelihoods to represent the subjective un-
certainty of an adversary, but, having only one form of probability to express them
made it in that case impossible to distinguish between belief and probabilistic truth.
Here however we are able to make such distinction, and we express strong anonymity
in terms of belief (see Section 4.3). We come back to the Dining Cryptographers
(DC) network (slightly modified compared to the example in Section 3.6) to illustrate
our approach, and additionally consider Oblivious Transfer [Rab81] for single bits
and entire strings. The properties of the Oblivious Transfer, which were already ana-
lyzed in [CP07a], are represented here by using both belief and probabilistic truth (see
Section 4.4).
We start this chapter by introducing in Section 4.2 the doxastic µ-calculus with
error control (DµCEC). Sections 4.3 and 4.4 are dedicated to the formalization and
validation of probabilistic anonymity and oblivious transfer. Finally, Section 4.5 con-
cludes the chapter with an assessment of achievements and future work.
4.2 A quantitative doxastic logic and its interpretation in CCSp
4.2.1 Modal operators for belief and truth
In this section we propose an extension DµCEC of Nielsen’s µ-calculus with past
[Nie98] suitable for expressing information-hiding properties and for reasoning about
security protocols.
Recall that the µ-calculus has modal operators a that express the future capa-
bilities of a process: the formula a φ means that a process can perform the action a
and evolve into a new process that satisfies φ. In addition to these, Nielsen’s calculus
contains also their past counterparts 
^
a : the formula 
^
a φmeans that the process is the
outcome of an a-transition from another process which satisfies φ.
We extend Nielsen’s calculus in two ways:
1. We internalize probabilistic truth in the form of probabilistic statements which
are based on Parma and Segala’s probabilistic extension [PS07] of Hennessy-
Milner logic. They consider constructs like [φ]p, where p is a parameter repre-
senting a probability. Formulas are interpreted on probability measures, and the
meaning of [φ]p is that the set of states that satisfy φ has probability at least p
with respect to the given measure. We actually consider constructs like P qp (φ),
meaning that the set of states that satisfy φ has probability at least p and at most
q. The operator P qp (φ) could be approximated by [φ]p ∧ ¬[φ]q+ǫ, but we pre-
fer to have the former as a primitive because in some examples we need exact
probabilities.
2. We add belief in the form of doxastic operators iB
q
p which represent the degree
of confidence of agents about the truth of formulas in DµCEC. Intuitively the
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formula iB
q
p(φ) means that the agent i estimates that there is a probability at
least p and at most q that the process satisfies φ.
Remark 4.2.1. Note that in general iB
q
p(P
1
1 (φ)) and iB
1
1(P
q
p (φ)) are not equiva-
lent, neither are P 11 (iB
q
p(φ)) and P
q
p (iB
1
1(φ)). The intuitive meaning of these four
formulae is the following:
• iB
q
p(P
1
1 (φ)): Agent i believes with probability at least p and at most q that φ is
always satisfied (i.e. satisfied in all states of the protocol).
• iB
1
1(P
q
p (φ)): Agent i knows (i.e. has no doubt) that a state in which φ is satisfied
has a probability at least p and at most q to occur.
• P 11 (iB
q
p(φ)): In all states, agent i believes with probability at least p and at
most q that φ is satisfied.
• P qp (iB
1
1(φ)): There is a probability at least p and at most q that a state occurs
in which agent i knows that φ is satisfied.
For instance, if iB
1
1(P
1/2
1/2 (φ)) holds, the agent i knows that φ is satisfied in half of
the states of the protocol, while if iB
1/2
1/2(P
1
1 (φ)) holds, agent i is never sure about
anything. On the other hand if P
1/2
1/2 (iB
1
1(φ)) holds, we may find a state in which
agent i knows that φ is false, while if P 11 (iB
1/2
1/2(φ)) holds, agent i is never sure about
anything.
4.2.2 Syntax of DµCEC
The syntax of DµCEC is given by the following grammar, where p and q are constant
between 0 and 1:
φF ⊤ | X | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | a φ | 
^
a φ | P qp (φ) | iB
q
p(φ) | lfpXφ(X)
where lfpXφ(X) is a least fixpoint formula where the variable X is assumed to
occur positively in φ.
The use of fixpoint operators in modal logics of programs goes back mainly to
Pratt [Pra81], Emerson and Clarke [EC80] and Kozen [Koz83] and was motivated
by the need to have a semantics for recursion, which could then provide an effective
way of expressing all the usual operators of temporal logics. In particular, formula
such as ”always φ” or ”there exists a path on which φ eventually holds” can be easily
expressed with fixpoint operators. The positivity requirement on the fixpoint operator
allows to ensure by a syntactic means that φ(X) represents a functional monotonic in
X , and so has unique minimal and maximal fixpoint. We refer the interested reader
to [BS] for more details on modal µ-calculi.
To define formally what it means that X occurs positively in a formula, we use
the standard notion of context C[ ] and define the concepts of positive and negative
context as follows.
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Definition 4.2.2. For a context C[ ], the properties of being positive and being nega-
tive are defined inductively as follows:
[ ] is positive
C[ ] ∧ φ is positive if C[ ] is positive
φ ∧ C[ ] is positive if C[ ] is positive
pop(C[ ]) is positive if C[ ] is positive with pop = a , 
^
a , P 1p , or iB
1
p
nop(C[ ]) is positive if C[ ] is negative with nop = ¬, P p0 , or iB
p
0
lfpXC[X] is positive (C[ ] must be positive)
and
C[ ] ∧ φ is negative if C[ ] is negative
φ ∧ C[ ] is negative if C[ ] is negative
pop(C[ ]) is negative if C[ ] is negative with pop = a , 
^
a , P 1p , or iB
1
p
nop(C[ ]) is negative if C[ ] is positive with nop = ¬, P p0 , or iB
p
0
Definition 4.2.3. X occurs positively in φ if φ = C[X] for some positive context C[ ].
Remark 4.2.4. Informally, a variableX occurs positively if it is not within the scope
of an odd numer of negations, that is if we use the actual value of X and not its
negations. There exists another implicit kind of negation that occurs when we impose
an upper bound to the probability of a positive occurrence of X or when we impose
a lower bound to the probability of a negative occurrence of X . This leads to the
relative definition of operators P qp .
4.2.3 CCSp revisited
We want to use the logic DµCEC to express properties of processes written in CCSp,
and we will therefore provide an interpretation of our logic in this language, in the
form of a satisfaction relation |= between CCSp and DµCEC.
We will use in this chapter the CCSp variant described in Chapter 2. Again, the
whole set of actions is represented by Act = A ∪ A¯ ∪ {τ}, but here we assume that
the number of channel names (i.e. the elements in A) is finite (rather than countable
in the general case). This restriction allows us to express certain operators as syntactic
sugar, notably the operators · , 
^
· , and · of Table 4.2, thus simplifying the theory.
The finiteness assumption is not really a restriction in the context of this chapter, be-
cause we are interested in analysing properties of programs, that, being finite syntactic
entities, can only contain a fixed number of channel names.
4.2.4 Interpretation of DµCEC
We are now ready to define a satisfaction relation between the language CCSp and
our logic DµCEC. In standard Hennessy-Milner logic, and in µ-calculus, satisfaction
is usually defined with respect to processes. Here we need to interpret the doxastic
operators iB
q
p, and for this purpose we must consider not just the current process,
but the whole (finite) history of the execution, because of the dynamic nature of our
notion of belief. Furthermore, as explained before, in order to interpret the formulas
P qp (φ) we need to consider probabilistic measures. In conclusion, we are going to
take as domain the set of discrete distributions Disc(exec∗(M )), where exec∗(M ) is
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the set of finite histories generated by the probabilistic automaton M underlying the
CCSp semantics (as defined in Section 2.2). Note that by definition, all histories in
exec∗(M ) start with the same initial state sinit , the initial state of the automaton M .
Given a history h, an action a, and a probability distribution on states µ, we denote by
haµ the extension of µ to the histories of the form haP , for every CCSp process P .
Namely:
(haµ)(h′)
def
=
{
µ(P ) if h′ = haP
0 otherwise
The interpretation of the operators iB
q
p is based on an epistemic accessibility relation
≡i on finite histories. Intuitively h1 ≡i h2 represents the fact that the histories h1
and h2 are indistinguishable to an agent i. ≡i is usually chosen to be an equivalence
relation as induced by the local view of i. We assume that the local view is only
restricted to actions (while the states, represented by processes, remain hidden to i),
hence we consider the projection of histories on actions (traces). Intuitively, the trace
of h is the string of the actions in h, i.e. what is left in h after we remove all the states.
More formally:
Definition 4.2.5. Given a finite history h, the trace of h is defined inductively as
follows:
• trace(P ) = ǫ (the empty trace)
• trace(haP ) = trace(h)a
We assume that in general an agent has only a partial view on actions. Formally,
this can be represented by introducing the following abstraction function:
Assumption 4.2.6. For every agent i we assume a function Vi : A→ A ∪ {ǫ} which
represents i’s view on actions.
We can now define formally the accessibility relation on traces and histories. We
use for simplicity the same symbol ≡i to denote both relations.
Definition 4.2.7. Let a, b be actions and t, t′ be traces.
• For every agent i, the relation ≡i on traces is defined inductively as follows:
– ǫ ≡i ǫ
– ta ≡i t
′b if either Vi(a) = Vi(b) and t ≡i t
′
or
Vi(a) = ǫ and t ≡i t
′Vi(b)
or
Vi(b) = ǫ and tVi(a) ≡i t
′
• For every agent i, the relation ≡i on histories is defined as follows:
h ≡i h
′ if and only if trace(h) ≡i trace(h
′)
We can now define the interpretation of DµCEC with respect to the process terms
of CCSp. We only consider the closed formulas of DµCEC, namely only the formulas
in which all variable occurrences are bound.
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µ |= ⊤
µ |= φ1 ∧ φ2 :iff µ |= φ1 and µ |= φ2
µ |= ¬φ :iff µ 6|= φ
µ |= a φ :iff for every h ∈ supp(µ) there exists η and a transition
lst(h)
a
−→ η such that haη |= φ
µ |= 
^
a φ :iff there exists h such that lst(h)
a
−→ µ and δ(h) |= φ
µ |= P qp (φ) :iff p ≤ µ(JφK) ≤ q
µ |= iB
q
p(φ) :iff for every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every scheduler ζ for fst(h)
we have p ≤ pζ(↓JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q
µ |= lfpXφ(X) :iff µ ∈
⋂
{DX ⊆ Disc(exec
∗(M )) | ∀η ∈ Disc(exec∗(M ))
if η |= φ(X := DX)
then η |= DX}
µ |= DX :iff µ ∈ DX
P |= φ :iff δ(P ) |= φ
Table 4.1: Definition of satisfaction for the closed formulas in DµCEC. µ ∈
Disc(exec∗(M )), where exec∗(M ) is the set of finite histories generated by the prob-
abilistic automatonM underlying the CCSp semantics.
Definition 4.2.8. The relation |= on Disc(exec∗(M )) and on the closed formula of
DµCEC is defined according to the clauses in Table 4.1. In the table, J K is defined as
JφK
def
= {h | δ(h) |= φ}, while pζ represents the probability measure on etree(P, ζ)
(see section 2.2), and [h]≡i is the equivalence class of h with respect to ≡i. Finally, if
H is a set of executions, ↓H represents the maximal executions with prefix in H , i.e.
↓H
def
= {h ∈ ΩP |∃h
′ ∈ H s.t. h′ ≤ h}
In the definition of µ |= iB
q
p(φ), the idea is that the probability that the process
satisfies φ given any h′ indistinguishable from h in i’s view is between p and q. We
quantify over all possible schedulers because in general i does not know what is the
scheduler, except for the partial view it has on h.
The auxiliary “hybrid formulas” DX (“auxiliary” because they do not exist in the
syntax of the language, and “hybrid” because X represents a set of executions) are
introduced to define the semantics of lfpX .
The semantic correspondent of lfpXφ(X) (i.e. the set of distributions that sat-
isfy lfpXφ(X)) is the least fixed point of a transformation Tφ : 2
Disc(exec∗(M )) →
2Disc(exec
∗(M )) defined as follows:
Tφ(D)
def
= {µ | µ |= φ(X := D)}
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It can be proved that if X occurs positively in φ(X) then Tφ is monotonic on
the lattice (2Disc(exec
∗(M )),⊆) which, by the Theorem of Knaster-Tarski, implies the
existence of the least and greatest fixed points.
The core of the proof is Theorem 4.2.10 below.
Definition 4.2.9 (Monotonicity). For any formula φ in DµCEC, let {|φ|} denote the set
{µ | µ |= φ}. An n-ary operator op in DµCEC is monotonic. if for all φ1, φ2 . . . , φn,
ψ1, ψ2 . . . , ψn, we have that {|φ1|} ⊆ {|ψ1|}, {|φ2|} ⊆ {|ψ2|}, . . . , {|φn|} ⊆ {|ψn|} im-
plies {|op(φ1, φ2, . . . , φn)|} ⊆ {|op(ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn)|}. It is antimonotonic if for all
φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn, we have that {|φ1|} ⊆ {|ψ1|}, {|φ2|} ⊆ {|ψ2|}, . . . , {|φn|} ⊆
{|ψn|} implies {|op(ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn)|} ⊆ {|op(φ1, φ2, . . . , φn)|}.
Theorem 4.2.10. The operators ∧, a , 
^
a , P 1p , iB
1
p and lfpX are monotonic. The
operators ¬, P p0 and iB
p
0 are antimonotonic.
Proof. The proof proceeds by case analysis. We consider here only the operators that
are used in this paper, i.e. those which appear in the scope of a lfp or gfp operator
in Table 4.2. In the following, we assume {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, {|φ1|} ⊆ {|ψ1|}, and {|φ2|} ⊆
{|ψ2|}.
∧) Let µ |= φ1∧φ2. Then by definition µ |= φ1 and µ |= φ2. From the hypotheses
we have {|φi|} ⊆ {|ψi|}, i.e. (µ |= φi) ⇒ (µ |= ψi) for i ∈ {1, 2}, hence
µ |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
¬) Let µ |= ¬ψ. Then by definition µ 6|= ψ. From the hypotheses we have {|φ|} ⊆
{|ψ|}, i.e. (µ 6|= ψ)⇒ (µ 6|= φ), hence µ |= ¬φ.

a ) Let µ |= a φ. Then by definition for every h ∈ supp(µ) there exists η and
a transition lst(h)
a
−→ η such that haη |= φ. From the hypotheses we have
{|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, i.e. (haη |= φ)⇒ (haη |= ψ), hence µ |= a ψ.

^
a ) Let µ |= 
^
a φ. Then by definition for every h ∈ supp(µ) there exists h′ such
that lst(h′)
a
−→ µ and δ(h′) |= φ. From the hypotheses we have {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|},
i.e. (δ(h′) |= φ)⇒ (δ(h′) |= ψ), hence µ |= 
^
a ψ.
iB
1
p) Let µ |= iB
1
p(φ). Then, by definition, for every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every
scheduler ζ for fst(h) we have p ≤ pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ 1. From the hypothe-
ses we have {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, therefore pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ pζ(↓ JψK | ↓ [h]≡i).
Hence p ≤ pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ pζ(↓ JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ 1, and therefore
µ |= iB
1
p(ψ).
✷
Corollary 4.2.11. If X occurs positively in φ(X) then Tφ is monotonic on the lattice
(2Disc(exec
∗(M )),⊆).
Corollary 4.2.12. If X occurs positively in φ(X) then the set of fixed points of Tφ
forms a sublattice of (2Disc(exec
∗(M )),⊆). In particular, there exists a least and a
greatest fixed point.
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4.2.5 Relation with standard (KD45) belief
Following standard Kripke semantics (see e.g. [Eme90]), we can construct a Kripke
frame F , defined over Disc(exec∗(M )), the non-empty set of discrete distributions
with sample space exec∗(M ) (where exec∗(M ) is the set of finite histories generated
by the probabilistic automatonM underlying the CCSp semantics), and with accessi-
bility relation T , the transition relation ofM . Our goal in this section is to discuss the
relation of DµCEC with standardKD45 belief.
We recall that given a modal operator B and logical formulae φ, ψ in a Kripke
frame F = (W,R) over a setW and with accessibility relation R, the logic of belief
KD45 is the logic generated by the set of the four following axioms:
• AxiomK: B(φ→ ψ)→ (B(φ)→ B(ψ))
• Axiom D: B(φ)→ ¬B(¬φ)
This axiom states that one cannot believe a contradiction, and requires R to be
serial.
• Axiom 4: B(φ)→ BB(φ)
This axiom states that belief is positively introspective, and requires R to be
transitive.
• Axiom 5: ¬B(φ) → B(¬B(φ)) This axiom states that belief is negatively
introspective and requires R to be Euclidean.
Our operators iB
q
p and P
q
p satisfy probabilistic analogues of the axioms of standard
belief and truth, in the sense expressed by Theorems 4.2.13 and 4.2.15 below. In the
following, the operator → stands for Boolean (material) implication, see Table 4.2,
and |= φ means that µ |= φ holds for all µ.
Theorem 4.2.13. For any p, q, r, s ∈ [0, 1], any formulas φ, ψ in DµCEC, and any
agent i, the following hold.
K) |= iB
q
p(φ→ ψ)→ (iB
s
r(φ)→ iB
q
t (ψ)) where t = max{0, p+ r − 1}
D) |= iB
0
0(⊥) (“i does not believe false”)
4) |= iB
q
p(φ)→ iB
1
r(iB
q
p(φ))
5) |= ¬iB
q
p(φ)→ iB
1
r(¬iB
q
p(φ))
Proof. K) Assume µ |= iB
q
p(φ→ ψ) and µ |= iB
s
r(φ). Then, for every h ∈ supp(µ)
and for every scheduler ζ for fst(h) we have p ≤ pζ(↓ Jφ → ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q
and r ≤ pζ(↓JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ s. Observe now that:
pζ(↓Jφ→ ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) = pζ(↓J¬φK | ↓ [h]≡i) + pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i)
−pζ(↓J¬φ ∧ ψK | ↓ [h]≡i)
≤ pζ(↓J¬φK | ↓ [h]≡i) + pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i)
= (1− pζ(↓JφK | ↓ [h]≡i)) + pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i)
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Hence
pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≥ pζ(↓Jφ→ ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) + pζ(↓JφK | ↓ [h]≡i)− 1
≥ p+ r − 1
Hence pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≥ max{0, p+ r − 1}.
On the other side, observe that we have
q ≥ pζ(↓Jφ→ ψK | ↓ [h]≡i)
= pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) + pζ(↓J¬φK | ↓ [h]≡i)− pζ(↓J¬φ ∧ ψK | ↓ [h]≡i)
≥ pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i)
D) This statement follows immedialy from the observation that for every scheduler ζ
and every history h we have pζ(↓J⊥K | ↓ [h]≡i) = pζ(↓J⊥K) = 0.
4) Assume µ |= iB
q
p(φ). Then, for every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every scheduler ζ for
fst(h) we have p ≤ pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q. Hence, for every h ∈ supp(µ)
we have δ(h) |= iB
q
p(φ), from which we derive that,for every scheduler ζ for
fst(h), pζ(↓JiB
q
p(φ)K | ↓ [h]≡i) = 1 holds. Therefore µ |= iB
1
r(iB
q
p(φ)).
5) Similar to the proof of (4).
✷
For (4) and (5), when r = 1 the implication holds also in the other direction,
which means that belief can be “flattened” for certain probabilities, as shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.14. For every agent i and every formula φ, the following hold
1. |= iB
1
1(iB
q
p(φ))→ iB
q
p(φ)
2. |= iB
1
1(¬iB
q
p(φ))→ ¬iB
q
p(φ)
Proof. 1. Assume µ |= iB
1
1(iB
q
p(φ)). Then, for every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every
scheduler ζ for fst(h) we have pζ(↓ JiB
q
p(φ)K | ↓ [h]≡i) = 1. Hence, for every
h ∈ supp(µ) we have δ(h) |= iB
q
p(φ), from which we derive that, for every
scheduler ζ for fst(h), p ≤ pζ(↓ JiB
q
p(φ)K | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q holds. Therefore
µ |= iB
q
p(φ).
2. The proof is similar.
✷
For probabilistic truth we have the following
Theorem 4.2.15. For any p, q, r, s ∈ [0, 1], any formulas φ, ψ in DµCEC, and any
agent i, the following hold.
K) |= P qp (φ→ ψ)→ (P
s
r (φ)→ P
q
t (ψ)) where t = max{0, p+ r − 1}
D) |= P 00 (⊥)
4) |= P qp (φ)→ P
q
p (P
1
r (φ)) if r > 0
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5) |= ¬P qp (φ)→ P
q
p (¬P
r
0 (φ)) if r < 1
Proof. K) Similar to the proof of (K) in Theorem 4.2.13.
D) Similar to the proof of (D) in Theorem 4.2.13.
4) Assume µ |= P qp (φ). Then p ≤ µ(JφK) ≤ q. Observe that h ∈ JφK if and only if
δ(h)(JφK) = 1, or equivalently, for r > 0, r ≤ δ(h)(JφK) ≤ 1. By definition
this is equivalent to δ(h) |= P 1r (φ), which holds if and only if h ∈ JP
1
r (φ)K.
Therefore p ≤ µ(JP 1r (φ)K) ≤ q.
5) Similar to the proof of (4).
✷
For (4) and (5), the implication holds also in the other direction, meaning that also
the probabilistic truth can be “flattened” for certain probabilities.
Proposition 4.2.16. For every agent i and every formula φ, the following hold
1. |= P qp (P
1
r (φ))→ P
q
p (φ) if r > 0.
2. |= P qp (¬P
r
0 (φ))→ ¬P
q
p (φ) if r < 1.
Proof. 1. Assume µ |= P qp (P
1
r (φ)). Then p ≤ µ(JP
1
r (φ)K) ≤ q. Following the
same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.15 (4), we have that (for r > 0)
h ∈ JP 1r (φ)K if and only if h ∈ JφK. Therefore µ |= P
q
p (φ).
2. The proof is similar.
✷
Finally, we want to point out that the following formulas hold, meaning that our
belief operators behave well with respect to probability measures. The proof is imme-
diate.
Proposition 4.2.17. For every agent i and every formula φ, the following hold
• |= iB
q
p(φ)↔ iB
1−p
1−q(¬φ)
• |= P qp (φ)↔ P
1−p
1−q (¬φ)
We conclude this section by giving the definition of some derived operators in
DµCEC. They are illustrated in Table 4.2.
4.3 Application: Dining Cryptographers
In this section, we consider a variant of the Dining Cryptographers protocol which
is simpler than the version we presented in Chapter 3 in that we will restrict to n =
3 cryptographers and add explicitly the master, whose role is to choose the payer
(himself or one of the three cryptographers).
In order to specify formally the protocol, we use CCSp, the probabilistic version
of CCS presented in Section 2.3, with a standard notation for value-passing:
Input c(x) . P =
∑
v cv . P [v/x]
Output c〈v〉 = cv
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⊥
def
= ¬⊤ false
φ1 ∨ φ2
def
= ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2) Boolean disjunction
φ1 → φ2
def
= ¬φ1 ∨ φ2 Boolean (material) implication
a φ
def
= ¬ a ¬φ after every a-transitions φ holds
gfpXφ(X)
def
= ¬lfp¬φ(¬X) greatest fixed point of λX.φ(X).
The variableX is assumed to occur
positively in φ. Note that this im-
plies that also ¬X occurs positively
in ¬φ

a pφ
def
= a P
1
p (φ) there is an a-transition after which
φ holds with probability at least p

· φ
def
=
∨
a∈Act 
a φ there is a transition after which φ
holds

^
· φ
def
=
∨
a∈Act 
^
a φ there is a transition before which φ
holds
· φ
def
=
∧
a∈Act 
a φ after all transitions φ holds

a∗
def
= lfpX . a ⊤ ∨ · X it is possible to reach a state which
has an a-transition

^
a ∗
def
= lfpX . 
^
a ⊤ ∨ 
^
· X there has been an a-transition in the
past
·
∗φ
def
= lfpX .φ ∧· X φ holds now and at all points in all
the possible futures
ICB
1
pφ
def
= gfpX(
∧
i∈I iB
1
p(X ∧ φ)) φ is common belief among the
agents in I
Table 4.2: Some derived operators in DµCEC.
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Master
def
= (m0〈0〉 .m1〈0〉 .m2〈0〉)⊕p( ◦
∑
0
2 pim0+i〈1〉 .m1+i〈0〉 .m2+i〈0〉)
Crypt i
def
= ci,i(x0) . ci,i−1(x1) .mi(zi) . pay i〈zi〉 . out i〈x0 + x1 + zi〉
Coinh
def
= (ch,h〈0〉 . ch+1,h〈0〉)⊕ph(ch,h〈1〉 . ch+1,h〈1〉)
Collect
def
= out0(y0) . out1(y1) . out2(y2) . outall〈y0, y1, y2〉
DC
def
= (ν~c)(ν ~m)(ν ~out)(Master |
∏
i Crypt i |
∏
h Coinh | Collect)
Table 4.3: The dining cryptographers protocol formalized in CCSp (addition and sub-
straction in the indices is performed modulo 3).
The protocol can now be described as the parallel composition of the coin pro-
cesses Coinh, h ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the cryptographer processes Crypt i, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the
master process Master , and a process Collect whose purpose is again to avoid the
problem of the omniscient scheduler (see discussion in Paragraph 3.7).
The CCSp terms expressing the protocol are given in Table 4.3.In this representa-
tion, the secret actions are pay i〈zi〉, and the observable actions is outall〈y0, y1, y2〉.
The constants p and pi’s represent the probability that the master pays, and the prob-
ability that cryptographer i pays, respectively. Note that we have the constraint p +∑
i pi = 1.
In the following we model the property of strong anonymity with respect to ex-
ternal agents.1 We assume that, for every external agent i, the actions payj〈bj〉 and
payj′〈bj′〉 are indistinguishable for i, namely for each agent j, j
′ and bit bj , bj′
Vi(payj〈bj〉) = Vi(payj′〈bj′〉)
i.e. the view that i has of payj〈0〉 is the same as of payj〈1〉, payj′〈0〉 and payj′〈1〉.
Strong anonymity can be expressed by the following class of formulas, where p is
an arbitrary number in [0, 1], j stands for payj〈1〉 with j 6= i, and the conjunction is
taken over all external agents i:∧
i
·
∗(iB
p
p( 
^
j
∗)→ · ∗iB
p
p( 
^
j
∗)) (4.1)
Intuitively, this formula means that at every point of the execution, if Agent i at-
tributes probability p to j (i.e. to Cryptographer j being the payer), then at every point
in the future he will attribute to j the same probability. In other words, the observable
events of the protocol do not help the agent to refine his estimation of the probability
distribution on the secrets. This definition of strong anonymity corresponds to the one
given originally by Chaum [Cha88], requiring the a priori probability of a secret event
a to be equal to its a posteriori probability after an observation o, i.e. p(a|o) = p(a).
It is possible to show that, if the coins are fair, the program illustrated in Table 4.3
satisfies the formula 4.1.
Proposition 4.3.1.
DC |=
∧
i
·
∗(iB
p
p( 
^
j
∗)→ · ∗iB
p
p( 
^
j
∗))
1In order to model anonymity also with respect to internal agents we need quantification over proba-
bilities. This is left as future work.
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Proof. The proof proceeds by induction, by proving that, for every i, iB
p
p( 
^
j
∗) →
·
∗
iB
p
p( 
^
j
∗) is an invariant which holds at every step of the execution. ✷
The strong anonymity of the Dining Cryptographers with fair coins was also
proved in [BP05]. One major difference with respect to that work is that here we
use belief operators, which allows us to express the belief of a given agent. As a con-
sequence, we can distinguish between the belief of internal agents and external ones.
In [BP05] strong anonymity is expressed in terms of equality of the likelihoods of an
observable o, that is the conditional probabilities of o given different culprits a and a′,
i.e. p(o|a) = p(o|a′). However, the relation between agents and observables is not
formalized with this approach. An internal agent, for instance, observes more than an
external one because he can see also the results of the adjacent coins. This is not a
problem in the case of a complete ring where there is a direct link between all pairs
of cryptographers (i.e. a fully connected network), which is indeed the case in our ex-
ample. But if the ring were incomplete (i.e. missing at least one arc) then there would
be a difference between external and internal agents, in the sense that strong anony-
mity would only hold for external agents, not for internal ones. With the approach in
[BP05] we would not be able to express this difference formally. This is also related
to the fact that an approach based simply on probabilities cannot distinguish between
subjective uncertainty (belief) and objective uncertainty (truth), as already mentioned
in the introduction.
4.4 Application: Oblivious Transfer
An oblivious transfer is a protocol by which an initiator sends some information to a
responder, but remains oblivious (ignorant) as to what was recovered by the responder.
In this section, two variations of the oblivious transfer protocol are considered and
specified in DµCEC. For each of them, we give the expression of the agents’ post-
belief holding after the execution of the protocol, and we give a specification in CCSp
of an implementation for the second one.
4.4.1 Oblivious Transfer of one bit only
4.4.1.1 Description
The Oblivious-Transfer-of-one-bit-only protocol, OT b, was first described in [Kil88].
In this protocol, a single secret bit b is transferred between the initiator (e.g. Alice)
and the responder (e.g. Bob). At the end of the protocol, one of the following two
events will have occurred, each with a probability 12 :
1. the responder Bob learns the value of b, or
2. the responder Bob gains no information about the value of b.
In both cases, at the end of the protocol, Bob knows which of these two events has
occurred, while the initiator Alice learns nothing about that.
4.4.1.2 Specification
We express the communication between the agents with two actions s and r defined
as follows:
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s
def
= Send(Alice, b,Bob) : Alice sends bit b to Bob
r
def
= Receive(Bob, b) : Bob receives bit b
The OT b protocol can be specified as follows:
OT b
def
= s P
1/2
1/2 ( r
∗)
Intuitively, this formula means that after the bit was sent by Alice, there is a prob-
ability of 12 that Bob eventually receives it.
The post-belief of the agents after the execution of the protocol can be expressed
as:
PostBelief b
def
= · ∗(ρ(r, s))
where
ρ(α, β)
def
= AliceB
1/2
1/2 
^
α
∗ ∧ P
1/2
1/2 (BobK 
^
β
∗) (4.2)
and aKφ
def
= aB
1
1φ
This formula can be read as follows: Alice believes with degree of confidence 12
that Bob has received the bit (subjective probability), while, with probability 12 , Bob
knows the bit that Alice has sent (objective probability).
Note that the fact that Bob knows that a formula φ holds (BobKφ) is expressed as
the limit of belief, i.e. BobB
1
1φ.
4.4.2 The 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
4.4.2.1 Description
In the 1-out-of-2-Oblivious-Transfer protocol, OT 12 [Kil88], the initiator Alice sends
two secret strings u and v, of which the responder Bob receives exactly one. At the
end of the protocol, the following three states of affairs hold:
1. Bob learns one of the two strings,
2. Bob gains no information about the other string, and
3. Alice does not know which one of the two strings Bob knows.
(4.3)
4.4.2.2 Specification
In the following, with a slight abuse of notation we use the symbols u and v to rep-
resent the actions of sending the messages u and v respectively. Analogously we
represent by u and v the complementary actions of retrieving u and v.
We now express theOT 12 protocol and the agents’ post-beliefs in terms of DµCEC
formulae.
The first requirement is that, after Alice sends the two strings, there is a probability
1
2 that Bob retrieves u, and a probability
1
2 that Bob retrieves v:
OT 12
def
= u
∗

v
∗(P
1/2
1/2 (u) ∧ P
1/2
1/2 (v))
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Secondly, we require that, after the execution of the protocol, Alice believes with
degree of confidence 12 that Bob has received the message u and with degree of confi-
dence 12 that Bob has received the message v (subjective probability), while Bob with
probability 12 knows the message that Alice has sent (objective probability):
PostBelief 1
def
= · ∗(ρ(u, v) ∧ ρ(v, u))
where ρ(α, β) is defined in Equation 4.2.
Finally, we require that if Bob receives u, then he gains no further information
about v, and viceversa if he receives v, then he gains no further information about u.
This can be expressed with an invariant, like for the Dining Cryptographers:
PostBelief 2
def
= (∀p̺p(v, u)) ∧ (∀q̺q(u, v))
where
̺p(α, β)
def
= BobB
p
p( 
^
α
∗)→ (· ∗BobK( 
^
β
∗)→ BobB
p
p( 
^
α
∗))
4.4.2.3 Implementation of the OT 12 protocol using a public-key cryptosystem
We consider here the implementation of the oblivious transfer OT 12 described in
[EGL85]. In the following, M represents the message space and we assume that
all the random choices of messages or bits are made with a uniform probability.
Let ⊞,⊟ : M×M→M denote two binary operators which satisfy the follow-
ing:
1. For every x ∈M, the mapping y 7→ x⊞ y is a permutation onM.
2. For every y ∈M, the mapping x 7→ x⊞ y is a permutation onM.
3. For every x, y ∈M, (x⊞ y)⊟ y = x.
Furthermore, we assume that these operators are known by both agents. For in-
stance, when using RSA as public-key cryptosystem, x⊞ y can be defined as the
reduction modulo N (the RSA’s modulus) of x + y while x⊟ y can be defined as the
reduction modulo N of x− y.
In our process calculus, the OT 12 protocol can be specified as the parallel compo-
sition of the initiator process Init and of the responder process Resp. The initiator
Alice wants to send one of the two strings u and v. She starts the communication
by generating a public key/private key pair (e, d) and sending her public key along
with two random messages m0 and m1 to the responder Bob. Bob chooses a ran-
dom message m and a random bit r and sends back to Alice z = E(m, e)⊞mr,
where E(m, e) denotes the encryption of the messagem with the public key e . Simi-
larly, D(c, d) denotes the decryption of a string c with the private key d and we have
D(E(m, e), d) = m.
Alice (who does not know r) computes both e0 = z⊟m0 and e1 = z⊟m1.
Then, Alice decrypts with her private key d both e0 and e1, obtaining respectively d0
and d1. Only one of these two values, namely dr = D(E(m, e), d), is identical to the
initial message m. This however cannot be determined by Alice since she does not
know the value of r andm.
Alice chooses then a random bit s and transmits to Bob the tuple (u⊞ ds, v⊞ d1−s, s).
Depending on the choice of s, two independent situations may occur: either s = r, and
thus ds = dr = m and Bob can read u (by performing the operation (u⊞ ds)⊟m)
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Init
def
= ◦
∑
m0,m1
p out1〈e,m0,m1〉 . in(z) .
◦
∑
s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈u⊞D(z⊟ms, d), v⊞D(z⊟m1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Resp
def
= out1(e, x0, x1) . ◦
∑
r∈{0,1} 1/2 ◦
∑
m q in〈E(m, e)⊞xr〉 .
out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r ⊟m〉 . 0
POT 12
def
= ν(Init |Resp)
Table 4.4: Implementation of the protocol OT 12 in CCSp. The probabilities p and q
represent the uniform probabilities over the space of message pairs (m0,m1) and the
space of the messagesm, respectively.
without learning anything about v, or s = 1 − r and Bob can read v (by performing
the operation (v⊞ d1−s)⊟m) without learning anything about u. Both events have
equal probability to occur (due to the uniform probability on the random choice of
r and s), which ensures that the first and second intended properties of the protocol
(corresponding respectively to the first and second sentences in statements 4.3) are
satisfied.
Moreover, since Alice only gets the information z = E(m, e)⊞mr andm is ran-
domly chosen by Bob, z does not give Alice any information about r, which ensures
that the third intended property of the protocol (corresponding to the third sentence in
statements 4.3) is satisfied as well.
The protocol narration of OT 12 is as follows:
1. Alice
e,m0,m1
−−−−−→ Bob
2. Bob
E(m,e)⊞mr
−−−−−−−−→ Alice
3. Alice
u⊞ ds,v⊞ d1−s,s
−−−−−−−−−−−→ Bob
We describe POT 12, the implementation of the protocol OT
1
2 in CCSp in Table
4.4.
The unfolding of the CCSp terms representing the protocol OT
1
2 is illustrated in
Table 4.5.
4.4.2.4 Verification
In this section we show that our protocol satisfies OT 12, PostBelief 1 and
PostBelief 2.
The initial prefix in the formula for OT 12 specifies that eventually, the actions u
and v occur (i.e. the messages u and v are sent): POT
1(5,6)
2 |= OT
1
2, where the tuple
(5, 6) in the exponent represents the final state. This is indeed achieved in our protocol
by the (synchronous) action out2 performed in step POT
1(4,4)
2 . The remaining part
of the formula OT 12 is true if u and v are received each with a probability of exactly
one half, which holds as explained beforehand in the protocol description.
On the contrary to OT 12, the prefixes of PostBelief 1 and PostBelief 2 are used to
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Unfolding of the protocol OT 12. Initiator
Init0 := ◦
∑
m0,m1
p out1〈e,m0,m1〉 . in(z) .
◦
∑
s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈u⊞D(z⊟ms, d), v⊞D(z⊟m1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init1 := out1〈e,m0,m1〉 . in(z) .
◦
∑
s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈u⊞D(z⊟ms, d), v⊞D(z⊟m1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init2 := in(z) .
◦
∑
s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈u⊞D(z⊟ms, d), v⊞D(z⊟m1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init3 := ◦
∑
s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈u⊞D(z⊟ms, d), v⊞D(z⊟m1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init4 := out2〈u⊞D(z⊟ms, d), v⊞D(z⊟m1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init5 := 0
Responder
Resp0 := out1(e, x0, x1) . ◦
∑
r∈{0,1} 1/2 ◦
∑
m q in〈E(m, e)⊞xr〉 .
out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r ⊟m〉 . 0
Resp1 := ◦
∑
r∈{0,1} 1/2 ◦
∑
m q in〈E(m, e)⊞xr〉 .
out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r ⊟m〉 . 0
Resp2 := ◦
∑
m q in〈E(m, e)⊞xr〉 . out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r ⊟m〉 . 0
Resp3 := in〈E(m, e)⊞xr〉 . out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r ⊟m〉 . 0
Resp4 := out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r ⊟m〉 . 0
Resp5 := out〈ys+r ⊟m〉 . 0
Resp6 := 0
Protocol
POT
1(i,j)
2
def
= ν(Init i|Respj)
Unfolding:
POT
1(0,0)
2
m0,m1
−−−−→ POT
1(1,0)
2
τ(out1)
−−−−−→ POT
1(2,1)
2
r
−→ POT
1(2,2)
2
q
−→
POT
1(2,3)
2
τ(in)
−−−→ POT
1(3,4)
2
s
−→ POT
1(4,4)
2
τ(out2)
−−−−−→ POT
1(5,5)
2
out
−−→ POT
1(5,6)
2
Table 4.5: Unfolding of the protocol OT 12.
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describe invariant properties that have therefore to hold at every step of the protocol:
∀(i, j) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 4), (5, 5), (5, 6)}
POT
1(i,j)
2 |= PostBelief 1 ∧ PostBelief 2
The first part of PostBelief 1, namely AliceB
1/2
1/2( 
^
u∗) ∧ AliceB
1/2
1/2( 
^
v ∗) describes the
subjective knowledge of Alice and is the transcription of the third axiom in state-
ments 4.3, while the remaining of the formula specifies an objective knowledge of
Bob and corresponds to the first axiom in statements 4.3. Similarly, PostBelief 2 is
the transcription of the second axiom in statements 4.3. We already saw that these
axioms, and thus PostBelief 1 and PostBelief 2 hold at the end of the protocol. They
also hold at the beginning of the protocol. From the description of the protocol, one
can finally see that no step leads to a change of these beliefs. Therefore, PostBelief 1
and PostBelief 2 hold at each step of the protocol.
Note that for the sake of simplicity, several aspects of our description which were
not directly necessary for our purposes, such as the cryptographic primitives or the
fixpoint operators, have been left informal.
4.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we have achieved novel formalizations of probabilistic anonymity and
oblivious transfer in a new modal logic, namely the doxastic µ-calculus with error
control (DµCEC). Our formalizations can be validated on the protocol of the dining
cryptographers, and on the protocols of 1-bit and 1-out-of-2-strings oblivious transfer.
The intuitiveness of our formalizations is due, first, to our distinction between belief
and internalized probabilistic truth, but also to the dynamicity of these notions, and
finally to the introduction of lower and upper bounds (error control) therefore.
We have also shown that belief and internalized probabilistic truth satisfy a prob-
abilistic analogue of standard KD45-belief, and that these notions can be flattened on
certain, but different conditions.
As future work for DµCEC, we envisage the development of tool-support, its
axiomatization, and the introduction of cryptographic data types and restricted logical
quantification (over messages, including probability values).
Given the expressibility of oblivious transfer in DµCEC and the foundational
power of oblivious transfer for modern cryptography [Kil88], we also believe that
DµCEC can serve as a framework for comparing abstract cryptography based on
Dolev-Yao message-passing and concrete cryptography based on bit-string message-
passing, thus bringing a new approach to a problem that has received a lot of attention
recently, see for intance the work of [CRZ07].
Chapter 5
Other notions based on Bayesian risk
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we studied concepts from information theory that turned out
to be quite convenient in developing quantitative theories for security problems such
as secure information flow and anonymity. We considered in particular the notion
of noisy channel to model protocols for information-hiding, where the input and the
output of the channel represent respectively the information to be kept secret and the
observable visible to an adversary. The noise of the channel is generated by the efforts
of the protocol to hide the link between the secrets and the observable, often achieved
by using randomized mechanisms.
Correspondingly, as explained in the introduction of this thesis, there have been
various attempts to define the degree of leakage by using concepts based on Shannon
entropy, notably the mutual information [ZB05, CHM05b, Mal07, MC08] and the
related notion of capacity [MNS03, MNCM03, CPP08a].
In a recent work, however, Smith has shown that the concept of mutual information
is not very suitable for modeling the information leakage in the situation in which the
adversary attempts to guess the value of the secret in one single try [Smi07]. He
shows an example of two programs in which the mutual information is about the
same, but the probability of making the right guess, after having observed the output,
is much higher in one program than in the other. In a subsequent paper [Smi09], Smith
proposes to use a notion based on Re´nyi min-entropy.
The programs used by Smith in [Smi07] to motivate his new measure of leakage
are the programs P1 and P2 given on Figure 5.1. The secret h is a uniformly dis-
tributed 8k-bit integer with range 0 ≤ h < 28k and k ≥ 2. Initially, nothing is known
about the 8k-bit integer h, thus its Shannon entropy isH(h) = 8k. Note that since the
programs are deterministic,H(l|h) = 0 and therefore the mutual information between
the input and output is given by:
I(h; l) = H(h)−H(h|l) = H(l)−H(l|h) = H(l) (5.1)
Program P1 leaks the secret h entirely for 1/8 of the values of h (i.e. whenever h
is a multiple of 8), and leaks almost nothing otherwise (it only leaks the fact that h is
not a multiple of 8). In the definition domain of h, there are 28k−3 multiples of 8, i.e.
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PROGRAM P1
1 if h mod 8 = 0
2 then l := h
3 else l := 1
PROGRAM P2
1 l := h & 07k−11k+1
Figure 5.1: When mutual information is a bad measure of leakage (example from
[Smi07])
of the form h = 8n with 0 ≤ n < 28k−3 so the Shannon entropy of l is:
H(l) = −p(l = 1) log p(l = 1)− 28k−3p(l = h) log p(l = h)
= − 78 log
7
8 − 2
8k−3 1
28k
log 1
28k
≈ 0.169 + k
(5.2)
Program P2 always leaks the last k + 1 bits of h, so H(l) = k + 1.
Smith pointed out that the traditional entropy-based notion of leakage, which iden-
tifies the mutual information I(h; l) with information leakage, fails here to provide
a satisfactory notion of information leakage. According to Equation 5.1, we have
namely I(h; l) ≈ k + 0.169 for P1 and I(h; l) = k + 1 for P2, which means that
both programs leak about the same amount of information. More precisely, P2 leaks
slightly more information than P1, meaning that P1 is safer in terms of anonymity
than P2 with respect to this measure of leakage.
However, the probability for an attacker to guess h correctly in one try (i.e. the
vulnerability of h [Smi07]) is about 1/8 with P1, whereas with P2 her probability of
success is only 1/27k−1. So if we consider the worst case scenario (i.e. the adversary
guesses h in one try), the program P2 appears actually much safer than P1, which
contradicts the result based on Shannon entropy.
Smith proposed therefore to use the aforementioned vulnerability as a measure of
leakage, in order to capture effectively the intuitive notion of leakage highlighted in
the example. More precisely, he uses min-entropy H∞(h) = − log V (h) instead of
Shannon entropy and defines information leakage as the corresponding mutual infor-
mation I∞(h; l) = H∞(h)−H∞(h|l) whereH∞(h|l) is the conditional min-entropy
as defined in Equation 2.2.
For P1 (resp. P2), this measure gives a leakage of log(28k−3+1) ≈ 8k−3 (resp.
k + 1), so P2 appears now much safer than P1, reflecting correctly our intuitive
expectation.
Smith however noted that if we increase the amount of bits copied from h to l in
P2, so that only the three last bits of the input remain unknown, then the vulnerability
of P2 is equal to the vulnerability of P1 (1/23 = 1/8), although the nature of the
threats are very different in the two programs: P2 gives a systematic leakage (of
8k − 3 bits) but never leaks h entirely, while P1 leaks either everything of h (with
probability 1/8) or nothing (with probability 7/8).
We look at the problem from the point of view of the probability of error, and we
propose to formalize the notion of leakage as the “difference” between the probability
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of error a priori (before observing the output) and a posteriori (using the output to
infer the input via the MAP rule described in Section 3.1). We argue that there are
at least two natural ways of defining this difference: one, that we call multiplicative,
corresponds to Smith’s proposal. The other, which we call additive, is new.
In both cases, we show that it is possible to find the suprema, which is nice in that
it allows us to consider the maximum leakage (i.e. the minimal level of security) with
respect to our additive and multiplicative notions of leakage. However, Smith proved
that the supremum of additive leakage is NP-complete (see the proof in the full version
of the TACAS 2010 paper [AAP]), which means that the search for the supremum,
while possible, may not be efficient. The maximum leakage is also interesting because
it abstracts from the input distribution, which is usually unknown, or (in the case of
anonymity) may depend on the set of users.
5.2 Mutual Information and Capacity
The examples given by Smith in [Smi09] and mentioned previously are deterministic,
i.e. have the property that the input determines univocally the output. For such sys-
tems, it turns out that the issue observed for the mutual information (namely that two
programs with different vulnerabilities have the same mutual information) does not
arise in the case of the capacity. Surprisingly, indeed, Smith showed in [Smi09] that
the Shannon capacity coincides with the “min-entropy capacity”, i.e., the maximum
(with respect to all input distributions) of the logarithm of the ratio between the a
posteriori probability of making a right guess and the a priori one. Therefore, the dif-
ference of vulnerabilities between two programs (measured as the difference between
their min-entropy capacities), will be systematically reflected in a difference between
their Shannon capacities. We will come back on this point in the next section.
Unfortunately, this coincidence does not carry out to the more general case of
probabilistic channels, and, worse yet, the notion of capacity suffers (in the general
case) from the same problem as the mutual information. The following example illus-
trates the situation.
Example 5.2.1. Consider the following channels:
y1 y2 y3
x1 2/3 1/6 1/6
x2 1/6 2/3 1/6
x3 1/6 1/6 2/3
Figure 5.2: Channel matrix A
Since A and B are symmetric channels, their capacities can be easily calculated
using the formula [CPP08a]:
C = log |O| −H(~r)
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y1 y2 y3
x1 2/3 1/3 0
x2 0 2/3 1/3
x3 1/3 0 2/3
Figure 5.3: Channel matrix B
where |O| is the cardinality of the observables andH(~r) is the entropy of a row of the
matrix.
We have therefore
C(A) = log 3− (
2
3
log
3
2
+
1
6
log 6 +
1
6
log 6) =
1
3
and
C(B) = log 3− (
2
3
log
3
2
+
1
3
log 3) =
2
3
However, under the uniform input distribution, the ratioR between the a posteriori
and the a priori probability of making the right guess (see Section 5.3) is the same for
both channels:
R(A) = R(B) =
∑
j maxi p(yj |xi)p(xi)
maxi p(xi)
=
∑
j
max
i
p(yj |xi) = 3
2
3
= 2
Therefore the capacity does not seem to correctly capture the notion of leakage for
nondeterministic systems.
5.3 Towards a more suitable notion of leakage
In the following, we are interested in quantifying the leakage of a security protocol,
i.e. the amount of information about the input that an adversary can learn by running
the protocol and observing the resulting output.
5.3.1 Probabilities of a right guess
Before running the protocol, the probability that a given input xi occurs depends only
on the a priori distribution ~π, and a rational adversary will therefore assume that the
most probable input, called the a priori probability of a right guess PRi(~π), will be
the input having the maximum a priori probability, i.e.:
Definition 5.3.1. The a priori probability of a right guess is defined as
PRi(~π) = maxi πi
After running the protocol and seeing the output, the adversary may revise his
guess. An adversary applying the MAP rule, when observing output yj , will choose
as most probable input xi the one for which the a posteriori probability p(xi|yj) is
the highest. The average of this value on all possible outputs gives the a posteriori
probability of a right guess PRo(~π), which is the complement of the Bayes risk.
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Definition 5.3.2. The a posteriori probability of a right guess is defined as
PRo(~π) =
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)πi)
In the rest of this chapter, we will consider only adversaries applying the MAP rule
since this is the rule that gives the best result from the point of view of the adversary
(see Section 3.1 for more details).
5.3.2 Leakage and uncertainty
Intuitively, the leakage is the amount of information learnt by the adversary by ob-
serving the output of the protocol. Following [Smi09], it seems natural to define it
as the difference between the uncertainty about the input before observing the output,
and the remaining uncertainty afterwards:
Information Leaked = Initial Uncertainty− Remaining Uncertainty (5.3)
Now, the question is how to measure information, and (correspondingly) what do
we actually mean by uncertainty. We consider here two possibilities. The first leads to
a multiplicative notion of leakage, and it follows the proposal of Smith [Smi09]. The
second leads to an additive notion, and it is new.
5.3.3 Multiplicative leakage
In relation to Equation (5.3), Smith [Smi09] measures the information in bits, and
proposes to define the initial uncertainty as the min-entropy of X , H∞(X), the in-
stance of Re´nyi entropy [Re´n60] obtained for α = ∞ (see Paragraph 2.4). As for the
remaining uncertainty, it would be natural to use the conditional min-entropy of X
given Y . Unfortunately, as explained in Section 2.4, there is no agreement on what
Re´nyi’s generalization of Shannon’s conditional entropy should be, even though there
seem to be a consensus towards
∑
y p(y)Hα(X|Y = y) [Cac97]. Smith however
proposes to use the definition ofH∞(X|Y ) equivalent to the one given in [DORS08],
which is
H∞(X|Y ) = − logPRo(~π)
In this way, Smith obtains a definition of leakage similar to the definition of mutual
information, except that Shannon entropy is replaced by H∞:
L(X;Y ) = H∞(X)−H∞(X|Y ) = log
PRo(~π)
PRi(~π)
We consider a similar definition for leakage, namely the ratio between PRo(~π)
and PRi(~π), which coincides with Smith’s notion apart from the absence of the loga-
rithm. Furthermore, in general we want to abstract from the a priori distribution, and
consider the worst case, hence we are particularly interested in the supremum of such
ratio.
Definition 5.3.3. We define the multiplicative leakage as
L×(~π) =
PRo(~π)
PRi(~π)
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Note that PRi(~π) > 0 for every ~π, hence L×(~π) is always defined.
We will also use the notationML× to represent the supremum of this quantity:
ML× = max
~π
(L×(~π))
5.3.4 Additive leakage
Another possible interpretation for Equation (5.3) is to consider the uncertainty as
the probability of guessing the wrong input. The leakage then expresses how much
the knowledge of the observable helps decreasing such probability. This leads to
define the leakage as the difference between the probabilities of error before and after
observing the output. As usual, we are particularly interested in the supremum of this
difference.
Definition 5.3.4. We define the additive leakage as
L+(~π) = PRo(~π)− PRi(~π)
We will also use the notationML+ to represent the supremum of this quantity:
ML+ = max
~π
(L+(~π))
Proposition 5.3.5.
∀~π,L+(~π) ≥ 0
Proof
L+(~π) = PRo(~π)− PRi(~π)
=
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)πi)−maxi πi
≥
∑
j p(yj |xim)πim − πim where πim = maxi πi
=
∑
j p(yj ∧ xim)− πim
= πim − πim
= 0
✷
5.4 Properties of the mutiplicative leakage
In this section we consider the multiplicative leakage and we study its supremum. It
turns out that the supremum is very easy to compute. In fact, it coincides with the
value of the leakage in the point of uniform distribution, and it is equal to the sum
of the maxima of the columns of the channel matrix corresponding to the protocol.
This property was also discovered independently by Geoffrey Smith and ZiyuanMeng
(personal communication).
Proposition 5.4.1.
ML× = L×( ~πu) =
∑
j
max
i
p(yj |xi)
where ~πu is the uniform distribution.
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Proof
L×(π1, . . . , πn) =
1
maxi πi
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)πi)
≤ 1maxi πi
∑
j maxi p(yj |xi)(maxi πi)
=
∑
j maxi p(yj |xi)
= n
∑
j maxi(p(yj |xi)
1
n )
= L×(
1
n , . . . ,
1
n )
Since this inequality holds for all input distributions (π1, . . . , πn), the leakage in the
point of uniform distribution is the supremum of the multiplicative leakage (but other
distributions may realize this supremum too).
✷
5.5 Properties of the additive leakage
We turn now our attention to the additive leakage. We will see that the supremum is
not always in the point of uniform distribution. However, we prove that it is in one of
the corner points of PRi. Since PRi has a finite set of corner points, and their form
is known, also the additive leakage is relatively easy to compute.
First we prove a general property concerning the relation between suprema, con-
vexity, and corner points:
Proposition 5.5.1. Consider two functions f, g : D(n) → R and suppose f has a set
of corner points U , and g is convex. Define h : D(n) → R as h = f + g. If h has a
maximum over U , then it has the same maximum over D(n).
Proof
Let ~u ∈ U be such that h(~u) is maximum over U and let ~w ∈ D(n) be arbitrary.
Since ~w ∈ D(n), there are elements ~v1, ~v2, . . . , ~vk in U and c1, c2, . . . , ck in R with∑
i ci = 1 such that ~w =
∑
i ci~vi and f(~w) =
∑
i cif(~vi). Then
h(~w) = f(~w) + g(~w)
= f(
∑
i ci~vi) + g(
∑
i ci~vi)
=
∑
i cif(~vi) + g(
∑
i ci~vi)
≤
∑
i cif(~vi) +
∑
i cig(~vi) since g is convex
=
∑
i cih(~vi)
≤
∑
i cih(~u)
= h(~u) since
∑
ci = 1
✷
An example of Proposition 5.5.1 is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
We now show that −PRi and PRo satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 5.5.1.
The necessary property for −PRi comes from a result in [CPP08b].
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Figure 5.4: An illustration of Proposition 5.5.1
Proposition 5.5.2 ([CPP08b], Proposition 3.9). The functionPRi onD
(n) is convexly
generated by (U, f(U)) with U = U1 ∪U2 ∪ . . .∪Un where, for each r, Ur is the set
of all vectors that have value 1/r in exactly r components, and 0 everywhere else.
Remark 5.5.3. The cardinality |U | of the set U is 2n − 1:
|U | =
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
=
∑n
i=0
(
n
i
)
− 1
= (1 + 1)n − 1 (Binoˆme de Newton)
= 2n − 1
Remark 5.5.4. The function −PRi has the same corner points as PRi.
We now prove that PRo satisfies the necessary property.
Proposition 5.5.5. PRo is convex.
Proof
Let ~z be the convex combination
∑
i λi ~zi where the dimension of ~z, ~z1, . . . , ~zm cor-
responds to the number of input variables and ~z1, . . . , ~zm is a set of corner points.
The jth component zkj of any corner point ~zk corresponds to the input variable xkj
chosen according to the MAP rule when the output variable yj is obtained.
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PRo(
∑
i λi ~zi) =
∑
j maxk{p(yj |xk)(
∑
i λi ~zi)k}
=
∑
j p(yj |xkj )(
∑
i λi ~zi)kj
=
∑
j p(yj |xkj )(
∑
i λi zi,kj )
=
∑
j
∑
i λip(yj |xkj )zi,kj
=
∑
i λi
∑
j p(yj |xkj )zi,kj
≤
∑
i λi
∑
j maxk p(yj |xk)zi,k
=
∑
i λiPRo(~zi)
✷
Corollary 5.5.6. ML+ is reached on one of the corner points of PRi.
Proof
Since−PRi has a finite set of corner points U and PRo is convex, L+ = PRo−PRi
has a maximum ML+ over U and Proposition 5.5.1 shows that this maximum is
reached on a corner point of −PRi, which correspond to the corner points of PRi.
✷
Remark 5.5.7. In generalML+ is not reached on the point of uniform distribution.
Example 5.5.8. Consider the channel whose matrix is given in Figure 5.5.
y1 y2 y3
x1 1 0 0
x2 0 1− e e
x3 0 1− 2e 2e
Figure 5.5: Channel matrix (e ∈ [0, 1/2])
The calculation of L+ on the distributions corresponding to the corner points
gives:
Corner points PRo PRi L+
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) 1 1 0
(1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2) 1 1/2 1/2
(0, 1/2, 1/2) (e+ 1)/2 1/2 e/2
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (e+ 2)/3 1/3 (e+ 1)/3
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We have for every e ∈ [0, 1/2[,
0 = L+(1, 0, 0) ≤ L+(0, 1/2, 1/2) < L+(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) < L+(1/2, 1/2, 0) = 1/2
and L+(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) = L+(1/2, 1/2, 0) = 1/2 for e = 1/2. Therefore if e < 1/2,
ML+ = 1/2, reached on distributions that are different from the uniform distribution
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Moreover, this remark holds also for symmetric matrices:
Remark 5.5.9. Even in case of symmetric matrices, in generalML+ is not reached
on the point of uniform distribution.
Example 5.5.10. Consider the channel whose matrix is given in Figure 5.6.
y1 y2 y3 . . . y10 y11
x1 0 1/10 1/10 . . . 1/10 1/10
x2 1/10 0 1/10 . . . 1/10 1/10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
x10 1/10 1/10 1/10 . . . 0 1/10
x11 1/10 1/10 1/10 . . . 1/10 0
Figure 5.6:
Let ~π = (1/r, 1/r, . . . , 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) be the a priori distribution with an equal
probability of 1/r for the r first inputs (r ≥ 2). This distribution is a corner point of
the matrix, and since the matrix is symmetric, any other corner point corresponding to
a distribution containing r non-null probabilities of 1/r will give the same results for
PRi, PRo and L+.
PRi(~π) = 1/r
PRo(~π) =
∑
1,...,11(1/r)(1/10)
= 11/(10r)
L+(~π) = PRo(~π)− PRi(~π)
= 1/(10r)
ThereforeML+ is reached when r has the smallest value, i.e. when r = 2. This
corresponds to the distribution (1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) and gives ML+ = 1/20, while
L+(1/11, . . . , 1/11) = 1/110.
5.6 Comparison
In this section, we compare the two notions of leakage. We first compare them with
respect to a specific distribution, and then we consider the comparison of their worst
cases.
5.6. COMPARISON 93
5.6.1 Comparison on a specific input distribution
If we consider a specific distribution, it comes out that the two notions are equivalent,
in the sense that a program is better with respect to the additive notion if and only if it
is better with respect to the multiplicative notion.
From Definitions 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, we can derive a direct relation between the ad-
ditive and multiplicative leakages at a specific input distribution ~π:
L+(~π) = PRi(~π)(L×(~π)− 1) (5.4)
Proposition 5.6.1. Consider two programs P and P ′, and let L+ and L+
′ be the
additive measures of leakage for P and P ′, respectively. Analogously, let L× and
L×
′ be the multiplicative measures of leakage for P and P ′, respectively. We have
that, for every ~π
L+(~π) ≤ L+
′(~π) ⇔ L×(~π) ≤ L×
′(~π)
Proof
Obvious from Relation 5.4 and from the fact that for all ~π, PRi(~π) is positive. ✷
5.6.2 Comparison of the worst cases
Another criterion of comparison is the worst case. Let us consider first two examples.
Example 5.6.2. Let us consider a 2k × 2k channel with the 2k first natural numbers
as inputs and outputs, i.e. X = Y = {0, . . . , 2k − 1}. Consider a random input
variable X with values ranging in {0, 2k − 1}.
Consider the following program:
PROGRAM P(X)
1 ✄ Input X
2 if X = 0 or X = 1
3 then Output X
4 else Output one of the values {2, . . . , 2k − 1} chosen randomly
according to the uniform distribution
This program corresponds to a channel whose matrix is given in Figure 5.7.
Let us consider first ML+. Because of Corollary 5.5.6, we know that ML+ is
reached on a corner point, i.e. a distribution of the form (q1, . . . , q2k) where each qi
is either 0 or 1/r, and there are r elements with value 1/r in the distribution.
For every corner point ~π we have PRi(~π) = 1/r, thus maximizing L+ for a
given r is equivalent to maximizing PRo. From the channel matrix, one can see that
the maximum value of PRo is reached on an input distribution where the two first
elements are as high as possible.
Therefore, we can restrict our study to distributions of the form (1/r, . . . , 1/r, 0 . . . , 0),
i.e. distributions where the elements with value 1/r are the r first elements.
For r = 1, we have:
PRi(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
PRo(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
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0 1 2 . . . 2k − 1
0 1 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 0 . . . 0
2 0 0 p . . . p
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2k − 1 0 0 p . . . p
Figure 5.7: Channel matrix (p = 1/(2k − 2))
Thus:
L+(1, 0 . . . , 0) = 0
L×(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
For r = 2, we have:
PRi(1/2, 1/2, 0 . . . , 0) = 1/2
PRo(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) = 1
Thus:
L+(1/2, 1/2, 0 . . . , 0) = 1/2
L×(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) = 2
For r ≥ 3, we have:
PRi(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 1/r
PRo(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 1/r + 1/r + (2
k − 2)(1/r)p
= 3/r
Thus:
L×(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 3
L+(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 2/r
We observe that for r ≥ 3, the value of L+ decreases when r increases. Since
L+(1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, . . . , 0) = 2/3 > L+(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0)
= 1/2 > L+(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0
we haveML+ = 2/3 reached for r = 3.
In particular,ML+ > L+(1/2
k, . . . , 1/2k) = 1/2k−1 for all k > 1.
Concerning L×, we have that, for r ≥ 3, L×(1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) = 3 >
L×(1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0) = 2 > L×(1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1, thus ML× = 3, reached on
any distribution (1/r, 1/r, 1/r, 0, . . . , 0) with r ≥ 3, and in particular on the uniform
distribution, which confirms Proposition 5.4.1.
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Example 5.6.3. Let us consider the following program:
PROGRAM P′(X)
1 ✄ Input X
2 with probability 3/2k Output X
3 with probability 1− 3/2k Output a value in {0, 2k − 1}\{X} chosen randomly
according to the uniform distribution
This program corresponds to a channel whose matrix is given in Figure 5.8.
0 1 2 . . . 2k − 1
0 p1 p2 p2 . . . p2
1 p2 p1 p2 . . . p2
2 p2 p2 p1 . . . p2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2k − 1 p2 p2 p2 . . . p1
Figure 5.8: Channel matrix (p1 = 3/2
k and p2 = (1− (3/2
k))/(2k − 1))
The symmetry of the matrix implies that we can restrict the study to the a priori
distribution ~π = (1/r, 1/r, . . . , 1/r, 0, . . . , 0), where the r elements with value 1/r
are the first elements in the distribution.
In this case, for r ≥ 1:
PRi(~π) = 1/r
PRo(~π) = r(p1/r) + (2
k − r)(p2/r)
= p1 + [(2
k/r)− 1]p2
Finally:
L+
′(~π) = p1 − p2 −
2
r(2k−1)
Thus L+
′ increases when r increases, and ML+
′ = 1/2k−1 is reached for r = 2k
(on the uniform distribution).
L×
′(~π) = rp1 + (2
k − r)p2
= r(p1 − p2) + 2
kp2
Since p1 > p2, L×
′ increases when r increases, and thusML×
′ = 3 is obtained
for r = 2k (on the uniform distribution, which confirms Proposition 5.4.1).
The programs P and P ′ have therefore the same maximum multiplicative leakage
ML× = ML×
′ = 3, but the maximum additive leakage is equal to 2/3 for P and
equal to 1/2k−1 for P ′.
The limitation of the multiplicative leakage highlighted with the previous exam-
ples is due to the fact that two different channel matrices lead to the same value of
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ML× (reached for both protocols in the uniform input distribution) as soon as the
sums of the maxima of their columns are the same. This can happen for two matrices
with very different shapes, as highlighted with the previous examples. These differ-
ences may be further interpreted as differences in the levels of anonymity of both
protocols, which would then not be appropriately captured byML×. In such cases,
ML+ may be more discriminative thanML× and allow to distinguish between the
two levels of anonymity, as was the case in the two previous examples.
We would like to investigate in the future whether this property holds in general, or
if we can find also for the additive leakage two programs with the same value ofML+
(and same value ofML×) but obvious differences in their degrees of anonymity.
Finally, we can also notice that in some casesML× andML+ may even give op-
posite results, as illustrated in the previous example by taking p1 = 4/2
k = 1/2k−2
and p2 = (1− (1/2
k−2))/(2k − 1) for the probabilities in the channel matrix of Pro-
gram P ′ (given in Figure 5.8). In this case, we obtain for the maximum multiplicative
leakage:
ML×
′ = 4 > 3 = ML×
and for the maximum additive leakage:
ML+
′ = 3.2
k−1−1
2k−1(2k−1)
< 23 = ML+
for all k ≥ 3, which shows even more clearly the non-equivalence of the two different
measures of leakage.
5.7 Conclusion
We have considered two notions of leakage related to the Bayes risk. One of them,
which we call multiplicative, corresponds to the notion recently proposed by Smith
based on Renyi min-entropy. The other, which we call additive, is new. We have
shown that the two notions are equivalent in all distributions. If we consider the dis-
tributions that give the worst case for the leakage, however, then the two notions are
different. In particular, the multiplicative one has the worst case always in correspon-
dence of the uniform distribution, while this is not the case for the additive one. So
we can consider the new notion as a criterion, in addition to the one of Smith, to help
assessing the degree of protection offered by a protocol or a program.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we considered different approaches for quantifying information hiding
in communication protocols. First, we investigated a process-calculus approach and
used a probabilistic extension of the language CCS to specify protocols and study
their compositional safety, i.e. how constructs of the language may (or may not) be
composed while preserving the security guarantees of the protocol. We showed that
some of the constructs, such as secret choice or unrestricted parallel composition,
do not preserve safety and that this property mainly comes from the unconstrained
scheduler we used and whose behaviour may leak some information to the adversary.
Using process calculus was a rather natural approach to reason in the first hand on
our information-hiding systems, whose behaviour can be modeled very conveniently
as probabilistic automata. However, this formalism was unable to capture useful dy-
namic and temporal properties as well as subtle variations in the belief of agents using
the communication protocols under concern. This motivated the use of modal logic
which has a long history of successful applications in the field of verification of se-
curity properties in computer programs. For our purpose we specified a new logic
which, as opposed to the existing ones, does combine both dynamicity of belief and
error control. We were then able to express with accuracy e.g. how much an agent
believes in a certain fact or a given property holds.
These two approaches provided us with a complementary, dual strategy to analyze
the security of information-hiding protocols such as information flow or anonymity
systems. We have been able to quantify efficiently the vulnerability of communication
protocols by using the Bayes risk of a potential adversary. We investigated further this
approach in Chapter 5 of this thesis, following a recent work of Smith [Smi09], by
comparing two different ways of measuring the difference between the a posteriori
and the a priori vulnerability of a protocol, interpreted as its degree of security. These
two methods (multiplicative and additive) actually proved to be complementary and
thus useful to evaluate the vulnerability of a wider spectrum of security protocols.
In order to illustrate our results, we used as running example the well-known ano-
nymity protocol of the Dining Cryptographers and we believe that our results may
already contribute to assess effectively the security of various information-hiding sys-
tems in use today.
We already outlined in each chapter several open questions that may be worth
considering. In addition to these, we would be interested in the future in implemet-
ing a probabilistic model checker able to automatically evaluate the security of var-
ious information-hiding systems. This idea was already investigated by Norman,
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Palamidessi, Parker and Wu, who presented an implementation of model checking for
probabilistic and stochastic extensions of the π−calculus [NPPW09]. The resulting
compiler was actually split into two parts: translation from probabilistic π−calculus
to the Probabilistic Symbolic Transition Graph (PSTG) and traduction from PSTG to
PRISM. While the first part has already been achieved [MMC], the second step has
not been completed yet, which significantly limits the applicability of the tool in its
present form. We would like therefore to pursue the implementation of this automatic
checker, and possibly add features related to our results, such as the quantification of
the security guaranteed by the protocols given as input to the checker.
Another possible future line of research is the extension of our framework to quan-
tum anonymity protocols, which were recently proposed in the context of quantum
information theory, the generalization of information theory to the quantum world
[CW05, HZBB05, VSC07]. These papers demonstrate that quantum information pro-
cessing provides resources allowing anonymous communication of classical data with
security features not achievable by classical cryptography. In particular, most of the
quantum anonymity protocols rely on the existence of an entangled state shared be-
tween the participants, i.e. a global state identical to all of them but which may be
modified locally by the sender depending e.g. on the value of the message which
has to be anonymously transmitted. Devetak defined in 2003 the notion of private
classical capacity of a quantum channel to quantify the amount of (classical) secret
information that could be reliably transmitted over a quantum channel [Dev03]. In
the same line of research, the security of the communication of quantum informa-
tion (i.e. where messages are qubits rather than classical bits) was also investigated
and it was shown that an information-theoretically secure anonymous transmission
could be achieved [BBF+07]. We would be particularly interested in following these
approaches to extend our results to the quantum world, by e.g. studying whether
the use of a quantum channel may increase the safety (as defined in Section 3.5) of
information-hiding protocols for classical data. Additionally, we would also like to
consider the transmission of quantum information and study strategies for quantifying
this communication.
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